The Lyttelton Times. WEDNESDAY, DEC. 14, 1881.

Lyttelton Times, Volume LVI, Issue 6489, 14 December 1881, Page 4

The Lyttelton Times. WEDNESDAY, DEC. 14, 1881.

Aktee a general election, Parliament, in all countries in which the British system of representative Government prevails, is called together immediately. The reason is obvious. Representative Government cannot exist constitutionally without the Parliamentary formal delegation of the governing power from the representatives of the people to the persona governing. When, therefore, a new Parliament is returned, the first thing the representatives of the people have to do, is to exercise their power of Parliamentary delegation. Unless this thing is done as speedily as can possibly be managed, the government of the country is being carried on without the consent of the people. Under these circumstances, constitutional government becomes unconstitutional. The Constitution is most jealous of this prerogative of the people. It requires that Parliament must meet not less often than once a year, and that the first business of every session shall bo the pronouncement of the opinion of the popular chamber upon the policy of the Government. Parliament is in consequence opened by the Speech from the Throne, in which the policy of the Government is set forth, and after the speech comes the Address in Reply, m which the Government measures are accepted, temporarily at least, or rejected. Thus it comes to pass that no Government can hold office for more than a year without getting the formal permission of the representatives of the people to continue in office. Representative Government, in fact, is a tenancy of power terminable at will, and untenable without periodical formal renewals of permission to occupy. When Parliament is dissolved, the Government ceases to bold the ordinary permission to occupy. The place of the ordinary permission is taken by a special permission lodged in the maxim that the Queen’s Government must he carried on. But that special permission is necessarily only of temporary character, terminable at the first moment possible for calling Parliament together. The special circumstance of there being no Parliament having ceased, the ordinary delegation of power must be granted by the ordinary authority. Wore it otherwise, a Ministry not being obliged to meet Parliament at once after a now election, would be able to enjoy a long career of power, contrary to the will of the (people. A Constitution which watches with such jealous care over the foundations of responsible Government most

ho held to bo capodally tender la the matter of Urn granting of power after tiio people have been called together to exprtna their views. It waa a long time before the Parliament of'Bog* land vm able to enforce Ite right to be called together periodically. The logical cooeloeion from that anforoamenfe (a that no Ministry can exercise power without the formal delegation of the representatives of the people. The principle is under certain circumstances suspended in England. There, for tbs sake of convenience, the custom after dissolution is, when the political conditions remain unaltered, and there in no question of confidence tn the Ministry, to continue the recess by prorogation until the usual time for the mooting of Parliament. These conditions for the suspension of tho principle are absent in the present case of New Zealand. The political oondi* lions have altered. The constituencies which have elected the new Parliament are not the constituencies which wore represented in tbo old; the balance of power between the various Provincial districts of the Oolony has been placed on a different basis, and a more Liberal franchise has come for the first time into play. As, moreover, the Ministry only reached the recess last September on sufferance, the question before the country after the dissolution was of Ministerial confidence. The conditions necessary before convenience can be consulted by the suspension of the Constitutional principle, being absent, the principle remains in fall binding force. The principle is unaffected by the vote of the constituencies, The point is not whether the country has or has not returned a House of Bepresenlatives pledged to support the Ministry. The point is that the Ministry which has carried on . the Queen’s Government through the time intervening between the dissolution of Parliament and the election of a new House of Representatives must consult the new House, Tbo old House, te which the Ministry was responsible, having ceased to exist, the Ministry most consult the new House, to which alone it is responsible. There is only one way in which this consultation con take place. That method is prescribed by the Constitution. It is to coll the new House together, and that the Ministry mnst do at the earliest possible moment. Even when the verdict of the constituencies is in favour of the Government of the day, Parliament mnst be at once called together, for without the House of Representatives the delegation of power is impossible, and the holding of power without delegation is unconstitutional. When, alter dissolution, the verdict of the country is not in favour of the Government, the ease for an immediate consultation of Parliament is strengthened by on additional argument. The Ministry, which has been found not to possess the confidence of the country, mnst at once meet Parliament to meet its fate. In the present case the country has, according to the showing of the Ministerial Press, not declared in favour of the Government. When, out of a total of 91, only 42 are represented by Ministerial observers of the situation os in favour of Ministers, while there is a large brigade set down as Independent, the best that can be said of the Ministerial case is that it is doubtful whether Ministers possess the confidence of the country. From the Ministerial point of view, the Ministerial position is donbtfol. Ministers cannot, therefore, think of going on without calling Parliament together at once. It is their constitutional duty to take the proper constitutional step to clear up the doubt without delay. It is most unseemly that a Government Which doubts whether it possesses the public confidence should sot for six months as if it possessed fully the right to power formally delegated by the representatives of the people. If the Ministerial point of view is left out of the question, hardly as it bears on the evident intention of the Government, the other and more probable view of the results of the election remains. That, giving 38 against the Government, with 18 Independents, places the Government In the strong probability of a large minority. According to that view, Ministers should call Parliament together immediately; not to obtain a merely formal lease of power, bnt to ask whether the representatives of the people intend to repose confidence in them any longer. When Napoleon was meditating a policy by which ho hoped to gain the Grown of Spain for his brother Joseph, Talleyrand gave him a word of warning. 44 Sire,” said the shrewd Minister, “ crowns are seized, not pilfered.” Between the act of seizure there advised and the neglect to call Parliament together at Wellington immediately, there is, constitutionally, no difference. The one is a seizure of power without right just as much as tbo other was. It is precisely against such acta of rapine that Constitutions are devised. When a Constitution is imposed upon a country, might ceases to be the law, giving place to right. A Constitution, having been imposed, can only endure as long as it receives implicit obedience from all parties in the State and all individuals. Consequently, the duty of the highest is to give the beat example. In implicit obedience to the Constitution, Government should call Parliament together at once. Ministers have, doubtless, not reflected upon the position in which they stand. Reflection ought to convince thorn that if they refrain from colling Parliament together till the usual time, they will be seizing power for six months by an act of rapine, pure and simple. This will be tbo logical conclusion from their failure to obey tbo Constitution by calling Parliament at once together. Let them obey tbo Constitution and give a good example.