UNITED STATES.
Intelligence had been received at Sydney from California to the 22nd February, in which news from the Atlantic States to the 26th of the previous month is acknowledged. The ' San Francisco Evening Bulletin' of February 22nd, publishes the following summary of the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, presented by Senator Slidell, in-relation to the bill for the appropriation of thirty millions of dollars to facilitate the proposed purchase of Cuba, and ot the debate which thereupon followed in the Senate : — On the 24th January, in the United States Senate, Mr. Slidell, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill making ;'P" propriations to facilitate the acquisition of Cuba by negotiation, reported the report of the committee on the acquisition of Cuba, and said : —lt is uo^ considered necessary by the committee toenlmge upon the vast importance of the acquisition "| Cuba. Its ultimate acquisition may be consider' I a fixed purpose of the United States—a purpose resulting from geographical and political necessities, which have been recognised by all parties an« administrations, and in regard to which the popular voice has been expressed unanimously in luvo"1The purchase and annexation of Louisiana led, a necessary corrollary, to Florida, and both po' 1' with unerring certainty to Cuba. What the p"s' session of the mouth of the Mississippi was to W west, Cuba will become to the nation. Our leadny
JM statesmen have endeavoured with steadiness and ' H perseverance to hasten the consummation of this IS ProJ6ct. ' ■'■■■>■■.■. '■■' ■■" jffi The report here quotes the opinions of Jefferson, S Adams, Clay, Van Buren, Buchanan,"in'his; dispatch II to Saunders, Everett", in his celebrated letter to Ik Sartiges, and Marcy's dispatch to Soule. From X these authorities it is manifest that the ultimate « acquisition of Cuba has been long regarded not B only as desirable but inevitable. The only difH ference is in the time, mode, and conditions of obH taining it. The law of our national existence is 11 growth, which we cannot disobey, while we should B not unduly stimulate it, and should be careful not gH to impose upon ourselves a regimen so strict as to X prevent its healthy development. MB England, France, and Russia are expanding by 9| the same law of progression, but their growth is n| the absorption of weaker powers, whilst ours is the i 5 result of geographical position, higher civilization, II t and greater aptitude for government. We have p[ neither the right nor disposition to find fault with B ; this; so let England pursue her annexation in fh India, France in Africa or the Khine, Russia sub--11 i due barbarous Asia, and we shall look on their ip progress, if not with favour, at least with indif- | ference. We claim on this Hemisphere the same I privilege. We repeat that the acquisition of Cuba l is but a question of time. The fruit that was not ■ ripe in.Quincy Adams' day is now mature, and the i question is, shall it be plucked by a friendly hand | prepared to compensate its proprietor with a princely guerdon, or shall it fall to the ground P As Spain cannot long maintain her grasp, there are j but three alternatives: First. ; The possession of Cuba by one of the great European powers, which is incompatible with our safety, and must consequently be resisted. Second. The independence of the island, which would result in a protectorate, more or less disguised. If under ours, annexation would follow; if. under European, civil and servile war would result. Third. TLe question, how is this to be done, can only be answered—by conquest or negotiation. Conquest, even without the interference of other powers than 'Spain, would' be expensive, and with such interference it would involve the whole civilised world in war. Purchase, then, is the only practicable course; but that cannot be attempted, with success, unless the President be clothed with the powers to negotiate and pay, as he suggested in his message.1 Much has been said of the danger | of confiding such powers to the Executive, but we have three examples, in the purchase of Louisiana, Forida, and Mexico. Much has also been said of indelicacy^ also, that I the offer will wound the Spanish pride, and be rejected with contempt. For* many" years our desire for the purchase of Cuba has been known to the worTd. We now simply say to Spain, you have a distant possession, held by a precarious ; tenure, which is almost indispensable to us for the | protection of our commerce, and which may, from : I its peculiar geographical position, the character ■: of its population, and the mode in which they are I governed, lead at any time to a rupture which both I nations would deprecate. This possession yields | you a net revenue not amounting, on the average | of a, series of years, to the hundredth part of the j price we offer. True, you have refused to sell j heretofore, but circumstances are changing daily, ; and our offer may now be more acceptable than in 1848.
