THE PACIFIC PROBLEM,

Manawatu Herald, Volume XLIII, Issue 2335, 29 September 1921, Page 2

THE PACIFIC PROBLEM,

WRITING of the “.still vague and unformulated apprehensions” to which lie attributes public interest in Pacific questions, Admiral Sir Syprian Bridge says that within the lifetime of men not yet past middle age nearly the whole continent of Asia has undergone art immense transformation, a transformation undreamed of 40 years ago. That Asia is already throwing off or escaping from European domination and guidance is visible to those who care to look closely into affairs. When the European domination or guidance has gone, what is Asia going to do? Have its revenge on the West? Is there any inherent improbability in a twentieth century repetition-of the movements of Darius and Xerxes, of Mahomet’s early successors, of Attila, of Genbhis Khan, of Tamerlane, of Mahomet II.'? Asia will be materially as well equipped as any contemporary nation of the West; and, most likely,

united beyond all historical precedent. Suppose that Asia calls upon .Japan to lead in a great counterOccidental movement, will it be possible for Japan, say a quarter of a century hence, to disregard the call? Is there any reason for supposing that Japan, by the time' just indicated, will not desire, and prove her ability, to make of China what the British have made of India? There seems to be one way, arid only one way, of preventing altogether, or at the least robbing of its terrors, the Asiatic movement above hinted at. That way is to establish a real and lasting solidarity between America and Europe, beginning with co-op-ej'ation and general untiy of aim in the Pacific on the part of the United States and the British Empire. If the United States, backed as far as possible by the British Empire, will regard the Pacific as Western Europe for so long had to regard the Atlantic, an aggressive Asiatic movement against not merely Europe, but the West (including America) will be frustrated; indeed; it will not, be likely to be begun. In view of what is apprehended, naval measures may hereafter become as important in the Pacific as we all know they used to be in the Atlantic. Of course, this is no argument against general 'and honest naval “disarmaments.”