An Important Licensing Decision.

Manawatu Herald, Volume III, Issue III, 21 May 1891, Page 2

An Important Licensing Decision.

. _♦ On the 20th March the Lord Chancellor gave judgement in the appeal case of Sharp v. Wakefield. The appeal was from the decision of the Court of Appeal and raised a question of great importance to the owners of licensed premises, it being whether the licensing justices have a discretionary power to refuse to renew the license on the ground that there was no longer a necessity for a licensed house in the neighbourhood. It appeared that on the 10th of September, 1887, William Bedding applied to the licensing justices for the Kendal District of Westmoreland, of whom Mr Wakefield was chairman, for the renewal of a license for the sale of intoxicating liquors at the Lowbridge Inn, at Kentmere in that county. The application was refused. Susannah Sharp, the owner of the inn, appealed in due form to the Quarter Sessions for Westmoreland, on October 24th, 1887, contending that on an application for the renewal of an existing license, the justices were not entitled to inquire into the character and wants of the neighbourhood, or to refuse a renewal upon the ground that there was no longer a necessity for a licensed house in the neighbourhood. The Court of Quarter Sessions refused to renew the license, on the ground of the remoteness of the premises from police supsrvision and of the character and necessities of the locality and neighbourhood *in which the inn was situated. The case was then stated for the opinion of the Queen's Bench division and the appeal being lost, it was carried to the Court of Appeal, lost there and then to the House of Lords and as will oe seen, lost there also. The Lox'd Chancellor, in giving judgment, said he did not think that at any period of the argument any of their lordship^ doubted but that the judgmant of the Court of Appeal must be affirmed, and that by the express language of the statute, which was still the governing statute on the subject, the granting of licensee was expressly within the directiou of the magistrates. He was of opinion that no limitation had ever alterecL the provision. But if they were to argue a priori, what possible reason could there be for limiting the discretion of justices to the first grantiug of a license ? It was not denied that for the purpose of the original grant it was within the power, and even the duty, of the magisrates to consider the wants of the neighbourhood, with reference both to its population, means of in=- A spection by the proper authorities, -^ and so forth. If that was so, what sense or reason could there be in making one of those topics irrelevant in any one direction ? It surely must have been in the contemplation of the Legislature that the ciroumstances of the neighbourhood ' might ohange and the population of

the neighbourhood diminish or increase. »„ . i , In. truth, the arguments for the appellant had been addressed, not to the true construction of the Act of 1828, and subsequent Acts, but to some supposed injustice, and that the legislature could never have entrusted the justices with a discretion so wide. But if the injustice were so great as suggested that consideration could not prevail over the plain language ot legislature. . . . As to the question of law arising upon the language of all the statutes it might, in his judgment, be very shortly disposed of. The first statute, it was admitted, gave discretion. Did any Acts passed since purport to withdraw it? Certainly not. On the contrary, they expressly retained it subject to certain provisions which it could not be pretended affected to exclude the topics which it was argued were topics irrelevant to a re newal. He did not say that a repeal or renewal might not be implied by subsequent statutes enacting something inconsistent with a previous Act, but in a uialti i r so constantly before the Legislature as the licensing laws, he could not but think that if it was intended to alter the law in this respect it would have been done in plain language. Now the "Acts of 1872 and 1874 the Acts relied upon — did not profess to limit the discretion but enacted certain new procedures, all of which was perfectly consistent with the preservation intact of the discretion given to the magistrates. This was merely procedure, and it left the earlier Act absolutely untouched upon the subject now in debate, and he entirely approved of and j adopted the decision of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn and Mr Justice Charles arrived at thirteen years ago. Consequently was of opinion that the appeal ought to be dismissed with costs. Lord Bramwell concurred. He said he was distinctly of opinion that a discretion to grant or refuse the renewal of this license was vested in the justices, and that they had exercised their discretion within the powers conferred upon them. Lords 0. Herschell, Macnaughten, and Hannen also expressed their agreement with the judgement delivered by the Lord Chancellor. The judgement of the Court Appeal was, therefore, affirmed, and the appeal dismissed with costs.