Should -war break out in Europe, Spain can scarcely hope to escape being involved—the Cubans may edze the opportunity to proclaim their independence. Further, our Minister will not broach the subject of purchase till he has reason to believe it will be favourably entertained. Spain is a country of coup d'etats and pronunciamentos; the Minister of to-day may be a fugitive to-morrow. With the forms of a responsible government, Spain is a despotism sustained by the bayonet. Her financial condition is^one of extreme embarrassment and a crisis may arrise whenever the dynasty may be overthrown, unless a'large sum of money can.be raised forthwith. The President says he.would not acquire except by honourable negotiations, and he will not depart from such a course, unless circumstances which he does not anticipate may render a departure justifiable under the imperative, and overruling law of self-preservation. He tellus it may be necessary to renew the negotiations and make an advance in money without awaiting a ratification by .the Senate. This, in point of fact, is an appeal to Congress for an expression of its opinion on the propriety of renewing the negotiations. Should we fail to give him the means, he will consider it as an intimation that we do not desire the acquisition of the island. The report then goes on to say that if, .as has been said, the Cubans do not desire a transfer, it would be a very serious objection to the measure, but the Cubans would be less than men if they are contented with their lot, and the report has the best authority for asserting that nearly the entire native population of Cuba desire annexation. The report then proceeds at considerable length to discuss thebearing of annexation on the slave trade, urging that this illegal traffic is now confined to Cuba and Porto Rico, and that Spain could have suppressed it;as completely as Brazil has done, but she had not done so; therefore, those who desire to exterminate the slave trade may find in the sympathy for the African "an incentive to support this bill. Then turning round, the report proceeds to relieve the minds of. southern gentlemen of their apprehension of peril to their institution from the different elements of Cuban society, as made up, by adding that annexation would increase the comforts of the slave. Next the circumlocution of Havana-Cuban diplomacy is recurred to and condemned. Statistics are cited to show the value of the island, especially as it would give us the monopoly of sugar, and finally, the purchase is recommended now as a" measure of economy before the price is raised. Since the reference of the bill to the committee, the President has announced that no correspondence has been exchanged, and he has taken the occasion to repeat that any negotiation should re- \ eejve prior sanction of Congress. The emphatic I reiteration throws upon Congress the re--5 sponsibility of failure, if it is withheld. Indeed ! the inference is sufficiently clear that, without some expression of opinion by Congress, the President will not feel satisfied in renewing the negotiation. Mr. Mason said it was perhaps understood that all who concurred in committee in the presentation of this report did not concur in. some of its recommendations^ The report had stated that it is the policy of this Government to extend its dominion by the successive acquisition of territory. He did not believe in such a policy. Mr. Seward, as the representative of the minority 4 of the committee, introduced a bill calling on the President to transmit to Congress, at the commencement of the next session, a statement of the relations then existing between this country and Spain. The bill also requires a statement of the condition of the Treasury, and the effective of the Army and Navy at that time, so as to enable Congress to judge whether it may be necessary to adopt any extraordinary measures to maintain the rights and interests of the United States. • In regard, to Spain, Mr. Seward proceeed to show the financial hindrances to the acquisition df Cuba. The passage of this bill also conferred upon the President certain powers which would compel the Senate to ratify them, if exercised. The bill was in derogation of senatorial powers. He had supposed that political necessities would cause Cuba to gravitate to the continent, as* had been stated by illustrious statesmen, but the< time.or, opportunities had never, presented themselves^ He
doubted if we had arrived at that point now. For ten years we have made no overtures to Spain for the purchase of Cuba, and she now clings more tenaciously to the island than when she was in a less prosperous condition. She was now in perfect repose. He showed the Senate the report of a debate in the Spanish Chamber of Deputies, showing that Government intended to demand reparation from the President of the United States for an alledged insult contained in his message regarding the purchase of Cuba. Mr. Seward considered the proposition to buy Cuba now as unwise and ridiculous, and characterised its purchase as much of necessity as that offered by the woman in the play who had a mania for auctions, who thought her purchases might come so very handy some day. Mr. Bayard briefly advocated the passage of the, bill reported by the committee; He thought it might be passed with safety, whether the object was attained or not. Mr. Foote said that when the proposition was fairly before the Senate, he shonld give his views upon the subject. Mr. Toombs replied to Mr. Seward, arguing to show the fallacy of the constitutional objections made by the senator. He thought the senatorwas mistaken, in saying that the Senate was obliged to ratify the treaty when made by the President. There was no derogation of senatorial power, as senators could exercise their constitutional powers by opposing it, when it came before the Senate. Without taking action on the snbject, the Senate went into executive session and adjourned. Further discussion on the subject was, next day, postponed to Monday, 31st January.
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Lyttelton Times, Volume XI, Issue 684, 28 May 1859, Page 4
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1,860UNITED STATES. Lyttelton Times, Volume XI, Issue 684, 28 May 1859, Page 4
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