De Wet on the War.

Manawatu Herald, 8 January 1903, Page 3

De Wet on the War.

A SUMMARY OP BOOK. The special bf the Cape Times following admirable _ summary of the leading feature -’j in Mje book ; General De In his book, provides a powerful and fascinating narrative, and displays a generous spirit throughout, though he is very bitter against the National Scouts. The necessity for the surrender of the Boer forces, he declares, was mainly due to them. Their advice and guidance in the British successes during the closing \ months of the war were to be constantly detected. The Boer leader T is enraged at the surrender of General Prinsloo in July, 1900. He says that it was wholly unjustified. The force was split into three divisions, each of which was ordered to take a different direction, General De Wet's Column got away safely, but the remainder never attempted to move, though their course was clear. It Jte difficult to acquit General Prinsloo, the writer adds, for this definite act of treachery. He and his officers committed nothing short of murder. General De Wet exclaims angrily, " One gnashes one’s teeth to think of a nation so ready to rush to its ruin.” Paardeberg, he says, was a dossal misjudgment. General De Wet was operating outside the British cordon, and made a clear passage for General Cronje’s escape. He implored the latter to abandon his wagons and dash through. General Oronje refused to budge, General De Wet finally sent Danio Theron, his chief scout, to tell General Oronje to fight his way out during the night. Theron performed an exploit which General De Wet says was unequalled daring the war. Both going and returning, ho crawled past British sentries, tearing his trousers to rags and lascerating his skin. General Oronje still would not budge, but preferred to be courageous at the expense of his country’s independence. His personal bravery was undoubted, but i he was lamentably stubborn and deaf t<to advice. Paardeberg was the greatest blow of the war, and its baleful influence dogged the steps of the Boer forces for months, unnerved the burghers, and caused a string of calamities, including the wild fight at Poplar Grove. The defence of Bloemfontein, General Da Wet continues, was fully planned. Commandant Welbach, holding the key of the position, deserted the town during the night, with the result that the capital was taken without a shot. Similar acts of treachery made him almost heartbroken. After the capitulation of Bloemfontein, the British troops swarmed over- the country. Successful opposition by our burghers demanded rapidity of action more than anything else. They had to fight quickly, reconnoitre quickly, and fly, if necessary, quickly. “ This is exactly what I aimed at, and had not many ; burghers proved false to their colours, England, as the great Bismarck bad foretold, would have found her grave in South Africa.”

He describes his numerous escapes, and considers as the most wonderful that near Kroonstad in August, 1900. While staying at Commandant Nel’s farm, hia suspicions were aroused by the behaviour of a strange Hottentot. He was filled with unaccountable uneasiness, and leaving his bed at midnight ordered his followers to paddle, and bolted. Hardly had he ICe before 200 British troops stormed the farm, intent upon his capture. After his wanderings in the Transvaal and the Cape Colony, he was always glad to get back to his beloved Free State, where he felt more at home* ' • The portion of General De Wet a

forces under Commandant Pronemairheld up'a train at Leeuwapruit, in the Orange River Colony. The men were ordered to storm the train, but they disobeyed, otherwise Lord Kitchens? would have fallen into their hands, though they did not then know that he was a passenger. As the train stopped, Lord Kitchener unrecognised, got a horse from a wagon, mounted it, and disappeared into the darkness. The Boer leader regrets that this great opportunity was lost. General De Wet was responsible for the disasters at Sanaa’s Post, Riet River, and Eeddersburg. He deplores the grass fire at Biddulphsburg, in which the English wounded were burned to death. The origin of the fire, he states, is inexplicable. The writer recognises the gallantry of many-British officers, but refers in a withering tone to the Cape Mounted Rifles, Brabant’s Horse, and similar corps, because they were largely composed of Afrikanders. General De Wet repeatedly complains that the wagons hampered bis movements. He quickly saw that the old laager system had exploded, and had the utmost difficulty in convincing the burghers of the folly of dragging round cumbersome convoys. The Boer leader plaintively re- I marks that the British forces constantly concentrated on him, and prevented any chance of a great battle. Ho was obliged to be always moving. The drive which took place in the Orange River Colony last February Was his severest experience. He and ex-President Steyn, together with two thousand others, including many youths and old men, charged a cordon pt Helspruit at a point which was defended by Remington’s Guides, and a severe engagement followed. The General admits that he had to use the sjambok on the burghers, and that he, with two hundred men, had a narrow escape. At the beginning of June, 1900, the Boors were on the verge of despair. ■ The English swarmed over the country, and the burghers surrendered everywhere. General Do Wet says : —“ All we could do was to make the best of every little chance we got of hampering the enemy. If fortune deserted us, it only remained to flee. Ab, to flee. 'What would have been more bitter than that ? The book concludes as follows: “ To my nation I address the last word. Be loyal to.the new Government. Loyalty pays best in the end, and loyalty alone is worthy of j the nation which shed its blood for freedom.”