GENERAL FOCH’S TASK

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17280, 22 September 1916, Page 2

GENERAL FOCH’S TASK

LIE OF THE LAND. (From H. Warner Allen, representative of British Press with French Army.) In tho Sommo offensive tho French battle-front is about ten miles in length. It runs, as the communiques have shown, from the district of Hardeccurt, north of the Somme, whero.it joins up with tho British front, to a point a mile or two south of the main road between Amiens and St Quentin. This road provides a striking landmark in the southern section on the French extreme right. It follows a course that is absolutely direct east and west, as if it had been drawn with a ruler, until, after crossing tho French trenches, it disappears in enemy territory. Tho lines of big trees that fringe it can bo followed for miles, and seem to resemble those perfect straight lines in which tho geographer delights, rather than a road in the building of which a thousand practical difficulties have had to be faced.

A view of . practically tho whole French battlo front can bo obtained from a point of vantago that I have just visited in close proximity to tho lines. On the extremo right tho horizon lino is formed by tho wooded hills that lie near Chaulnes and which rise to a height of about 350 feet. In the foreground tho country is almost a plain, broken only by low rolling hills, with small woods and villages nestling in the hollows. Consequently, as a rule, tho villages are concoaled by the green copses that surround them. A DARING MANOEUVRE.

The character of tho fighting in this sector both north and south of the Amiens-St Quentin road is conditioned by the abundance of fortified woods and vilages. Round Fay, Estrees and Soyecourt the French artillery have had to demolish not only the German underground fortresses in the villages, but also the little woods that gave cover to tho most complicated system of entrenchments. It is for this reason that progress on the right wing has, relatively speaking, been slower than that further north. South of the high

road the main object of the French Command was to protect the advance oa tho north of that road, and this object was accomplished by a brilliant piece of tactics. At the moment of tho first assault the French line in the neighbourhood of Foucaucourt was facing east. The. troops left their trenches in an easterly direction, and as they advanced on Fay and Estrees swept gradually round, pivoting on their starting point, until they were facing due south along the Amiens-St Quentin road. This move-

ment was carried out with complete success, in spite of the obvious danger of a counter-attack on the flank during its execution, and tho positions which exposed a German assault from the trenches which they still held south of the gap opened by the French advance

■were held despite the enemy’s artillery. The new French line thus formed was exposed, on tho one hand, to fire of heavy guns at a distance, which were able to concentrate their shells on a limited and well-defined target, and, on the other hand, to an enfilading fire from the German batteries in the south.

This brilliant and daring manoeuvre guaranteed the French centro from a flank attack during its advance, and its success was indispensable to the progress of the centre. On July 20 the results thus obtained were fortified and consolidated by the capture of part of Soyecourt and other strongly organised positions to the south of the high road in the direction of Vermand-Ovillers.

Further north, in the French centre, tho country is less wooded. Hills are still low and rare, and villages are numerous. Here the main resistance which the French had to overcome was

that made by the enemy in his village fortresses. Such small woods as there were have been torn to pieces by shell fire, and only exist in the form of baro trunks rising from a chaos of shell holes. The villages themselves havo been razed to the ground, and the ruins of Dompierre, Becquincourt, Assevillers, and Herbecourt are almost as shapeless and unrecognisable as tho ruins of Troy or Carthage, and far more so than those of Pompeii. In the direction of Flaucourt the ground begins to rise, and then falls away towards the east, to rise again in a series of small hills just above the Somme. The most important of these hillocks, which lie north-west and stMth-wcst of Biaches, is La Maisonette, captured by the French on July 10.

In this sector the artillery preparation had been particularly successful, and the nature of the ground lent itself to a rapid advance once the village fortresses had been blotted out of existence. After Flaueourt had been taken, on July 3, the Germans were driven back on their last line of defences on the left bank of the Somme, that is to say, the small hills mentioned above. THE FRENCH LEFT. , The French left had to work along the river in liaison with the English, and its movements had necessarily to

be co-ordinated with the advance ot the troops south of the Somme. _ ike country here is moro hilly, and villages aro less plentiful. It was, of course,

risible from, the point from which 1 surveyed the right and centre, but o appreciate fully its configuration it was necessary to observe it from another angle further north. From the Bois de Moreaucourt, which is one of the highest points on the southern bank, the lie of the countrv further north is clearly visible. It consists of a series of bare downs, dotted here and there with small woods, which in their trench organisation are distinctly suggestive of the Champagne Pouillouso. In this district, with its far-scattered villages, the defence is bound to depend mamlj ou xi series of trenches, xuicl it is in this open country that the French advance above Ourlu and Horn has taken placo. The villages of Maurepas and Clery are the two great bastions on which the German trench system is Further south, on the banks of the river, the country is entirely different. The downs fall more or less abruptly to the river, and the road skirts impenetrable marches, some half a mile aroad. In these circumstances the c.uestion of communication between the two banks of the Somme becomes of great importance, and the only interest in the possession of Frise is that it is situated in such a way as to command the loop of the river, -which possesses a bridge across the marches. This bridge, called La Grenouilliere, lies exactly opposite Frise across the base of the loop. At this point the Somme flows first north from Frise, then at Qurlu turns suddenly south, enclosing a promontory of swamps. When last January the Gormans captured tho village of Frise, their Press announced that this success represented a serious advance. As n matter of fact, at' that moment Frise was perfectly useless to them, as it was also to the French. Once at Frise the Germans simply found themselves face to face with the marches, across which all passago was, absolutely impossible. On the south the hills rise very sharply from Frise, so that it could not possibly form a base of operations for an attack in tho direction of Herbecourt. Tho French conifi regard its with equanimity, since Ourlu and.

Hem were in German hands,' and eon* sequontly it was impossible for them to use La Grenouilliere bridge, which reaches the northern bank between these two villages. This brief description of the country forming the French battle front may pei haps suffice to thrown some light on the probable course of future operations. The French are undoubtedly handicapped by tho line of marshes that divides their positions, but their successes up to the present have ensured to them the most important means of communication between th< two hanks of the Somme west of Po ronne.