LENGTH OF THE WAR.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXIX, Issue 1697, 12 April 1917, Page 3

LENGTH OF THE WAR.

GERMAN’S REMAINING GREAT STRENGTH. GENERAL MAURICE’S OPINION. The war may easily extend over another winter, so tar as purely military factors are concerned, according to a statement by General Frederick B. Maurice, Director of Military Operations for the Imperial General Staff, in an interview given to the Associated Press and published in the Toronto Globe. General .Maurice is an authority on military history, and has been chosen as (lie hoigrapher of Robert E. Lee in a series published under the title of ‘‘Makers of the Nineteenth Century.”

“Strategy as immutable as lime,” lie said, “is dominating this war as it lias dominated all other conlliets. The strategy of which General Lee was a master does not change with time, and in the year 2001 military leaders will he acting on the principles of Napoleon and Lee. THREE GREAT MODERN FACTORS. “The men over in the trenches, seeing only a brief and intimate part of the actual operations, are inclined to assert that the major principles of warfare have changed; but this is true only of tactics, which, according to Napoleon, change every ten years, a period which, had he been alive to-day, he probably would have reduced to Jive years. This is due to the increase in inventive power over the lime when Napoleon fought. In the tactics of this war are seen three tremendous innovations which can probably be placed in the following order: First, aeroplanes; second, improved heavy artillery with highly explosive shells; third, machine guns. In strategy the immutable problems of time and space still prevail, and were Napoleon or Lee alive to-day the genius which made (hem great would find an outlet.

“In n paragraph, the difference between strategy and tactics may be explained to the lay reader as follows: Strategy consists of plans for 1 lie manoeuvres of armies seeking a delinile result, while tactics are I lie opera I ions when two forces are in actual contact. The victory of the Marne was the result of high strategy, as was the (jerman sweep through Belgium and the encircling movement about Baris. The trench warfare prevailing since has been purely a matter of tactics, without either side being able to make any manoeuvres in the realm of strategy. POWER OF CENTRAL POSITION. “People wonder frequently why, with the superior resources in manpower .undoubtedly possessed by the Allies, more progress toward victory is not made. The reason lies in the,form of strategy which made (he Civil War so long, and enabled Napoleon to keep his back to the wall so long when he had a coalition of Europe against, him. Lee and Napoleon worked on interior lines from a central position, and they had the genius to make the best possible use of the great advantage this gave them. The Bermans understood this form of strategy so well that even in peace times their economic necessities are frequently siicriliced to military needs. In their transportation system alone the result of this policy can be seen. Lee and his small army held back greatly superior forces for lour vears, and there is no reason to anticipate, on purely military grounds, an early collapse of the Bermans. Of course, Lee operated on bat lb' lines measured in miles, while the present fronts extend almost across continents, but the principles of strategy, covering time and space, remain the same, so the duration of this war is not surprising. FORCED TO WITHDRAW.

“1 sec no indication ol what Inis lu , (‘ii iisscrlc<l, 11 1 :)t the (icemans arc withdrn at some places ahmg inn 1 Iron I because of a desire |o force open This movement is a retirement t'oreed upon them. They do not like it any more lhan we did when, after the second battle of Ypres, we had to retire a shorter distance to straighten our line. You may he sure no army likes to retire, and therefore it is certain the Germans will make a determined effort some where to restore their lost prestige. We an 1 now merely gathering’ the Iruits_ of our winter operations, the result of which is that troiu Arras to the Ancre a salient decidedly dangerous to German positions has been established. Our raids on the Somme front gave us commanding positions from which our artillery lire was much more effective. The Germans, who are no longer occupying snug and well-constructed dug-outs, are more than anxious to retire to a safer line. They also probably counted on making our preparations for an offensive over this ground abortive by giving up their front line and compelling us to alter our plans. BLOCKADE MAY END WAR EARLIER. • “I have no patience with the idea that the Germans are at the end of

their lighting resources. They are still ca|iable of and will pul up a strong tight. From a purely military standpoint I see no reason why the war should not go through another winter, but conditions outside the military zone may operate I" end it sooner. How tar the shortage of food in Bermany has aileded the physique and morale of the latest recruits I cannot say, but sonii' deterioration from this cause is almost certain, and will become more and more effective with the passage id’ time. In our armies I believe that we have the manhood, as well as the material superiority, which will result' in ultimate victory."