THE THEORY OF WAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XI, Issue 648, 22 January 1859, Page 3

THE THEORY OF WAR.

(From the 'Times,! 22nd October.) The theory of war lias always naturally resolved itself into the two rival branches of attack and defence, the relative resources of which have been constantly varying. .Until the discovery of gunpowder the superiority may be said to have rested usually with the defence, nor were strong places often reduced except through treachery, stratagem, or famine. The introduction of artillery intp military tactics reversed these conditions, and gave a general superiority to the attack, except in cases of unusual character. Up to a very recent period the utmost, expected of a fortress was that it should enable a small body of men to detain and occupy a larger "body of men. for; a certain finite time. Beyond this little or no reliance was placed on ordinary fortifications, and it was accepted as a law that after a given number of days the resources of the garrison must come to an.end. Of late year 3 the superiority of; the defence has been once more .maintained, with what truth as regards purely land operations it may be hard to say, but certainly with considerable showof..reason as regards shore forts and shipping. A.lthpugh-the broadside of a man-of-war constitutes one of the most formidable batteries known, and although three-deckers could be-brougi.TT" against a fort .in- far greater strength than land artillery against a fortified town, the difference of material is supposed to be fatal, and it is questioned if wooden vessels can ever hold out long enough against the enemy's shot to succeed in battering down stone walls. Such, at least,.was the persuasion generally entertained in the.late war, and the experiment tried, at Sevastopol gave a partial conr firmatioh to the belief.. Just at this moment, how-. ever, the principles of defence have been applied in a manner entirely novel to naval 'tactics. Hitherto, war .afloat has been distinguished from war ashore by its.exclusive. dependence on the principles of attack. Two ships attacked each other like two tigers or two buffaloes, nor could the weaker protect itself against the stronger by any resource but that of flight. Excepting the artifices by which ancient galleys were occasionally guarded against the strokes of he^r antagonists' prows, there has been no attempt made to adapt defensive forti- - fication to floating vessels.: All that a ship did was to return blow for blow, to manoeuvre for advantage of position, and endeavour to. sink her enemy before the enemy sunk. her.

The question now raided is whether a ship, though left buoyant enough to float and steam, cannot be so protected as to defy the shot of a hostile battery, either afloat'or ashore. The theory received a certain.practical application during the Crimean war, at the attack upon the forts of Kinburn; ;but it has since been revived with greater, expectations, and is not only regarded with favour by the Emperor of the French, but has been taken into consideration by our own naval authorities. Lord Hardwicke, whose opinion in such .^ matters is entitled to respect, spoke the other day as if > lie was all but convinced of the success of the new principle, informing his audience.that he had himself seen a wrought-iron panel'on a ship's side resist the fire of heavy guns for hours together, and it is evident that if a ship could for this length of time be preserved from injury herself she could penetrate into any harbour in the world, and employ her own batteries in knocking down all before her. Obviously, therefore, if the principle in question could be,really, established,the tactics of modem warfare,. as regards naval engagements and coast defences, would be completely revolutionized. The powers of. attack possessed by ships would be in some respects diminished, for, as Lord Hardwicke remarked, they could not carry their iron sides and their broadsides together. They would have to be cut down into low floating batteries, but they might be armed with a few very heavy pieces, and these,, worked with complete impunity, would silence any antagonist in time. :'. ■

