THE NEXT WAR IN EUROPE.

Mount Ida Chronicle, Volume VI, Issue 350, 19 November 1875, Page 3

THE NEXT WAR IN EUROPE.

Hie criticiam3 s on the reorganization of the French army which appiacd'in a - recent J&fwpodvs "*■ have been virtually' unanswered.' Errors °.f ~:h !fve" beejK^oirectMJ here and there, and much indignation has been ex/ pressed at the; piesttmptidh' of v au anonymous foreigner in censuring the French War Offitie. IJutrn'orie of^the^important statements have been, disproved or even shaken, long as the 6are"of the' army is left in the hands-to- tf'hieh it'is at pres/ ent Committed, reSun%diu»n of France as a . jji'ejit. military • Po.iver mjjst-..be considered: j as indefinitely postponed. " France," says Colonel Chesney in his recent article ! .cm-j-the-: of. Germany, •''lias not under armi-three-fourths of the peace ;eshiblishmesj f pit-;^eriWjy > like' neighbor. It is only within the last month that her War-Office'has taken the first; step towards training even the first in-/ stalment ot the future reserve" that is to' fill it/up to'a field army." ";'/ ; . '/ Her territoral arrhy exists solely on paper.Her armament is incomplete/' Her sup-, ply of stores is utterly inadequate to the.; exigencies of a.great campaign*."""ln short, i if forced ihti> the struggle' now",* she would' undoubtedly enter it under far.less favor-; able conditioiis than those of 1870."

All. these facts being known at Berlin, how are we to account for the alarm at the military preparations of France professedly felt there in'the spring? Co-' loriel Chesnfey suggests a very natural ex -' planation. It was not,, as some writers in this country wished to make out, a purer ly military panic; On the .-rcontrary, no one so,.well.as the military ..authorities hovv* little Immediate military reason there \yas for.it. Yet at the same time the alarm %as perfectlygenuine, and in a sense perfectly well founded. But it was an alarm shared to the full by Germari statesmen, and thoughthe- action prompted by it threatened to have France object, alarm itself, wag.not caused by-France.. '"France the'possioleally of Germany's new antagonist, not Franc* ; the skilful mixture, of hectoring with: pretended fear which deceived not. only'other nations but .1 he:: sober iminded ' Germans themselves."- The ! " :: tievv ' • antagonist-" of course is .Russia,.-and; the apparently" fel<^ 7; alliahc# t ' > wh*itf : h ■ 'for the' ; preseiit- ;unue§q tlie,' .two * empires, " the great war [are buisjly a&tir " in . " avovv it to >be r their next /duty ; t.o <the"- : Fathe'riand" ta Ichlstise the Mug&iyite -pijide."The hett er class of , R ussiat is*" never- cease; to ■: declare their - conviction, "that the new Empire will sooner■ or later-fasten arqimrrel on the old "•■. it us-. : si a; deprived bv steam and telegraph of the' defensive strength which she formerly derived from the vastness of lier territory, " wo if Id-, be . aft almost certain prey toGerman attack ;" .and, as-^a -matter of course, Russia does not mean to. remain in this, defenceless state. When her- new military law has "jcome inty.full operation, " the field army wilf consist of two. millions of effective trained soldiers. The home army will add another million ;' and behind both these forces will be an additional i - e - •serve of at least- two-.miliioii more. mil- i lions of meu under arms'make a total which' ■'may well take" away - abut: Colonel Chesney' is/decidedly of opinion that, tremendous, .as these figures seem, and formidable as is the determination on the part of the Russian nation which they • indicate, - the' reconstructed Russian army "would still, if marched to invade her neighbor, march - to defeat as decisive a3 overtook Benedek or Bazainel" More thjui this, the military authorities pf/iermany are quite-aware of their superiority, and are as confident of being able to dictate peace at Moscow as they were of dictating , it at Paris... It is 'riot a war. with' Russia alone that Germany fears; it.' is a war in which" she would have to fight Russia and France togethisr, and so be taken, on both flanks at once. . This is the contingency against which all her military , preparations arte directed. • ■ As against either adversary by -itself - thele preperations would be; " worthy of the most shortsighted instead of the profoundest of aiministrations." For while the \vestern, frontier is being strengthened "by an enormous chain cf fortresses, the eastern frontier is left entirely, open: "The defences which are thought essential on the side, of France, which has not even begun to regain her strength, are dispensed with on the side of Russia} which is the real exciting cause of. German uneasiness, .t But on the assumption that-Germany is to be. attacked oil both sides at once,; and that one enemy is to be crushed at arid by. active operations .while the other is held in check by fortresses and the .new. Landsturm, this apparently inconsistent policy becomes perfectly intelligible. The.fortresses along the Rhine and . the Moselle: are meant" not to make.the. entry of a; .German army into France more, easy, but to make the entry of a. French army into Germany more difficult.- ."The true use of the mighty barrier can evidently only be found if Germany be unexpectedly" called for the 'time to act strictly on the defensive'against a; Frencjiiinvasion.- - But such art invasion, could only be hopefully made, such.a defensive attitude only be adopted, if the striking power of Gt runny ■b&{ >r'the time sumnioiied away .to meet a .great danger elsewhere; " and this ; .danger "elsewhere is a" possilile; attack from the JOast .by. Russia, and on the" Rhine by" France. Against-Rtis'sia alone Germany feels secure ; and as France' .is'the'_only Po.ver which is likely to court alliances for alliance sake, it is the possible co-opera-tion of France that .makes Russia really formidable. Even against these two Powers in combination Colonel Chesney thinks that Germany. wou'lil probably be victorious.. But to'strategists accustomed to forecast every and to 'be ahead of' their contemporaries by half a generation, a mere probability is. flot -enough. . It <-, was • a--rraLtTaTalv institict • that led German-'Sbvernment to re- 1

