STILL UNCERTAIN

Marlborough Express, Volume LXXV, Issue 254, 28 October 1942, Page 3

STILL UNCERTAIN

»- s AUSTRALIA'S PACIFIC ROLE INTERNAL DIFFERENCES. , THROUGH AN AMERICAN'S EYES.

; P.A. Cable.

NEW YORK, Oct. 26.

Mr Hanson Baldwin, writing in the New York Times, says: | "After ten months of war in the Pacific, Australia's rcle in it is still uncertain. The campaign in the Solomons is not based on Australia. Primarily it is based on Hawaii, and secondarily on New Zealana and New Caledonia. "The battle of the Solomons is not primarily ari efifort to protect the supply line to Australia, for under present strategy Australia has become a seeondary base. It is a battle to break Japan's power bv pushing northwara towards Rabau) and Truk the heart of the Japanese-doipin-ated Western Pacific. "When General MacArthur was assigned the command of the SouthWestern Pacific, it was understood that Australia would be the main base for any such move. Australia may vet become the main base of a powerful Allied cffort, but the reason its potentialities are not yet fuily developed is partly intemal problems indigent to Australia and partly shipp-ing shortage. "The strategic problem is further complicated by tho division of the Pacific into two separate areas. General MacArthur's position as commander-in-chief is rendered difficult by Australia's interna1 problems. Warwick Fairfax, referring to the serious Tapanese threat to Porfc Moresby recently asked whether the margin of time1 given by the arrival of Allied reinforcements was not somewhat narrow and also whether the fact that Australia might have to be defended partly in New Guinea was generally appreciated, adding that any retort to the effect that it was first necessary to concentrate on the defence of Australia is not, I think, eomplete. As Fairfax wrote, such a repiy is far from eomplete, but it contains inferentially part of the explanation of what has been wrong in Australia.

V POLITICAL AND LABOUR HANDICAPS. "Like so many other liaitions and like some of our own leadership. Australia was a long time too preoccupied in the defence of her own soil to pay proper attention to New Guinea. Nor was this the fault of General MacArthur who in some ways is supreme commander in name only. He has been hampered by a number of faetors, firstly, by the unfortunate proposal made that the United States nominate him as Prosident, which General MacArthur has not supported. Australian politics also must be considered since they weig'n heavily in the war's balance sheet as in the case of all the other United Nations, ' "The position of any American or any non-Australian as supreme commander of both American and Australian troops is naturally somewhat difificult. The circumstances under which General MacArthur arrived in Australia when the country was in dire danger of invasion naturally strengthened Mr Curtin's political position. The Australian War Cabinet naturally continued to reserve a considerable share of authority — military decisions have not alwavs been General MacArthur's. The normal difficult.ies of waging a coalition war have been increased in Australia by the labour problem', about which Australians themselves are complaining. There is no qucstion, in the opinion of many Australians, that Labcui's insistence on 'its rights,' its determination to work no more that the statfed number of hours, excluding Saturday afterncons and holidays, and its general attitude to the war have hampered the full developmcnt of the United Nations' War effort in Australia. The Labour attitude is best dcscribed as complacency. Many workers seern primarily interested in retaining peacetime privileges. Australians are open-heartea. friendly and hospitable and treated our troops as brothers, but as a result of the labour situation what has been accomplished in Australia is largely the result of our own efforts." "Our troops in many instances unloaded convoys, replacing stevedores who were not required to work after the whistle. We built airfields. roads and cantonments. The Australians helped, but insofar as laboui was concerned their help has by no means been what was hoped for. There are other problems which are cnly the reflection of a casual, easy, carefree mind too common in many of the United Nations "But the full development of Australia as the main base of operations is handicapped by more than internal problems. Shipping is a major factor, because the long supply lines to Australia impose a great strain to keep Australia supplied, yet the only way in which an effensive can be developed from Australia is across the seas. This means ships. Any offensive from Australia must be amphibious. This means not only transports and cargo- ships but also battleships to protect them,. INSUFFICIENT NAVAL FORCE. "General MacArthur has only a very limited naval force, insufficient to support a strategic push northward. Some of his vessels have been attached to the South Pacific forces in the Solomons offensive. General MacArthur's bombers have also supported this offensive by heavy attacks against Rabaul and the northern Solomons bases. In other words, the forces under the command of one of the two great strategical commanders in the Pacific have supported the forces under the command of the other and vice versa. "When the commands of General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were defined, strategic problems were complicated by division, of the Pacific into two separate areas, lumping Australia, New Guinea, part of the Solomons, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines as one strategic unit, under General MacArthur, but excluding New Zealand, Truk, and New Caledonia, When the Solomons^ campaign was mapped out, the dividing line between the authority of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur ran squarelv through Guadalcanar. Thus, to cehtralise authority under the navy, which conducted the campaign, the line was moved westward, putting all Guadalcanar and tho southern Solomons under Admiral Nimitz, but today the lino still divides the Solomons. All the Japanese bases in the northern Solomons and also, Rabaul lie on General MacArthur's side, though our first footholds, in the southern Solomons are on Admiral Nimitz's side. "This division is not necessarily a serious handicapi, but poses problems, particularly shoula Australia some dav become the base ■ for a

great counter-cflcnsive. That in turn is dependent on a solution of the shipping shortage, remediai measures to solve Australia's internal difficulties, and determination of the strategic role Australia must play in the Pacific," xr