Manawatu Herald. SATURDAY, AUG. 29, 1903. The Report on the War Office.

Manawatu Herald, 29 August 1903, Page 2

Manawatu Herald. SATURDAY, AUG. 29, 1903. The Report on the War Office.

The state of the administration, which existed in the War Office Department immediately «prior to the Boer war, receives a bold and significant exposition in the report which has just been brought doWn by Lord Elgin’s commission; yet it can hardly be said that it exhibits any aspect of the case beyond what has been the subject of much adverse criticism ever since the Boer war began, The most prominent feature of the report is the indication of the almost criminal want of preparation of which the department had been guilty, in spite of the adequate information which was constantly supplied to it of the preparations Which the Boers were plainly making for a struggle. The enormous loss of life and property which has been the outcome of the war must lie at the door of those who have been responsible for the deplorable lack of precautionary administration which the report discloses.- Lord Wolsely and the Hon. J. Chamberlain, besides the agents of the Intelligence Department, had repeatedly urged upon the War Office the absolute necessity of making preparations to counteract the elaborate and obviously hostile operations which were being carried out by the Transvaal Government. Yet, according to the commission’s report, for political reasons reinforcements and stores were limited, and the Cabinet failed to give due consideration to the fact, with which they were acquainted, that the Boers were organising for war. The indi-

cation that political considerations should be considered of sufficient importance to justify the sacrifice of human life and of an enormous amount, of property, quite apart from an/ question of the expenditure involved, discloses a most deplorable state of affairs, and points significantly to the necessity for drastic reforms in the department. A striking feature of the report is the statement that no military organisation is satisfactory which does not provide for expansion beyond the limits of the regular forces, and may not improbably point to the time when the colonial forces, and indeed all suitable material in any part of the Empire, may be drawn upon as a reserve. A further interesting feature of the report is the commendation bestowed on the auxiliary colonial forces, 'which proved of so much value, not merely in regard to their numerical and fighting strength, but perhaps even more as an indication of the attitude adopted by the colonies towards the Imperial policy, the moral effect of which, both at Home and abroad, it is impossible to calculate. There can be little doubt that the Boers had been led to believe that Great Britain would speedily be involved in foreign complications which would greatly aid their cause; and whilst it is satisfactory to record that such a catastrophe was averted, it is appalling to think of what the consequences might have been if their hopes had been fulfilled—consequences which would have required the best possible state of preparation on the part of-the British Government and the War Department to cope with, although it must be admitted that the efficient state of the Navy largely accounted for the aversion of further complications. Mr Chamberlain, as indicated by a letter to Lord Lansdowne in 1898, foresaw that the Transvaal would seize the opportunity, if it found Great Britain embarassed with other disputes, to assume a hostile attitude towards it, which would be greatly neutralised by firmness and readiness at the outset, and his feelings during the period that he so ably fulfilled his important and responsible post in connection wiih the hostilities, on seeing the outcome of the persistent neglect of his recommendations, can be imagined. The report gives indications of a recommendation’ to a reconstruction of the War Office, and when we consider the immense amount of suffering and misery, not to speak of pecuniary loss, which was the inevitable mult of the war, and how oriti-

cully during part of the campaign our prospects of success seemed to hang in the balance, it is matter for the deepest regret that such reconstruction had not taken place earlier, though perhaps from the nature of things this was hardly to be expected.