Manawatu Herald. [Established Aug. 5, 1878.] SATURDAY, SEPT. 5, 1903. The Elgin War Commission.

Manawatu Herald, 5 September 1903, Page 2

Manawatu Herald. [Established Aug. 5, 1878.] SATURDAY, SEPT. 5, 1903. The Elgin War Commission.

Last month we referred in ah editorial to the details of the finding of Lord Elgin’s Commission which sat to inquire into the Conduct andmanagement of the War Office prior to the Boer hostilities* The cables which have come to hand since then throw into still bolder relief the extraordinary inaction of the department in the face of the serious position disclosed to them by information supplied from various reliable sources. Intense indignation, so the cables inform us> ,is being shown throughout the United Kingdom, and the siipinness of the Government as disclosed by the evidence taken by the Commission, is meeting with unsparing condemnation from every quarter. The feelings of the immense number throughout the Ehlpire Who have ttefc With loSa add bereavement as a consequence of the war are not likely to receive much consolation from a perusal of the evidence taken before the Commission. It is impossible to excuse the administration on the ground that a sense of security resulting from prolonged peace had prevented them from being sufficiently prepared, for were acquainted with everything that was happening in South Africa, and were aware that hostilities might be expected in the near future. According to the cables the Director of the Military Intelligence applied to the War Office for an annual allowance of £IB,OOO for 10 years for survey work in South Africa, and in return was offered £100! £2,000 was spent annually for intelligence work by the British Government in South Africa, where the Transvaal Government Was spending £94,000 for the same purpose. Other matters in which the report condemns the War Office are the total absence of military maps of the country in which the struggle was located, or even of a Field Intelligence Department, the absence of instructions to the commanding generals, the sending of infantry at the beginning of the war to meet the Boer cavalry, and the delay of financial support to the military operations for political reasons. It is a striking illustration of the extraordinary misconception of the real position, that when the colonial governments first offered mounted contingents for service in South Africa the Imperial authorities actually expressed a preference for infantry, a predeliction which the progress of the war was not long in removing. In addition to the feeling of insecurity which the British public must necessarily feel in a department which could be capable of of such negligent administration, the Empire cannot fail to lose prestige in the eyes of other Powers, a fact which would materially strengthen their hands in the event of complications with Great Britain, and might quite conceivably be oue of the small considerations which would turn the balance when just wavering between peace and war. But in spite of the deplorable loss of life, property, and national repute which could have been prevented by proper administration, we have at least the satisfactory assurance that the war, leading as it has done to a thorough investigation of the .constitution and management of the department, cannot fail to result in very extensive reconstruction and improvement, which will be of the highest importance to the Empire in the event of future trials of strength, where unpreparedness might be attended with much more serious consequences. To this consideration there can be no doubt foreign governments will give due weight, so that we have good grounds to hope that out of of past neglect and mismanagement greater benefit may yet ensue than could have been expected if the late war had not given us a timely warning of a weak spot in the Imperial administration.