GERMANY’S MAN-POWER.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XL, Issue 1821, 2 May 1918, Page 1

GERMANY’S MAN-POWER.

FORCES ON WESTERN FRONT. 350,000 MORE THAN IN 1917. Some important figures in relation to Germany’s increased , strength in man-power on the western front were compiled, early in February by the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph with the French armies. Ho said; — “I am able to state that the number of German divisions on the western front ”is now between 180 and 190, and that, of these, 115 are in line and from 65 to 75 in reserve; These are figures of great import-, ance. The fact that such statistics are often misused, and always need scrupulous handling, does not in the least invalidate what are, in fact, the necessary bases of all the calculations and plans of all the High Commands. In themselves ' these figures may be accepted as accu- ■ rate, and if they do not bear out certain recently published estimates, so much the worse for the latter. ’, “The accession of German strength in the West, due mainly to the downfall of Russia’s military power, and now in a small measure also to ! the return of troops from the Italian front, must be neither understated nor exaggerated. Never was there greater need of exact knowledge and cool consideration. Absolute exactitude, even as to the present s;tua-‘ tion, is, indeed, hardly to be expected, and there are many doubtful elements in the war map of the early future. If speculation cannot be altogether avoided, at least we can severely limit it. Evidently there are divisions and divisions. It would certainly be fallaeioiis to compare these German units with British, French, or American units carrying the same name. With the development of new methods of attack and defence in the warfare of positions it has been found useful to reduce the old-time divisional cs- j, tablishment, but' the reduction has been much larger, on the German side than among the allies. “Duringthe last year the numerical strength of the German division fell considerably. As I showed a month ago, however, the transfer of troops from Russia during the late summer and autumn was used in large part not to provide complete divisions for the west, but to bring worn units up to the level of strength which had been previously declared to be a necessary minimum. In the spring of last year this necessary level amounted to about 7,500 infantry—three regiments of three battalions of four companies, 2,000 gunners (nine to 12 batteries); and pioneers, machine-gunners, cavalry and.services, bringing the , division up to a total of rather more than 10,000 combatants.

“Approximately, we may nay that there are now before the French, British, Belgian, and American forces in the west from 35 to 40 divisions more than there was before (he French, British, and Belgians at Hie beginning of active operations last year, 10 of these added divisions being already in line, and 25 or 30 being in scattered nearly equally among 'the enemy rear. From this joint we are in the domain of speculation. Two months may pass before weather conditions permit the commencement of grand operations. “The outlook certainly demands every precautionary measure. In particular, it suggests a close study of the defensive methods which the enemy has himself ' successively tried during the last year’s campaign. For a short spell, perhaps, the two roles may be reversed, and much may depend on how well they resume the offensive, if they attempt to do so, and how well we resume the defensive, if we must, turning back when the moment of the enemy’s exhaustion comes. There may be surprises in store, but there can be no such 'strain as England had to hear in ,the first defence of Ypres, or France in the great-de-fence of Verdun. When. I recall that before Verdun alone 24 German divisions were used up in relatively small attacks in two months of last autumn, and that the summer offensive of 1916 cost the enemy 76 divisions, it will be seen that the figures of the present reserve are not calculated to frighten the allies.”.