GRAND TACTICS.
NAPOLEON It ’ SCIENCE. GRAND DUKE'S RETREAT. MUSCOVITE ('OIIESfVENESS. The following arlielo was written for iho Sunday Sun by E. George Marks just prior to the fall of Warsaw : Tin statement, of the mililary critics oi the Russian capital that the Grand Duke Nicholas occupies a. position similar to that which Napoleon used on many occasions against the Coalitions of Europe with tremendous effect, is of intense interest to followers of the Napoleonic school of warfare as applied to the warfare of the present century. Axioms of war with Napoleon were never to accept battle on parallel lines, never to accept if. with a front, defined by the enemy; never to accept it where manoeuvres and evolutions vveie not possible; always to avoid the battle of encounter. Tlie.se axioms ar.y at the oresent moment mos appositely finding their application in the eastern the,.tie of war. Napoleon was unmistakable in bis dictum that the Commander-in Chief of an army should he responsible for the sutcesi or ihe failure of a campaign. The t 'nnima n.ler-in-Chief of tin- Russian Army (the Grand Duke Nicholas) is a steadfast brliev. r in tin- Napoleonic dictum. Equally lie is a bel'eve; in Napoleonic strategy and tacties. 'f,n,. ti the strategy of Napoleon, the Grand Duke, in the early stages ol I lie war, made a strong offensive movement againb Galicia, using the Vistula and the Carpathians. or portions of them, to deceive the Austrians a; to his numbers and his mode of eoi cent ration. So rapidly did Ihe Russian A rim Corps concent rale, that the Grand Duke, keeping up a vigorous olleiisive. pushed on to hi-' first objective. I.einherg, routed Ihe Andrians. and look t he GahVian capilal. A movement characterised with the same precision of concent rat ion ol his various Army Corps enabled Napoleon in IP,On to make Brunn. in Moravia, his objective ’file Austrians and the. Russians made an effort to force Napoleon to accept battle on parallel lines, lie resolutely declined; to do so would have prevent, (I his manoeuvring for Ihe best strategic positions. When Napoleon found he had the Russians and the Austrians in such a pre dramenl that they mint- assume the he|l,|ls|s( because In' had manoeuvred them mio a cramped position, with no vlianeo ot extending theii front lie launched the "tost vigorous'offensive, and, wittt the aid ol a turning movement, with two Army (oi|vwhi'h had been detailed on a mission ol sceictiveness. the Russians and the Austrians were muled, and the Austeiht/, w.u in-eribed on the banners of the Nopoleome legions NO UNITY OF COMMAND. Since the German host, juuctjoin'd with the forces of the Emperor of Austria the Napoleonic dictum that tin; Cominander-u, Chief uiit.'i be responsible lor the plan ot campaign would to have been lost m the diversity of commands ol the Germans ami ih- Austrians. Is Marshal vmi limlenberg, Marshal von Maekenseii. or the Austrian Archduke (.’oumiander ltd luel : » ihe,-' is no ComntaiidciTin G’hicl, the result juust" b- battles of encounter; coming m o collision with the Russians without pivmeiliI Red plan of battle; trusting to the short: instead of 111'- science of battle. Napoleon remit 'led ):itt h s- of encounter eonteiuphi,mslv; devoid of the elements ol science; rire'lv if ever decisive. A tremendous lacin the piesenr Til anic si nip h- d u*‘ of strategic railways; niiilembteillx tin > pu ,„p ;..r the revicliialling of much vaster arums than in Ihe Napoleonic campaigns. I" a large extent Napoleon made war-.uppoi r w 1 r ' tin- great armies ot the present da\ depend' on bases of supply, leaving a dehiiHe H nliv to fall hack upon, m the evenl ot mv.-itv arising. The Get mans and Aus--1,1 ms hating ivei.pl tired J .ember ;, a 1 o I foriress of BiV.emysl. determine,l to mao ,he Grand Duke aceepi bat He «» parallel line;, eonligiioiis to the Vistula, counting on a derisive victory to cut oil Ins ivlieal into Russian Roland.' The Russian ( ommamlern DJiief, with 1 he ailvant i",< s ol unity "I command, outwitted the Germans and Aid Hans, r,'l(e;,ted on Hie Napoleonic pnn ,4,,).. ’(lie various army corps eoinergiiig on ~ .riven strategic olqei 11 y, —\\ a rsaw . ll l ' has’now at his disposal railways which must he a great facto.