“DEPTH OF ATTACK”

Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXVI, Issue 1292, 3 September 1914, Page 4

“DEPTH OF ATTACK”

THE GERMAN STYLE DESCRIBED. (By A. Spence in the Dunedin Star.) Some time on Thursday the Anglo-French left wing fell back for the second time. This obviously indicates that the mass of Germans descending on this front is heavy. It will simplify the meaning of the cables if the German way of delivering a general battle is described. It is always the same. On the evening before a battle the general officer commanding issues orders to the corps commanders. These orders are always short, very clear and and very few. From them, however, the corps commanders learn the general intention. That the enemy is to be “attacked whereever met,” no matter in what numbers, is always understood. Having received the general idea the corps commanders transmit a few short orders (about half a dozen lines) indicating the roads by which the divisions will move. The divisional commanders then write out two or three short directions to the brigade commanders giving more detailed instructions as to roads etc. Either the divisional commander or some of the brigade, commanders tells off the troops who are to move as vanguards. A very wide option is always left, in the bands of the corps commanders, but the most instant and wholehearted co-operation between one corps and another has to be given. Unless orders forbid it, the general rule is to “march to the sound of the cannon.”

The infantry columns march well to one side of each road, leaving a clear passage lor the whole of the artillery, and for the balloon guns, which are mounted on motors, to come up fast as soon as the rifles of the vanguards indicate that battle has begun. In the first phases of the battle the artillery commanders have a free hand, except that is is understood that every available gnn must be gut into the line of battle as soon as possible. The infantry of the vanguard endeavour to seize as wide a front as possible, and establish a skeleton shooting line. Behind this thin shooting line, large bodies of the infantry scatter off the roads and deploy in the fields from column into line.

Then follows the practice of that deadly doctrine known as “depth of attack.’’ One of the cables states that the German disregard of life is shown by the fact that orders have apparently been given to forfeit, if necessary, 50 per cent, of the army to secure victory.

This is merely cable piffle. Assuredly no such order would be issued in any army in the world. It would kill the battle dash of the rank and file.

What happens in practice, however, is bloody enough. The divisional commanders and brigadiers thicken up the firing line, and this firing line endeavours to get forward. It suffers heavily, but is not reinforced too soon, for the idea is to have at least one last reserve left when the final stage of the battle comes.

As the shooting line works forward, it is closely watched through the field glasses of the corps commanders, and, as soon as it shows symptoms of coming to a standstill or losing heart, the next wave of men is sent in. Wave after wave of men go in all day and perhaps next day and perhaps the next. There comes at last the final stage of the battle, and the army which can produce the last fresh reserve wins. At this stage 50,000 fresh men are worth five times that number of jaded troops who have been long under fire. Great judgment is required in feeding in fresh troops. If they are sent in 100 soon, the last reserves will be used up before the end of the battle, If they are sent forward too late, the whole battle Hue wavers, and it is very difficult to stop soldiers from going back once the feeling of fear smites them. Ordinarily it is just the moment wheu the troops in the firing line begin to show the first symptoms of unsteadiness—such as looking back over their shoulders —that the next wave of men should be going forward. The Germans manoeuvre very little in battle. Such a move as the British troops recently executed from Mons would amaze them, because they could not do anything like it. Their one plan is

to feed the shooting line steadily hour after hour, and day after day, and, trusting to their own superiority in numbers, endeavour to produce some fresh body of troops at the last. The prospective last reserve is massed back very deep and is usually under the immediate direction of the general commanding the army. That is the German doctrine of “depth of attack.” We will see as the war goes on, that they will endeavour to repeat it in every battle, for that is their cut and dried way. It is the only way they have. What Retirement Means.

It is comforting to remember that two can play the same game. The British forces now happens to be nearest to the point at which the armies are clashing, but, however much the Anglo-French left wing wheels back, the real point is that the more they diminish their front of battle the more they deepen their own striking power. The battle results achieved by the Germans against the British and French so far may be set down as exactly nothing, but the strategic situation means advantages for both. On the one hand the German forces now have an opportunity of turning the whole line of the British and French. On the other hand, the Allies, by drawing closer and closer together—every retirement of the left wing means that —are increasing their own “depth of attack.” The closer they come together the greater will be their striking force when the major battle begins. At the same time this leaves an open road to France. To Smite Moetke’s Rear. There is no need to be prematurely alarmed. It is evident that a very skilful strategic move Is being prepared to overtake this. One of the messages received recently conveys the pleasant intelligence that a strong force of marines has been landed at Ostend. The object of landing the marines is to secure a lodgment for troops which will presently come from England with a view to falling on the rear of the German right wing. In conjunction with this movement the co-operation of the Belgian troops, which have been thrown back in the direction of Antwerp, may be expected, unless the German field forces shut them up. To Von Moltke time is now everything. By a very skilful movement he has managed to wheel the right German wing past the barrier of the Meuse fortresses, and has come to the French border. As far as he has gone he holds the strategic position, but unless he meets with rapid success in battle now, he may be caught on his rear. His aim will certainly be to fight as many battles as may be immediately necessary, and then wheel the whole of the right wing further to the left, getting out of Belgium altogether.

The news that the British force which had lauded at Ostend is composed of marines has its tinge of sadness. The navy is not well manned as far as numbers go, and stripping the navy of its valuable personnel is serious. It means that the English force of secondline troops are not yet ready. Still, a stategic chance is like a cavalry charge. It does not last long, and it must be seized when it comes. Any force, however urgently it must be needed elsewhere is better than none.