THE RAILWAY CATASTROPHE.

Marlborough Daily Times, Volume II, Issue 156, 17 September 1880, Page 3

THE RAILWAY CATASTROPHE.

Ttie Evening Post in the following article reviews the probable cause for the laite disaster, and suggests a remedy for the future:—‘LThe deplorable accident on the Rimutaka incline of the Wellington-Masterton railway, by which, on Saturday last, three lives were sacrificed arid a score of people more or less severely injured, is a fair subject for comment. At the same time, unless such comment is dictated by some slight knowledge of railway meehar cs a d of the system - under Which that particular, section

of oui'railway is worked, it is much less likely to take the shape of intelligent* and useful criticism than to resolve itself into a tissue of idle, impracticable, or absurd suggestions. The evidence of every competent witness establishes beyond reasonable doubt the fact that the train was simply Tjlo a n off the line l.y 1 h ; e cccksive force of the wind at that point. A Wairarapa paper publishes a silly statement by a person described as an official who was present when the disaster took place,” to the effect that “ there was but a single central buffer between the carriages, and that had there been a buffer on either side, the accident would not, probably, have taken place. With proper precautions, in his opinion, no amount of wind could overturn a cairiage.” That “official” obviously discoursed with the happy audacity of the densest ignorance. It is by no means a rare occurrence for railway carriages to be blown off the rails in violent gales. That lias occurred many times in England and elsewhere. Even (lie last mail brought intelligence of an accident of this kind. What has occurred to the heavy carriages of the 4ft Blin English gauge, -weighing on the average 10 or 12 tons each, is all the more likely to happen to the light vehicles weighing only 5 or 4 tons, used on our 3ft Gin gauge, especially on curves of 5 chains radius and a gradient of 1 in 15, which are utterly unknown in English railway practice. The carriages, lit must he remembered, are only kept on the rails by their own weight. It is therefore a very easy matter to calculate the force a broadside blow would need to have to he able to overturn them. The science ofanemometry is yet in its infancy, and the late disaster to the Tay Bridge showed that the wind at times developos a dynamic force hitherto almost unsuspected. The existing recordsof windfcrcearenot wholly trust, worthy, but at some of the principal observatories extraordinary pressures have been registered. At the Liverpool observatory a pressure of 991 bs to the square foot was recorded in one gale, and—in-Sydney..... the. ainazing forc3 ofjllTlbs was once recorded, although this has always been received with considerable distrust. Taking, however, the Liverpool observation, and assuming that the gust which wrecked the Feathcrsfcon train had a force of 901 b to the square foot, it will be seen that each carriage, while resting on the rails with a weight of only 3 or 4 tons, would be Struck side way with a blow of 8 or 10 tons. This at once shows the extreme probability of carriages being blown off the rails unless retained by something more than their own dead weight-, and as a matter of fact, as we have said, such a mishap is by no means uncommon The “central buffers,” so strongly condemned by this able (i official,” whoever fie may be, ar« among the latest improvements introduced on the English lire!. All the Pulman cars, now used on the heaviest and fastest English, expresses, are fitted with them, as they give greatly increased safety and steadiness in running, especially on sharp curves, and it has been remarked more than rn?e .that when accidents have happened to these trains the passengers in the Pulman. cars .have escaped almost uninjured, although the mortality and damage in the ordinary carriages have been frightful. Here, then, are two distinct “mare’s nests” at starting. Another ridiculous idea is that the accident was caused through some inefficiency in the couplings. It is unnecessary to demonstrate the absurdity of the notion. Anybody can see on a moment’s reflection that, no weakness of the couplings would have caused the carriages*'to be blown over,-while it is abundantly proved that the couplings must have been remarkably strong and safe t.o hold on as they did several a chicles suspended in mid-air, when had a single link given way the whole train must have fallen qji the huddled mass of wounded passengers lying at the foot of the precipice. Tin's stupid theory, is wholly untenable, and even were, the allegations made at the l inquest to the prejudice, of the. driver and lireman really well-founded, this would in no way •account for the mishap, or do away with the admitted fact, testified to,by a host of reliable witnesses that the force of the wind, pot only at the time of the disaster, but many hours later, was so great that strong men were blown bodily from their feet. This then-may be accepted gas conclusively proved, and it only remains to consider what steps can be taken to prevent the recurrence of such a shocking.', catastrophe. One very foolish;i•suggestion which has been offered is that the Fell engine should haul the whole‘train up the incline instead of pffiiluiTg" the'passenger carria’desL One would have' thought the sapient authors of this brilliant idea would have perceived, that this plan would simply transfer the danger from the leading to.the itrailing end of the train. The tail of train r would be blown off instead of thehead—that would be* tin*.;citly. difference. But apart'from* this self-evident, fallacy, seeing that the; power, which can bo exerted by the engine, is less in pushing than in pulling in. the proportion of as much as 3., to- 5 being found "ithati it can haul 50 tons, but;can only epush 30L-it is reasonable to suppose fliat tho plan which gave the better

result would certainly be adopted wore there not some insuperable objection. And that objection is its extreme danger. The only real safeguard against a train’s starting on a

headlong and fatal career down the incline—at least until brought to grief by one of the 5-chain curves—is the lAII engine being lowest with its vertical weight of Sdtnnsanditsmighty gripof 35tonshorizontalprcssureontho middle rail, And this safeguard cannot be dispensed wiili without incurring the gravest peril. A light brakevan would be easily driven down the incline by the momentum of a heavy runaway train, hut the ponderous Fell engine is an impassable barrier so long as its machinery holds firm. Another suggestion is that every carriage should be provided with means of “gripping” the middle rail. That in plain terms, means fitting every carriage with expensive brake machinery and a special guard. We hear this would swallow up all the small proposal that break-winds should be erected at exposed points is a good one, so far as it goes; but such

break-winds would require lobe of enormous strength, and to be on both

si lesof the lire, as the fierce gusts come from several directions. In short, they would have to he somewhat after the style of the snow-sheds in use on mountain railways in Europe and America. This again means heavy expense; but something of ihe kind should certainly he attempted. Lastly, it lias been approved by the authorities, that two Fell engines should be attached to the train,- one in front and one at the rear. This seems the only practical device which as yet can he adopted, but, it tco labors under the disadvantage of excessive, costliness. Double cngincrnlining means double expenses for staff, fuel, Arc. The extra engine must be run in steam otherwise it would form a complete load in itself for the other engine, and moreover, could not render aid when required. The leading engine would have to do all the pulling so as to keep the couplings extended tight the trailing engine simply moving its own weight so as to relieve the other, and allow it to pull the train. This, too, has the drawback that the passengers will be almost smothered in the tunnels with the dense smoke and steam from the first engiuo, but that, however, cannot be helped. AVe observe that this plan is to be used only when the wind is high but as that cannot be ascertain ed until the train reaches the dangerous spot it follows that for safety to be secured two engines must al ways be employed. All this implies the complete absorption of any profit arising from that section of the railway, anil goes strongly to boar out our contention tint the line is a gigantic and costly failure, and that the idea < f its being practicnVe to use it as a main trunk line at all—even to tin* East Coast, much more to the West Coast is monstrous and insane in the extreme.”