THE Manamatu Herald. TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1879. THE ZULU WAR.

Manawatu Herald, Volume I, Issue 70, 29 April 1879, Page 2

THE Manamatu Herald. TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1879. THE ZULU WAR.

Tho disasters which have befallen our troops in the conflict with the Zulus, will doubtless onfer upon it a historic position above many of the " little wars" in which Great Britain has eugaged during recent years. The extent of those disasters it is perhaps difficult at first sight to realise. Whole regiments of British soldiers have been slaughtered by overwhelming numbers of the halftrained Zulu army. Perhaps the worst news has not reached us yet. Flushed with victory, it is possible Cetewayo may yet attempt the invasion and total destruction of the Colony of Natal In the present article, w& desire f.o point out the causes, which led up tj the Zulu war. It appears Sir Bartle Frere (Governor of the Cape) acts in South Africa as High Commissioner of the Imperial Government, having been placed over the Governors of the adjoining colonies, so that practically in hi 3 hands was left the administration of all the British dependencies in that part of the world. Sir Theo. Shep* stone (Governor of Transvaal), and the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, were both instructed during last year to address Sir Bartle Frere on all important matters relating to native affairs, or to any subjects not entirely connected wit a tha purely internal administration of their respective Colonies. As far back as last September, Sir Bartle Frere asked for reinforcements of troops, for special purposes, in anticipation of hostilities bieaking out with the Zulus. This request the Imperial Government denied, in a despatch dated October 17, 1878, ontheground that •• by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting ihe Zulus in a spirit of forbearance andreasonable compro * mise, it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of war with Cetewayo." In the same despatch, Sir Bartle Frere was directed to consult on the situation of South Africa, with Sir Henry Bulwer and Lord Chelmsford. A report was accordingly

forwarded from thoso gentlemen to the Home Government by Sir Bar tie Frere, who also sent a list of charges made against Cetewayo, and pointed out iv strong' terms tile formidable and threatening- character of the Zulu power. This Sir Michael HicksBeach, Secretary of State for the Colonies, fully admitted, but asked whoMier a collision with the iSulus could not be postponed, The London Times thus summarises the position : — The answor was, that its postponement did not depend upon the" British, or Colonial Governments, but on the Zulu King-, and that Oetewayo's character afforded no ground for confidence. "As long." Sir Bartlo Frere wrote, "as a large force is maintained in Natal, it is possible that fear may preponderate over cupidity, pride, or passion ; but with Chaka as his avowed model, we can never have any better security for peace than an armed truce while ho rules Zululand." But it is, ho argued, out of the question to expect that ail Imperial force strong enough to overawe Cetewayo will be per" manently maintained in Natal, and what is to happen when Lord Chelmsford's troops are withdrawn ? The military organization is upheld '* for the avowed purpose of conquest j and aggression of the bloodiest and i most barbarous kind," and, sooner or later, it is oertain to be turned against the whito men, either in Natal or the Transvaal. The Zulu ambition finds itself hemmed in ou every side by tho British power, and againss that | power it will fling itself at. last. For ; Bottle 3'ears past there have been unrest and rising audacity, not alone among the Zulus, but among all the natives of South Africa, and their disposition to measure their strength with that of ihe white men has been shown in various quarters and at different times. But in every dis* turbance, in Secocoeni's attack on the Boprs, in the disaffection of the chiefs of Pondolaud, and in the open rebellion iv Caffraria, Sir Hartle Frere detects" the influence of Zulu intrigue. " I should, therefore," he wrote, more than three months ago, '* consider any delay in convincing the Zulus of the futility of attempts to restore their old supremacy as a great unmitigated misfortune for all the nativ6 races." Any concessions with a view to avert a collision would be mistaken for weakness. Such was the High Commissioner's view of the situation when he applied again for reinfoi'cements. He reCbived them, on the distinct understanding- that they were to be used for defensive purposes only. But the necessity fov offensive action had fixed itself in his mind. Zulu raids were frequent, and directly the garrison was woakened, a Zulu invasion was almost certain. Lord Chelmsford, Commander in chief, considered a defensive plan was unsatisfactory unless the troops were ready to assume the offensive at the right moment. Despotism and cruelty of a detestable character wero carried on in the Zulu dominions almost under the eyes of the British, and it was said, " no one can really sleep iv peace and security within a day's run of the Zulu chief." But another and larger question was involved. We again quote from the Times : — Sir Bartle Frere asserted that " though there might be no definite agreement between any two tribes, there was a common purpose and a general understanding that the time was now come for the black races to shake off the domination of the white men andexpeithetn from thecountry." Of this enterprise Cetewayo was " the head and moving spirit," and his army was the chosen and trusted weapon. The Zulu king had lately thrown off the disguise of friendliness which he at one time assume!, and, in reply to remonstrances at the massacres which disgrace his rale, had asserted his indepsndence in the most uncompromising language. "Go back," he said, " and tell the white men this, and let them hear it well. The Governor of .s'atal and I are equal. He is Governor of Na'al, and I am Governor hero." Is it safe to rest upon such terms, Sir Bartlo Frere asks, with such a neighbor? Is the "armed truco" endurable? These questions Sir Bartle Frere decided iv the negative, and having done so, he felt hims9lf free to " settle the Zulu question thoroughly and finally" by imposing such conditions on Oetewayo as would for ever paralyse his military despotism, and thenceforward deprive him of the power of disquieting his neighbors. The strengthening of Lord Ohelmsford's army afforded an opportunity whicn might not occur again of compelling Cetewayo, "if necessary, by force," to accept and observe those conditions. Such is the history of the ultimatum, the refusal of which led to the advance of Lord Uhelmsford's troops. The object of Sir Bartle Frere may be accomplished, in the crushing of the Zulu power. So far it has been a costly war, and after it is c included, and the Zulus crushed, there will continue to exist, as in this colony, the smouldering embers of rebellion and discontent in the minds of the Zulus towards their conquerors.