WILL THE HUN NAVY COME OUT.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXIX, Issue 1724, 12 June 1917, Page 4

WILL THE HUN NAVY COME OUT.

PROBABILITY OP AN EARLY SEA BATTLE. Those with an inside knowledge, of how things are trending incline strongly towards the belief that recent events have increased the probability of a naval battle at an early date (says the naval correspondent of the Weekly Despatch). Without entering minutely into the reasons for this inference, one may say that the pundits who keep asking “When will the German licet come out ?” have grasped the wrong end of the stick. The determining question is no longer, “When will the German ileet come out? ’ but, “How much longer will the German licet be able to stay in?” One may argue that there is no difference in substance between these queries. But there is —and a very wide one. Hitherto it has rested with the Germans (o say when a sea battle should be fought or whether one should In* fought at all. In so far as this important decision was involved, our Ileet has been at the enemy's disposal, as it were. Now, circumstances arc gradually depriving the Germans of this strong advantage. W hether willinglv or otherwise, the high seas Ileet may soon lie obliged to leave its “dug-outs” and accept the light that is waiting for it.

One of the factors in putting-this kind of pressure on tlie retuetant Hun is the failure of his I-boat operations. Right from the beginning of the war Germany has regarded her submarines as a bloek-ade-breaking weapon. And their tirst failure in this eapaeity did not destroy her faith in their ability eventually to do what she wanted of them, 'file Hun is tenaeious. Onee an idea gets into his head it slieks there. Finding that his earlier F ■ heats were unequal to the task of lessening our grip upon the North Sea, he set about equipping himself with underwater craft of a much more ellicient type. These he built in considerable numbers and oh a standardised system of construction, which enables the supply to be kept up. Possibly it may not for long prove equal to replacing the wastage. GERMAN BOASTS. It certainly will not if the protit and loss account continues to work out as at present. With these new U boats, and plenty of them, Germany expected she would be able to make the narrow seas so unsafe for our battleships and cruisers that they would be afraid to move far from their bases, as the risk of serious losses would be too grave for ns to face. With a great part of our licet thus penned in, and a paralysing attack in progress upon our sea-borne trade, Grcmauy believed she would be able to make a gap in our blockade sullicieutly wide to enable some of her own merchant vessels, or oilier vessels carrying goods for her, to slip through, especially if they had a protective screen of U-boats around them. All the world knows that in neither of these respects has her plans succeeded. Having thus failed in her purpose by one means, Germany must either try to accomplish it by another or give it up altogether, and lids she cannot afford to do without at least making the attempt, as such action on her part would be equivalent to a declaration of unconditional surrender. Public opinion may not count for much in the .Fatherland, hut it is not such a negligible quantity there that the War Lords can ignore it altogether, and the German people have in the past been told so many boas! ful things about what their Heel would do to the hated English when it got the ehanee that there will be big trouble for the Kaiser and his entourage if the Heel ends up by doing nothing, not even getting itself smashed up again. Already the German populace are beginning to ask with increasing emphasis when the vaunting promises made for the navy that has cost them so much good money are going to lie justified by deeds. IHXDEXBURG'S POWER. And Hindenburg ranks with the malcontents. .It is no secret that for a hmg time past he Ims been expressing himself strongly about the ineptitude of the High Seas Fleet. At tirst sight it may not appear that Hindenburg has any control of the naval policy. But lie is the Power (and with a very big P) at the moment in Germany, -and whenever Hindenburg decides that the situ-

ution demands naval action tins will have to be taken. - Any day that Hindenburg says the fleet must go and light ( and he may say this any day), out it will have to go. Every set-back to Germany’s arms on land also brings nearer the time when she can no longer avoid making a definite move on sea. As she is forced back on (ho Western front and elsewhere the effect will be to cause a ‘‘bulge” in another direction, and there exists .mly one in which it can occur. The cumulative effect of these various factors must be to force that naval action for which Germany has been assiduously preparing. That she has been, and even now continues, preparing with all her might to make the strongest possible shdwing at sea when she becomes obliged to hazard her hiji* throw there admits of no doubt. One cannot say to what extent her Jleet lias been strengthened since Jutland. But her shipbuilding resources are much greater than the majority of the British people realise, and one must not under-rate her energy by assuming that site lias not made full use of them. NEW G Kit MAN SHIPS. Germany possesses approximately JO large shipbuilding establishments, besides many smaller ones, and quite a host of factories in which contributory work can lie done. We know the systematic principle upon which she has organised her plants for turning out submarines in quantities. If she has in the same manner co-ordinated her other resources to “speed up” larger construction there is no reason why she should not have had somewhere about 25 battleships or cruisers building at the one time. About twelve of her yards arc so well equipped that they can build large warships complete. Others are capable of turning out smaller craft quickly. The Schicau Yard at Elbing specialises in destroyers, being able to construct some lifty' of these complete in a year. Under war pressure the yard may have done even better than (his. While it remains uncertain what additions in capital -.hips Germany lias made to her Heel, it is known dial she has placed a number of new small fas! cruisers in it. One may fairly assume, also that when the German licet does venture out there will lie in it new ships of large displacement, carrying heavy guns and possessing high speed. And the probabilities are that no great time will elapse before we hear of the reorganised German fleet m action.