Manawatu Herald. [Established Aug. 27, 1878.] SATURDAY, JAN. 9, 1904. The Far East.

Manawatu Herald, 9 January 1904, Page 2

Manawatu Herald. [Established Aug. 27, 1878.] SATURDAY, JAN. 9, 1904. The Far East.

The news which comes to us from day to day appears to grow more and more gloomy. It is difficult, in our view, to hope for any peacefu ending to the present negotiations.

We have only to try and put ourselves in the position of the Japanese and this conclusion is only too evident. For the Japanese have uo do with a Power whose word cannot be trusted, and a Power which is determined to grab not only Manchuria but apparently Corea, and which is clearly manoeuvring at present for no other purpose but to gain time. Sooner or later the conflict must come, and from the Japanese point of view better sooner than later. Every week’s delay will only enable Russia to strengthen her position, to reinforce her garrisons, augment her fleet and increase her stores.

It is, of course, pure speculation to attempt any forecast of the result of the struggle. It is difficult to believe that Japan can win in the end There are, however, several considerations in her favour. She is much nearer to the seat of action, and she could carry on a war at comparatively small expense, while Russia would find a campaign in the Far I ast very costly. This advantage of position makes in favoar of Japan in another way. It will enable her to put an army in the field which will vastly surpass any force that Russia can oppose to her for some time to come. If she is, prepared to strike at Once Japan will be able to do very extensive damage, assuming that the quality of her land forces are comparable to that of the Russian troops. That, of course, is by no means certain. There are those who profess to despise the Japanese soldier. He is, however, admittedly plucky and long-suffering, and, given the necessary weight of numbers, should give a good account of himself. In the cable news to date, it is hinted that Japan might content herself with garrisoning Corea. It appears to us that to do so would be playing Russia’s game. It would be simply deferring the inevitable conflict. If Japan is to succeed at all it will be by attacking and Separating the present Russian forces in the East before reinforcements can arrive. The campaign must be offensive on her part, and we do not doubt that both parties understand that quite well. There is more than a hint that the Chinese will throw in their lot with Japan That will undoubtedly make things harder for Russia. The value of the Chinese soldier by himself is small, but there is no telling what he might be made were he led by Japanese officers and stiffened by Japanese troops. At all events, it is clear that if the Chinese take a hand they may hamper the Russian forces very seriously, and in particular may render the Manchurian railway unsafe for the passage of supplies and reinforcements. If they only succeeded in dividing the Russian forces they would make the position very much more difficult for Admiral lexieff. The same may be said of the Chinese cruisers. Judging from the performance of the Chinese navy ten years ago it is not a very dangerous force. But, added to the Japanese fleet, controlled and supported by Japanese officers and vessels, it becomes at once a very different matter

As we have already said, we do not feel at all sanguine of the Japanese chance of success. But we cannot conceive a huh-spirited race such as the Japanese undoubtedly are submitting to the Russian advance without a struggle. The result of a war is always more or less uncertain, and it does not follow that the bigger nation always wins. The Japanese may gather hope from the consideration of the Russo-Turk-ish war of 1877, or even of the late South African war. Everything depends on the skill of the officers and the morale of the men, and there is really no means of comparing the two o. p'bnenta-in the Far East in these respects.