STILL INSECURE

Marlborough Express, Volume LXXVI, Issue 252, 26 October 1942, Page 5

STILL INSECURE

•v S0L0M0NS HOLD REALISTIC REVIEW B0DY BLOW AIMED AT JAPAN

P.A. Cable.

NEW YORK, Oct. 24.

"The Solomons started as d limited offensive operation which aimed to stem Japanese encrcaohment on our supply lines to Australia, but now the Solomons is considered as a steppingstone to further Paciflc conquests," says the New York Times correspondent, Mr Hanson Baldv/in. "We have embarked on a strategic offensive in only the tenth month of the war. It is apparent that the main thrust is planned from the southern Facific tov/ards the beast's belly. "The United States has lost 13 ships totalling 58,000 tons in the Solomons, eompared with Japan's eight, totalling 24,000, The American losses are considerahle, though not crippling, and we shall probably be staying in the Solomons unless our mistakes of August and September are repeated. "There is little of the Nelson touch — audacity, audacity, always audacity — in our Solomons operations. After the first landing, our task forces have not been used offensively. Unlike the Japanese, who nightly raided the Guadalcanar areas and shelled the Marines' positions, we have not raided Japanese bases in the northern Solomons. Also, we have not intercepted Japanese night raiders, and not interfered with Japanese night landngs outside the Marine lines on Guadalcanar. NO WORSE THAN SEPTEMBER. "Our cautious policies are partly dictated by Japanese air and naval superiority which they are still maintaining, also by their shorter communication lines, but the Solomons has clearly shov/n our deficiencies. Overcaution and the defensive complex must be remedied. To-day the situation is perhaps no worse than in mid-September, but three basic problems are remaining, of which supply is the first. Though the total casualties among the Marines has not exeeeded 8 to 10 per cent., we must repfiace the losses and keep the Marines siipplied and reinforced. Secondly, the construction of roads, airfields, and docks on Guadalcanar and the New Hebrides must be extended. Thirdly, local naval superiority must be established in order to intercept Japanese vessels, which are nightly landing troops. This can be done only by continuous use of surface craft, foecause air power alone cannot prevent constant infiltration. "Till these problems are solved, our footholds in the Solomons cannot be termed secure. "The -army, navy and marines are working harmoniously together in the Paciflc, but ibehind the lines these is considerable friction and mutual criticism, which is caused partly by pre-war Army and Navy bitterness, and partly by events since the war, for example, the disastrous Philippines campaign for which each service is seeking a scapegoat. CRITICISM OF Mac ARTHUR . "Mueh of the army has joined the ehorus of criticism of General MaeArthur which, behind the scenes, has increased since the fall of Corregidor. This criticism is la^gely due to a misunderstanding of General MacArthur's position in Australia and also to his more liberal and more intelligent application of the censorship rules which initially permitted prompter and more complete coverage of war news in Australia than in the Navy's sphere in the Paciflc. It is further due to lack of appreciation on the part of most outside Australia of the internal difficulties of that country. Furthermore, some army offlcers are criticising, often unjustly, the Navy, calling the surface craft dead ducks, thus exacerbating the friction. "A typical example was the Midway battle, after which the Army released a story creating the impression that army planes were instrumental in the victory, while actually navy carriers did the job and the army's role was only minor. The situation might rapidly be smoothed if overrigid censorship and unintelligent public relations officers had not fed fuel to the fire. Over-stringent censorship and delay in dissemination of war news from the Paciflc are primarily the navy's fault. The announcement of naval losses is often so delayed that the public has learnt to keep its fingers erossed whenever navy communiques are published. So, too, do the men who do the fighting. For example, early news published about the Solomons was so different from the actual situation that the men who did the job laughed at our own announcements." Mr Baldwin concludes that the navy's public relations policies have not only prevepted the public getting a clear idea of^the eritical nature of the Paciflc campaign, tout have also exaggerated differences between the services and often fcadly affected the morale of the fighting services. But they have not depressed the enemy's morale. The power of public opinion has not yet been used as a positive war weapon.