Manawatu Herald. [Established Aug. 27, 1878.] SATURDAY, AUGUST 18, 1904. Lessons of the War.

Manawatu Herald, 13 August 1904, Page 2

Manawatu Herald. [Established Aug. 27, 1878.] SATURDAY, AUGUST 18, 1904. Lessons of the War.

Mr Freo. T. Jane in die “ World’s Work ” writes an interesting article m the lessons to he learned from the present war. He lays particular dress on the necessity of having efficient admirals, and in bis opinion, these are not so plentiful as they night be in the British fleet. We ire so apt to regard our Navy as a 1 tower of strength,’ that Mr Jane’s •emarks come as a surprise, but there is no doubt that however unoalatable his argument it is in the main correct. He saysi—“The lesson is before us in plain black and •white—there must no longer he any •queamish sentiment about calling a spade a spade where admirals are concerned. Russia's failure is mainly from the inefficiency of Aloxeieff and Stark in the days of peace; how many admirals have we who would have don'e better ? For one who works his way, by merit there are a dofcen who do it by interest, by popularity, and so forth. ' There are not more than four admirals holding, commands to-day who could with certainty stand the test once suggested by Mr Arnold White - election of the fittest by the fleet. They are Admirals Fisher, Wilson, Fawkes, and Noel—four men who lack per soual popularity, but who can, and do,,make others believe in them as ‘strong men.’ It is public knowledge that one British Admiral in high command lacks the confidence of his officers, and the same applies to several others. To displace men, who from long service and fair industry feel that they have earn d certain commands, is brutal ; hut to risk sacrificing the Empire for the sake of their feelings and aspirations is more brutal still. Alexeieff and Stark were not exactly incompetents they were mediocrities. They did their best, but their best was of little account. It would be just the same with our mediocrities ; they would mean well, but the necessary power is not theirs. It behoves us to de mand some system that will ensure our having the pick of the very best men. At present we have not. “ Here is an instance in our Navy of how wo get Stark? instead of Togos. Some ten years ago one of the most hri limit officers in the Navy was detached to the Mediterranean, where he hud the misfortune to arouse the jealousy or ire ~of a ti led superior of (ho Stark ca’ihre, and from that day he passed into obscurity—snuffed out. Every naval man knows the story. . . . . .

Such things should not be; the Navy needs the best men always, and the most urgent* lesson of the war is that unless we ensure getting the best men, heedless of sentiment and ‘ prior claims,’ we, like Russia, may find a day when we send out our Makaroffs and Skrydloffs too late.”

There is a great deal of truth in what Mr Jane says. Our admirals are brave enough men, but bravery counts for little without ability. As Mr Jane also points out it is .extremely difficult for an officer, however worthy of promotion, to make his way to the top often owing to the jealousy of his superiors. This is a very bad feature indeed.. It is of the utmost importance that perfect unanimity should exist among all classes of the service, especially the officers, and it is a matter for regret that admirals in high -cotn'mand should allow petty feelings to have any weight with them. One thing Mr Jane has omitted, to mention, and that is, that young and in many cases expert officers are not promoted until they become too old to be of real use. It is a significant fact that the admirals of our Navy without exception are over the age of 50 years, and a large proportion of them have passed their 60th year. Such a system as this discounts many of the advantages accruing from the possession of a powerful navy. With all deference to the older admirals, numbers of whom have served their country faithfully and well, the younger men should be given a chance, and not be forced to wait until they are old and decrepit before being placed in responsible positions. Nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of making the fleet an efficient fighting machine. It is on this that the safety of the Empire depends; and the defects pointed out by Mr Jane, small though some may think them, should not be suffered to remain unremedied. Only by placing the best men in the foremost positions can the standard of the Navy be maintained,