It happens, however, that the theory has been once more disturbed even before the new principle could be said to have fairly prevailed. The defence made a stride no doubt, but the .attack has already overtaken it. It is perfectly true that in the experiments conducted at one of our ports, the resisting^ power of iron was proved as'aforesaid, and it is also proved that these iron-side vessels can be built tofloat with at least as much safety as an old 10 gun brig. All that was r.e.-deil 'for the establishment of the' new device, was Y that the powers of artillery should rem>jri stationary ; but this will not be the oase. Ey^erbody kr'ptys how the old musket has been super^Sc^vpy a rifle doing execution with infinitely greater^''certainty at a, far greater distance, what has been done with small arms can be done. : with cannon. Nay, the fact is already accomplished,' for the other day, after the iron sided target had baffled the powers of ordinary artillery, it occurred to some one to try the capacity^ of a Government gun rifled by Mr. Whitworth. The result wasvd«-; Glared in an instant, for the new cannon slapped her shot through the iron plate as if it had been so mudi, ginger jread, and ruined the theory of impregnable floating batteries for some, time to come. We need not, thorefqre, be in any desperate hurry, to break up our three ideckcYs, anil build a fleet of iron-sides. How far Mr:'WhitWrth's ennuoji may be applicable to evei'yday seryrco we cnnnot tpUjthe ".authorities" had bettergive'-him an opportu-'; nity of applyiu^thia. inveuiiion ttt'pia*-'1 «' Purppses j but;, been done-owfe an ay c v idently bo ,'dope;,a^J^ph^.'U--.tK^-%-p§*<i"«-nt lias IJ een correctljr^ r^^bl^^wraell»ii%;strtnjgor than iron armour, tnust^bCfourtd" before ft >'»'P .«>*" wckon. on rcsisling cannon-sKi>t,: Thcoc«!um»nce, however, is,

■'•OTfrfchM'/way deeply aHstwscUye. T.« get the advantage «f riili'd cannon, w® must get rifled «nuuo;u, a«4 the tiequisition has ■y<«t»t» 'be laade. The gun which smashed .the Blrip'V''ciuraKS'>nt was merely an old Gevernment iw, bj' «oine complicationa of apathy, 'StfiWTßnce, L.«r capricu, Aye have naver ydt curried out 'the which lias been 6O T\n«toriousfly cstablisheil, ftnd applied to cannon thoseSinprovpinents which have twsbied the powers of 'the miwket. Eifled cawnon, if they can be anaclo .practically avaU&Me, would not only protect ow co;ist against floating batteries, but would revolutionise the whole service of field artillery.

The weight of guns might be greatly diminished while their range was greatly increased, and ,»uch •«, change would exert an .extraordinary, effect upon s the m<3vemeitts of an army. Jin 'India especially •there ia no saying what might not bo economised in carriage,and transport if these reforms could be ■ effectually introduced. Be it observed, too, that

unless our arfcillevyus <pnt in this way of progress, it will >soon bo of a\q «se «t -all. Ilajjahs and ■ Begums have no arsenals, fortunately for us, tur-: mished with moderate arms, nor sharp-eheoters; among their retainers instructed in tho -arts »sf musketry. Lord Clyde, therefore, could ;push Jus .{funs to the front and clear the way for his infantry «\vtth perfect and success.-; but European artnies now possess marksmen -who at '14i©0 yards distance could pick off every artilleryman at his piece, and silence-the best battery ever yet brought upon a field. We do not forget thatiiinsofaras r rifled' cannon could be said to have been tried at Sebastopol they were not thought successful, but 1 the same was the case for a long timewith \>the. rijfled musket. .The theory was well known generations ago. though the rSfle,as'.the oKtfnai'y-soldierV weapon, is but a year or tw© 6hi. fit seems to - stand to reason'thatswhal has been accomplished

with the musket can be accomplished with cannon vtoo, and it would be*uieidal follyto overlook such . a resource. liven ;if 'these guns -should not be - valuable for range, they must >be valuable for force ' of propulsion, as this'trial of strength with the * npntiided ship sufficiently shows. The attack will ' be more than a match for the defence if we do not avail ourselves of our full power of aggression. Li such matters we cannot be left behind. Per"haps some-economist or philosopher «.wvU afek, what : is to be the end of these-incessant'discoveries in • the art of mutual destruction? Why, perhaps, tlie disuse of the art altogether. As fighting ac- ■ quires more; and more' fatality people may be some- - wliat' less ready to 'fight, and, at any rate," if the i-eld race between attack and defence is maintained

in specalation only instead ofitpractice/it-will be a great point gained. If an invention of floating batteries can be extinguished by an invention of -. rifled cannon, the process is about as cheap an expression of international rivalry as we can expect -on this side of the millennium.