- m the revielim ling ol his inri-e.-.. The further the Grand Duke imo the Germa.is and the Austrians honHli' I 'md'tlm support ol their slialegii i.ii. wiyys, *J Jif belter his ehanves of inflicting upon” them a crushing .Ideal. SUBTLETY OF RUSSIAN HE I REAL 11l several campaigns against Napoleon the Russians demonstrated that a. ret rograile movement such id |l|,J I" 1 ’' 1 '" 1 " ll " ..voviaphieal objective was not a relre.it H, the ordinary aceeptanve ol the mthlai.s term No general who had height the Rus shins wa-. more convinc'd of this tact, than Napoleon. Discarding winter canlonnmnts Napoleon, in Hie Ruslan campaign ol MR, bv skilful and rapid marching and inannmiv; ring, came up with the .Russian 80.000 men on the plain ol E\ lan. On I • n,arv 7, m the niid-t ol a him.lmg and lw rilje polish snow storm. I lie great b.i l h. opened to ihe accompaniment ol over DUO of cannon. Hour alter hour the innei.s coml.al cominned. Napdc.n timo every device, every manoenvie, I" drive the Russians fioin the lid,l. lb' hay l '' (lt «•"'« el tile real tenacity, the eouraee of the MnseoMle till now. When the terrible light had lasted lb hours eontiiireusß, the Ereneh and . the Russians biv. Hacked on the snowel.id held with l a u| Evlau, m flames, to the 3D 0(H) Russians and 20 000 I- lay hilled ami wounded. Napoleon .nlended o renew the battle on the morrow; to J meet surprise the Russian army, 'fbtvhh. I held its ground tor ib hours ag.rnis l.es- troops in the world, commanded. Ip he lb-4 captain of the ago, retreated m the ..idu fro,, the lidd of snow and bloo i. • radically battle formation > 1|,: ; ' * !. retreating with orderliness ami m •Hon, made Napoleon reflect. 1 that .’diva. in battle l»n, ~ ; , was an dement d llh.. •" j ,_ of the Muscovite. Na|, I 1 lowed, the Russian army. a l ' nl -\ v iuiit an*i to I- rnM.llan*i. H* f - poleon determined to cuKdl 1 b-;"’ eb^ of further orderly retreat. In . luilUant nia non vies, m which -L Ve ■ Davout and Mura. look P-t, ib.-taps were driven I'ive.y^W-milLOra'menl-do ll.e f/ar's; s^rx.m'n'ndio.::’ihe ■■ i-.. ■ nU 'i-od battle format ion, "I the Mumo ~, a'lnOst i/)')- I , (he sangmnars f - 1 " (DUF.SIVF.xm Ll the battles Of dena. and -^■'''■^;!T,,, r^m:::bD';:n,;Lln, 1 c::m l .a.gn, 'letoi'D agaoc. tl.e Au.-t, unis anti 1 ,v '* *’• ,t vj'ißi-n <r <» riMMILTiL’n in 1000, 'T;’: .... ■». l-Mv|.turn campaign ol IMo- .. , ■ln'i l'S EgviUians, Mamalnke-. " ‘ manv'i" iffin >vhml. the , ol'-ne similarity between the taet.es d I^ s and other Emopean armies, all. i feat. The Russians, instead of becoming a <c«xi'egatcd and rabble rout as e tlms were at Junn and Aim,;stadl -showed a eoht-ivvness whie), enabled llieiu to ic treat. in eoHi|)arative orderliness, ollen approximating battle lormalion A! ' lit/ the eoiio.sivcncss d Ihe Uus»l.tll,s. fI!! LL Napoleon’s victory, gave them greater id vantages than limn- Austrian ally, who like tile Prussians, al .lena, lied luml the held a chaotic miliidal ion. Hence, the Grand Duke Nicholas, in his retrograde movement, in the lime of German and Austriaii attiu’ks. is conloriiilny to a well iiolini-d method of Russian warfare; to that peculiar stilh'U subildy which characterised the various armies of their Czar when lighting the eagles of Napoleon. THE GRAND TACTICS. Not in any communique, German nor Austrian has tiie intelligence been conveyed of fhe \rmv Corps ot the Grand Duke not retreat m- ‘in orderliness and good lighting formation. On the Napoleonic plan, when the- Grand Duke has brought together Ins Army Corps, now retrograding, over a vast area," to his geographiefd objective, operatii,./ against, the enemy on jnienor or inner lines, lie will leave the German and Austrian invaders at the disadvantage ol dung surprised by a turning movement d seeretiveness —Napoleon s greatest and most effective deception in war. A cardinal udyan+Hce as IS'apolooii conceived it, of operating OXi interior or inner lines was that he could always deploy ills troops for offensive or defensive operations; watch the points d’appui of the enemy ; w atch his own lines of retreat: manoeuvre to embarrass the enemy’s lines of communication; absorb the cncniv’s troops in frontal formation, with the inevitable change of battle formation—the attendant weakening of the centre —consequent upon the debouching on to
