Manawatu Herald. TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1918. NIVELLE’S OFFENSIVE.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XL, Issue 1861, 6 August 1918, Page 2

Manawatu Herald. TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1918. NIVELLE’S OFFENSIVE.

THE objectives of the oJlensive conducted by General Nivolle last year and the reasons why they were not achieved, arc discussed by Mr John Buchan in the latest volume of his history of the war. The attack Avas launched on April 16th against a fronl of 50 miles from northcast of Soissons to the River Buippos in the Champagne. General Nivclle’s “aim was the ‘decisive blow’ —not to weaken, but to crush; not to ‘break up,’ but to break through.’ ” “Willi splendid seifcoulidcnee,” says Mr Buchan, “he promised himself La on as the result of the first day’s action, and such a gain was inconceivable unless he really succeeded in crumbling the whole enemy defences. As in the previous winter at Verdun, he told his Government precisely what he meant to do, and by what hour he would accomplish it, . . • and no offensive was ever undertaken with more assurance and hope. His plan was to force the Aisnc heights in one bold assault from west, south, and south-east, nt the same moment to carry the Rheims heights from the north, and at the same moment to launch his centre through the gap between the two into the plain of Laon. Next day a fresh army would attack the Moronvilliers massif to distract the enemy’s counter-attack and protect his own flank. In the centre he would use the new French tanks;” By the end of April, “though there had been remarkable gains of ground, the major strategy had failed. The road to Laon was as firmly barred as ever.” The result was “ a grave discouragement” among the French people, nut because of the losses, which bad

boon moderate, bui because their hopes bad been keyed too high, und they suffered a corresponding reaction. There was “a sudden reversion of feeling in favour of the (millions tactics of the-Somme,” and Petain and Foeh, the chief exponents of those tactics in (he French Army, were entrusted with the task of 'carrying to a true tactical advantage’the miniatured gains of Nivelle’s effort. After examining the actual results of that effort, Mr Buchan deals with the failure of the original scheme. He mentions three contributory factors: the exceptionally unfavourable weather, the fact that the enemy had learned of the French preparations and had strengthened all Ids positions, and the breakdown of the tanks. “But, allowing for all these,” he says, “it is difficult not to conclude that his plan of action was intrinsically fault v. . . . The kerne) of the

problem was the C'hemin des Dames, and it could not have been seriously believed (hat (bat mighty ridge would fall at once to the assault of April Kith. Yet (lie whole advance to Laon depended upon its immediate conquest. Only by a succession of miracles could Nivelle have succeeded, and miracles, . when (hey happen in war, come singly, and not in battalions. He fell into the error of endeavouring to reap the fruits of victory before beating the enemy. It was the error of a gifted and generous and most courageous spirit, but it was none the less an error.”