Protection of British Commerce.

Manawatu Herald, 29 September 1898, Page 3

Protection of British Commerce.

. *. Bear-Admiral Lord oharle3 Bkbbsford, in Cassobr's Magazine It is veil to remember tbat -while the chief aim of our military shipping will be either to blookade the enemy in his own port, or to indue? him to oome out and then to capturp or destroy him at Bea whenever or wherever found, there is to be considered the larger duty of protecting •ommerce by direct means. It will not be sufficient for tbe navy to blockade and fight the enemy, be cause if this alone were done the damage which might be inflicted on our commerce by one or two cruiser*? which got out, on to the trade route? would be simply incalculable. The damage from cruiser attack in the blue water, and of torpedo attack in the narrow seas, are the two great elements of danger which we have tc face in defending commerce. lam aware that the objection has been raised that international rule? would scarcely allow of a torpedo boat attack upon the mercantile marine during war. International rules, which may be observed when insignificant Powers quarrel and there are all the great Powers to 100 l on, and perhaps to interfere, arc likely to be much more elastic when tbe greatest naval Power — ourselves —is opposed to a coalition of two or more of the next greatest Powers. In other words, there is no possible chance of securing the recognition of so-called international rules and usaf.__ in warfare artless the parties to the quarrel are overawed by a possible combination stronger tban themselves, or the fear of reprisals acts as a deterrent. Apart from this the torpedo boat argument is very weak, in my opinion, because if it is permissible for a cruiser to destroy commerce by means of torpedoes— a> right which no one seeks to deny — it is on the face of it hardly likely that the right could be denied to the torpedo boat pure and simple. With regard to cruisers attack in blue water?, a foreign programme of strategy, which lies before me as I write, " points out that "to have Groat Britain at our mercy, it suffices to starve ber by intercepting and hitting her enormous mercantile fleet whioh carries the treasures of the world ; it suffices to starve her by stopping the packet boats that supply corn from foreign lands. These long files of cargo boats generally take the same course, routes tbat avc known to all navigators ; each of these ships recognises in its turn, certain capes, tbat sorve as land marks on their way. It is, therefore, easy to overtake them on their usual route or at their landing place." 1 his plan of attack will undoubtedly be adopted by any Power opposed to ns, and it will be the damage done before we are ready that will be the worst. Shippers are very nervous people, and the frightful losses which

our mercantile marine is, at present, likely to suffer upon the outbreak of war, would send up insurance rates to a prohibitive figure, deter shippers from sending cargoes afloat until our navy had achieved some striking success, and these two items would so operate as to cause an immediate and alarming rise of prioes fn this country directly war was declared. It will be seen, therefore, that the solution of the problem how to meet these -dangers lies entirely in the question of adequate organisation before there is any probalility of war. A definite system of keeping open the line of communication must be laid down. The Admiralty part of the plans for the mercantile marine in time of war ought to be cut, dried, and pigeon-holed ready for use. To the best of my knowledge and belief thore are no suoh plans, except of the most elementary charaoter. There were none in 1888, and it is unlikely they have been made since. The dangers are undoubted.