IS RUSSIA READY ?

Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXVI, Issue 1287, 22 August 1914, Page 4

IS RUSSIA READY ?

WAR MINISTER CONFIDENT. EXCITEMENT OF LAST MARCH. “ Relations between Russia and Germany ” was tHe title of a very illuminating article by J. Ellis Barker in the Fortnightly Review for April. “At the beginning of March,” the commentator states, “ a lively controversy broke out between the German and Russian newspapers. It began with a long article in the Kolnische Zeitung. which was apparently written by its representative in St. Petersburg. It said that Russia was at present not in a position to support its political threats with its armed force, because the Russian Army was not ready ; and there was therefore no immediate danger ot a war between Russia and Germany, but that in view of the great improvement of the Russian Army and of the Russian finances, Russia would be ready for war in the autumn of 1917. THE GROWL OF THE BEAR, “Some German journals believed that a further increase of the German Army was called for, and some suggested that, for the sake ot her security, Germany should strike at Russia before her military reorganisation was completed. The discussion in the German press attracted so much attention in Russia -that not only the leading journals, but also the leading statesmen of that country, thought it desirable to state their views in print. In an article entitled ‘ Russia Wants Peace, But Does Not Fear War,’ which is supposed to have emanated from General Sukbomlinoff, the Minister for War, we were told that Russia had reorganised her army during the last five years ; that she comtemplated formerly a war of defence on her western frontier, but that she bad altered her plans and had prepared everything for a war of attack in the direction of Germany and Austria-Hungary; that the peace strength of the Russian Army had been greatly increased, and that it was ready in every detail. The article concluded significantly with the words : ‘ Russia’s preparations may be disagreeable to those States which harbour aggressive designs, for the Russian Army constitutes a powerlul bulwark to those who covet her enormous territory, and herein lies probably the reason fur the dissatisfaction of the foreign press.’

A CHANGE OF POLICY. “ Russia has become more dangerous to Germany than she was in former times, because she had lost her former magalomania, her complacent belief in her invincibility, which- caused her to fritter away her strength in Asia, and to neglect her western frontier, where alone she is vulnerable, to the despair of General Kuropatkin and other leading soldiers, Russia has wisely abandoned the Pacific. She is satisfied to rule the Black Sea, where she is building three Dreadnoughts of 23,000 tons, and she intends concentrating her naval efforts upon the Baltic, where she is completing four Dreadnoughts of 23,000 tons, armed with X2-inch guns, and has laid down four huge battlecruisers of 32,000 tons, armed with nine I4in guns. The Russian Army is supposed to have a very excellent modern artillery, and it has been supplied with a new rifle since 1913. TO SPEED UP MOBILISATION. “ In 1910 Russia effected a most important redistribution of her troops, with a view to accelerating their mobilisation, increasing their efficiency, and protecting herself against a surprise attack. Formerly a large part of her army was concentrated in the frontier fortresses, where the mobilisation

was to take place in case of war. However, in view of the fact that distances are great in Russia, and that railways are few and slow, Russia’s mobilisation takes much longer than that of Germany. Hence the danger was great that a mobilised German army might have attacked the Russian Army berore it had completed its mobilisation, and that Russia, being attacked unprepared, might be defeated by Germany in the same way in which the French troops were surprised and defeated in 1870 by the Germans, and the Turks by the Bulgarians in the recent war. In both cases disaster was caused by the fact that an unready army was too slowly mobilised too near the frontier. In view of the possibility of a sudden attack, the Russian line of mobilisation has been drawn so far back from the German frontier that an advancing German army will lose the advantage of its more rapid mobilisation, for it will find the Russian Army fully mobilised, and ready for battle by the time it has covered the distance separating the German frontier from the line marking the points of assembly ot the Russian Army. Moreover, Russia has endeavoured to accelerate her mobilisation, and to quicken the transport of her mobilised troops towards the German frontier by improving her railways.

“Russia can attack Germany with i 3 army corps five weeks after the beginning of her mobilisation, and can, at the same time, direct her 12 army corps of the Kieff, Moscow, and Kasan districts towards the frontier of Austria-Hungary. During these five weeks much may, of course, have happened between Germany and France. Germany is strengthening very greatly her fortresses on the Russian frontier.”