file Held of new army corps in a pi'oconcertr.l turning iiieveinenl. Tin- 1 Grant! 1 >uk(' Nicholas, with no mom to manoeuvre with the Germans ami Austrians menacing his flanks; with a hig chance of his communications with Warsaw being cut.; retrograded to a geographical objective, using, whenever possible, fortresses to mask his movements, thus enabling him. although frequently called upon to light, to converge on the Polish capital. Should Warsaw fall, it would be no more decisive of the eastern campaign than when Napoleon, after winning the battle of Borodino, entered Moscow. the then capital of Russia. It was after .Moscow fell, the objective of Napoleon's strategy, the continuous retreat of the Russians sorely perplexed him: their extraordinary cohesiveness ms made more manifest, than ever. RESOURCEFUL AM) RESOLUTE. Within the gales of their territory the Russians have always proved a terribly resourceful, resolute, and subtle foe, particularly so if well led. The Grand Duke Nicholas possesses not. only the confidence of the great army he commands; that, of tin 1 entire Russian nation also. Such consciousness rmi-t be great inspiration to a ( 'ommandei-inChief. When the piesent Rns-o-t lerman-Ausl rian campaign i- written ir will he found the Russians have shown a partiality for Napoleonic tactics; especially room to manoeuvre to biing ahotit turning movements; the enemy, the Genii,ms. will have shown a preference for the tactics of wm Moltke— the outflanking movement, as against the turning movement. In the Eranco-Gcrnian war von Moltke achieved mc-i of his successes against, (he Krench with the outflanking movement. Marshal BaZable was not a (band fluke Nicholas, nor was Marshal M'Malmn, nor General Bourhaki. General Nogi's great turning movement at the battle of Mukden, which brought aland the defeat of the Rus-ian- and the tiimnph of the .liipanese army, was imposed hy a study oi Napoleon's grand lactic.. —a frontal fight absorbing almost the whole of the Uiriny’s forces; an attack against one flank of the enemy, disturbing him; shaking 1 1 i morale; forcing him to upset his battle lonualion to meet it ; (lien, almost immediately a final aback; massed artillery and civalry, with the requisite infantry against the weakened centre. In following the tactics of Grand Duke Nicholas it 11111-I not he lorgolteii. he, too. besides being a Napoleonic tactician, is a follower of the Russian -fhnol of .lefeiisive-olfeicive warfare, A NAPOLEONIC ANALOGY. Napoleon was essentially a general of aflat k. At l.eipsig. in lt!14; at La Rot Idem, at .\rcis. in his immoria'l campaign for 1 lie saving of Baris, against nearly 1.000,000 invaders. the same year. Napoleon tool: the olfen.'ive. beating Ids enemies in detail, until concent rated numerical preponderance forced him to light defensively. Therein is analogy between Napoleon in his altered ollensive, in 11114, and the Grand Duke Nicholas: to-day—with this iliffereiieo: Napoleon’s defeat at Leipsig exhausted his resources, for the time being; the tecapline of Lemberg, and Pr/emysl, (he retro grade movement to a geographical objective, has nor exhausted the military resouidvt of tin' Grand Duke. It has not shaken the morale of his stubborn and valiant troops, ’.rhe ( fei iniins and the Ansi riaiis, nearly a year ago, delianlly flung open Ihe temple of •Linns. Ir must not In- closed until Ihe Allies have triumphed -as decisively as Napoieon did at •lena. when he entered Berlin, and sundered (he power of Ihe Prussians; as decisively as he did at (he battle of 'Vagram, when he again entered Vienna, and brought the Austrians to their knees.
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Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXVII, Issue 1437, 17 August 1915, Page 4
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2,005GRAND TACTICS. Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXVII, Issue 1437, 17 August 1915, Page 4
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