HOW A WAR WAS AVERTED.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXII, Issue 865, 14 July 1910, Page 4

HOW A WAR WAS AVERTED.

WHY WE EVACUATED SOMALILAND. The Government, “weary of holding a worthless country at great civil and military cost,” decided to evacuate Somaliland. This is now an accomplished fact. All the reasons are set forth in the latest Blue Book, which contains much correspondence exchanged between the Colonial Office and the then Commissioner of the Protectorate. Captain Cordeaux, between August 19, 1908, and the beginning of the present year, and subsequently between the Colonial Office and the present Commissioner, Sir W. Manning, up to March 11, 1910. The political interest of the correspondence centres upon the divergent attitude assumed by Captain Cordeaux and the Colonial Office respectively towards the problem of how best to deal with the Mullah. The latter having shown evidence of hostile intentions, both the Commissioner and the Cojonial Office were at first inclined to take military measures, for which end troops wore sent from Nyassaland and the East Africa Protectorate and Uganda.

At the end of November, however, Lord Crewe informed the Commissioner of the decision of the Government not “to entertain the, question of sending an expedition against the Mullah,” and suggested that the reinforcements should confine themselves for the time to the task of securing Iho safety of certain ports and lines of communication.

In a subsequent despatch, dated March 12, 1909, Lord Crewe amplified the attitude of the Government by stating that a forward movement against the movement against the Mullah was out of the question, that a withdrawal to the coast or from the Protectorate altogether, might eventually he decided upon, and that the policy of the Commissioner should he directed towards arming the friendly tribes for purposes of their own defence, and arranging with the Mullah for the payment of a subsidy to him on condition of his good behaviour. . . From a perusal of the Commissioner’s despatches it is plain that he did not agree with the ] Mil icy as laid down by the authorities at home, and was anxious to bring about an energetic movement against the Mullah, lie was all in favour of a “carefully prepared and well-considered military expedition,” and repeatedly warned the Government that any delay in pushing it forward would be an encouragement to the Mullah to take offensive action.

Thereupon Sir R. Wingate was sent down from the Soudan as Special Commissioner, and nltimately, after niuoli correspondence, Lord Crcwo, under the. date of November 12, 1909, informed Captain Cordeaux that, having been impressed by his good and loyal service under exceptionally trying and difficult conditions, ho had decided to recommend him to his Majesty for further promotion, to the post of Governor of Uganda. Sir W. Manning, of the Indian Army, was appointed in his place, and he conducted the operations of withdrawal of the Colonial troops from Somaliland and of arming the friendly tribes. A phrase in the letter of Lord Crowe to Sir 11. Wingate, stating the objects of Ids mission deserves special mention as showing the nature of the reasobs which induced the Colonial Office to resist the impetuousness of Captain Cordeaux;

‘•Some alternative policy to that of catching the Mullah must bo determined. Paced with the difficulties of the situation as a whole, tired of having to remain indefinitely on the defensive, weary with holding a worthless country at great civil and military cost, a great body of opinion is tending more and more to incline with favour towards a policy of complete evacuation.”

Having received authority for evacuation in March, Commissioner Manning telegraphed on March 4 that the formal announcement of the fact to the friendly tribes would be made on March 20. In reply to this Lord Crewe telegraphed': ‘T have been glad to learn that yon have fixed the date for the announcement of the policy of withdrawal to the friendly tribes.”