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SECRETS OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN.

BRITISH CREWS IN GERMAN U BOATS. Five German U boats, operated by British crews and equipped with British guns and torpedoes, have (writes Mr Robert Mountsier in the New York World) changed the entire naval programme of the German General Staff. Representing only a small percentage of the submarines lost by the Germans, and carrying the submarine warfare to the very doors of Germany under the German periscope, these five under-sea boats helped to bring about the reversal in Germany’s policy towards American shipping and lives, caused Admiral Tirpitz to fall “ill,” and resulted in Germany’s decision to send to the Mediterranean most of her remaining submarines. Seventy-eight U Boats Lost. The section of the British Fleet which has been engaged in hunting German submarines since February 18th has succeeded in

capturing or sinking 58 submarines and 20 more are listed as “most probably destroyed.” The five U boats now operating with British sailors inside were captured early in the summer. New naval guns were mounted in them, the torpedo tubes were replaced by tubes for British torpedoes, and minor alterations made to improve the boats “made in Germany, improved in England,” I was told. Crews from British E boats were put into these ex-U boats to spend first, several weeks’ training over certain stretches of water on which no craft were allowed but a few old fishing vessels used as targets and patrol vessels, whose officers only were aware of what was expected ot them when they sighted “German'’ submarines. To this day there are British sailors who firmly believe that Admiralty officials are on the pay roll of the Kaiser, since they were under Admiralty orders on several beautiful summer days, not under any circumstances to open fire on German submarines, and on those days they actually saw U boats manoeuvring within range. Externally there is nothing to distinguish ex-U boats with British crews inside from the U boats that carry German sailors. The periscope of the British boats remain the same, and the decks, when awash, show every characteristic of the submarines that are still a part of the German navy.

The Enemy Deceived. Consequently, German U boats and patrol vessels were unable to discover the real identity of the ex-U boats when they passed through the Skager Rack and the Sound into the Baltic Sea. It is these former German submarines that have played havoc with shipping in the Baltic, demoralising Germany’s trade with Sweden, and have compelled the German High Seas Fleet, popularity known in Britain as the “High Canal Fleet,” to remain closer to the Kiel Canal than during any other period since the beginning of the war. Had it not been for them the Germans would have undoubtedly effected a landing in the Gulf of Riga, although the official communiques carefully pass over the part which the submarines from Britain played in sinking or disabling two of Germany’s cruisers and eight ot her destroyers. The manner in which the British Navy, during the days preceding and following this battle, operated against Germany’s fleet through submarines that were once effective weapons of the Kaiser remains a sealed book—a history in itself. However, to-day the Germans know, and what is more admit, that the submarine warfare has been a failure. The failure is closely connected with the eclipse ot Admiral von Tirpitz and with Germany’s so-called concession to the United States. To the Kaiser it was unbearable to know that five submarines made in Germany captured by British warships and operated by British crews had corked the loose end of the Kiel Canal and Inflicted a serious loss on his fleet. The Kaiser placed the blame for this climax to the failure ot the submarine warfare on Von Tirpitz, who was destined for a ‘‘rest cure.” So disorganised had the submarine warfare become that the Kaiser and the men about him decided to do wnat the destruction and capture ot the U boats was bringing about —that is, a cessation ot attacks on American ships and British liners carrying American passengers.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/MH19160201.2.23

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 1504, 1 February 1916, Page 4

Word count
Tapeke kupu
681

SECRETS OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN. Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 1504, 1 February 1916, Page 4

SECRETS OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN. Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 1504, 1 February 1916, Page 4

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