THE NAVY.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXV, Issue 1098, 17 May 1913, Page 4

THE NAVY.

MR CHURCHILL’S OPINION,

It is useless attempting to disguise the seriousness of the statement by Mr Winston Churchill in bis speech explaining the navy estimates, writes the London correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald itnder date of March 28th. Although Mr Churchill guarded himself in every way against attempting to bind down or influence the naval policy of any Dominion, and promised to help with the policy that was adopted, yet be definitely gave his opinion, and the opinion ot his technical advisers, against the naval policy followed by Australia, and in favour of another policy altogether. It is no use asking whether Mr Churchill’s views have changed, or whether those In touch with him have been mistaken, as to what his views really are. He was known to be favourable to the dominions conferring with a view to combined action ; and the great policy which he formally supported was that Great Britain should guard the decisive point, and that the dominions should be responsible for the outside. Later there arose an agitation over the Admiralty’s supposed intention to abandon the Mediterranean. Lord Kitchener is said to have hurried from Egypt to protest against it, and the outcry was loud for a week. Mr Churchill partly allayed that outcry by promising to keep the battle cruisers in the Mediterranean, including ships previously destined for the Pacific. And he has now apparently decided that the Mediterranean is the centre of the ‘outskirts' and proposes to base the dominion squadron on Gibralter. He explained that this squadron should, as opportunity offers, cruise freely about the British Empire, visiting the various dominions. The dominions would be consulted as to its movements (except when military consideration came in), and "special facilities would be given to Canadians, Australians, South Africians and New Zealanders to serve as men and officers in this squadron.” This protection for the outskirts could reach “Halifax in five days, Quebec in six, Jamaica in nine, South America in twelve, Capetown in thirteen, Alexandria in three, Sydney in twenty eight, New Zealand in thirty two and Vancouver in twenty three days.” It could reach any portion of the British Empire more quickly "than any European force of similar power.” Now the Admiralty knows that a fleet will be needed in the Pacific by the year 1921, and that even to reach a one-power standard it must be a fleet of ten or twelve Dreadnoughts—or whatever their equivalent in 1921 will be, The ■first lord’s technical advisers undoubtedly hold the view that Dreadnoughts would be wasted in the Pacific until that year approaches. And it Mr Churchill had ever mentioned the Pacific problem or given any hint that his proposal was simply a temporary one—that for the time being a fleet could be built up and trained, and near the Mediterranean, where there was an urgent temporary need for it, and that it was in his mind that the Pacific contingent could be afterwards transferred to make the beginning of the Pacific fleet when the time arrived—this proposal would appeal much more forcibly to Australians and New Zealanders. But Mr Churchill has not so far ever approached that suggestion or given any hint of it, His outlook of late appears to have been increasingly influenced by his technical advisers to whom, in recent pressure of other urgent business, the question of what is to happen in the Pacific eight years hence has become a very minor affair. But still that cannot be the view ot Australia and New Zealand. If the First Lord of the Admiralty has drifted with his technical advisers into forgetfulness of the Pacific, the only way is to get him to face the subject at a conference, which it is understood that he is willing to do if this can be arranged. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Mr Churchill either has been or will be invited to discuss with Australia, New Zealand and Canada, the whole question of the future in the Pacific, and especially what class of ship the Admiralty holds suitable for the needs of the Pacific. Whether that conference ends in complete agreement or not the Admiralty will be as good as its world, and will no doubt give the same thorough and generous assistance to Australians as at present.

There is, however, one important fact which may enable that conference to come to a decision far more easily than might at first sight seem possible after Mr Churchill's speech. For Mr Churchill mentioned that, side by side with his Imperial squadron,

the dominions would be encouraged to maintain cruisers and local flotillas. He clearly has no wish to encourage them to build Dreadnoughts, except as part of his flying squadron. At first sight that is strictly contrary to the Australian policy. But he may not prove so opposed to it as he probably intended, for there was another portion of his speech—a passage full of intense interest—in which he signified, if words means anything, that the day of the Dreadnought may be drawing to a close ; and that the dominant ship of the near future may be “a totally different form of naval construction.” It would almost seem, from the trend of Mr Churchill's speech, that the Admiralty is questioning whether the torpedo has not beaten the gun as a weapon, and whether the enlarged submarine and enlarged destroyer may not shortly supplant the Dreadnought and battle cruiser. If that be so, then in building submarines and light armoured cruisers (which turn out to ke really an enlarged form of destroyer) Australia would be building the “capital” ships of the Pacific fleet. And, although the Dreadnought cruiser of Australia might lose in value and become in time little more than a mother ship to a flotilla of lighter craft, yet, Australia in the Pacific would gain. It would be the first in the Pacific with the heavy Dreadnought squadron that would be most seriously discounted; and Australia and New Zealand would start on even terms with the best of them.