fleet that "it would be more convenient, Unuch .'.cheaper,- -and would incur far iless material risk; to settle conclusively with Prance now",-and'bo thoroughly reduce her power" that Russia could no longer count on her for serious aid." »

Nor would it he 6afe to assume that thia. natural instinct n has ceased to influ- • ence the policy of Germany because it was I not followed out last May. The nrent "of the German' designs against' France is not cornp!etely explained by the statement that the Czar interposed to for/ .bid war. . The power of the Czar to . give' effect to his words! exists at present onlvin intention, whiie France will long be too: weak/ to count, as an appreciable addition; to the.strength of Russia.,, Cok>nel ; .Ches-' ney, it will be remembered, feels confident ..that Germany would beatsßtfsiia standing, alone, even M.hen the Russian military system has .been got into \\orking: order. It this somewhat hazardous opinion is to be accepted, fiow ijriuch _. greater" ! was the chance that Germany would beatRussia, and prance combined when, as was the case last, spring, - the armies of both powers were, chiefly formidable on." paper? If it would: have cost Germany nothing to settle with France, it would not have, cost her venr much to settle with Russia at the san& time; or rather, it would have mattered little-how much it cost her when we consider that the work once done would have been done for half a century, and that Germany, victorious a .second time over France and a first time over Russia/ would vhave been the' undisputed" mistress of Europe. Why was the occasion, allowed to slip by unused? Some allowance must perhaps be made for the kind of terror which overtakes even the greatest favorites of fortune when they-are left to cry double 'or quits after • such victories as those 'of 1870; Great statesmen are never destitute of im'--agination," and even of a certain superstition; and imagination : and isuperstition ! readily conjure up the. unforeseen chances which may frustrate the best-laid- plans, j and the changing luck which may>cloud the most" certain prospects. Something, j again, may be set down to the- personal influence which still playsa'large 'part in politics- of the Continental Europe.?* Relationship and family affection might have made it a hard, matter for the Emperor to - resist v the • Czar. -These, however, are .but speculations." It is more important bear in mind that what has been -taken font-he abandonment of a purpose, may be iO.nly- .its.: postponement.'. .According to Colonel. Chesney, the new military 1 systems/whether of. French or Russia will ■need, years fbr-tkeirfull development; . and during this interval the. opportunityjwhich Germany seemed" befit upon making last sj-i'ihpf may present itself under conditions .equally favourablefrom a ,diplomatic point of view. /The question which -really/concerns Hiirope is~not wliy Germany-did not fight France a few months .back, but jwhether she is likely to delay doing so [until France.'and' Russia haTe""growh : -toostrong to be attackted except by an enorOusirisk.—' Pall Mall Gazette. 1 I