THE APPROACHING CAMPAIGN IN INDIA

Lyttelton Times, Volume XI, Issue 645, 12 January 1859, Page 3

THE APPROACHING CAMPAIGN IN INDIA

(Fromthe 'Friend of India,' 30th September.)

The Commander-in Chief keeps his movements, perhaps wisely, strictly secret. We say "perhaps," for in spite of the military tradition it may be questioned whether, the rumours caused by secrecy do not produce more evil than a knowledge of the fact. It is, however, generally known that all departments are ordered to be in. readiness by the Ist proximo, and that on some day in October the final expedition will commence. It is intended to subjugate Oude as Oude has never yet been subjugated by British solders, to subdue the last rebel in the last province which has defied our authority. For this purpose an army such as has seldom been collected in India, comprising, at least twentyfive thousand Britisli troops, and ten thousand cavalry will be coHected at Cawnpore. The furthest point,of the province can be reached with decent expedition in three weeks, and if the plans attributed to Lord Clyde do not break down, he will have at least four months of weather as favourable to health as that of England. Before this grand army commences operations matters should be settled in Behar. The public will not have failed to remark that for weeks no telegram has been published from Patna. The secret, we believe, is to be found in the gradual organisation of a force which will clear the provinces of the rebels. In a few days the position in the jungle ought to fall, and with it the last hope of this section of the mutineers. They are hemmed in within the natural triangle, and the ability to march forty miles a'day will not help them to pass rivers, a mile and a-half across. The attack, if decently managed, 'cannot' fail, and the public ■ has :as yet sound reasons for its'distrust of Brigadier Douglass, Foot-sore Europeans can accomplish little, and an over rigid adherence to orders is not necessarily a mark of an unskilled or efficient officer. The Shahabad rebels have effected incalculable mischief, but they can have no real fighting strength.^ They must be principally composed of levies fighting with little heart, and Sepoys beaten in every engagement from Kohilcund to Azimghur. No leader of the' slightest mark is left among them, and but for the fatality which has attended our minor operations in this direction they must long since have been dis- ; Sir Hugh Rose, it is reported, will lead the forces intended to clear Central India of the Sea,poys, Wilayutees, Mekranees, and other gangs of ruffians who every now and then express practicaUyjtheir, preference' for' anarchy. The . annou^cej&e^t,:.' ,if > correct, is equivalent to victory;-'aria* even if. not,

these disturbances are not formidable. There is ntf rebel army in the field. The scatlerel gangs hava neither guns, ammunition, nor courage. They ara alienating the villagers, and the few triumphs of; which they can boast are due principally to tha speed with which they run. They may continue ta create riots, but the task of extirpating them will ba scarcely a campaign. Their permanent destruction, moreover, is rather,a matter of organisation than of! war. JYom the day they fled from Calpee they have never been within the British territories, andl it is the powerlessness of native States, and not o£ the British Government, which has left them % momentary immunity. Had Scindia been as strong as Lord Ellenborough believed him to be, Central India would long ere this have been quieted. Tha organisation of European contingents will once mora place in his hands the power of exacting obedience, and it is to this, and not to any rapid forays by English Generals, however brilliant or however successful, tli at we must look for the permanent maintenance of order

With the successful result of these campaigns tha great rebellion of 1857 ought to terminate. The fewscattered remnants of the rebel force will not be too strong for the police! and though daeoity on a largo scale may be prevalent for a time, the political mojement must be at an end. The success, however, which we anticipate, will depend upon one circumstance, the final dispersion of the men in Oude. If theCommander-in-Chief, collecting all his strength for one grand coup, and moving a vast army at fifteen miles a day, should again suffer them to escape, the Pindaree war will recommence. Gurruckpore and Asrimghur, Ilohileund, and the. Doab will again bo flooded by hordes of desperadoes whom it is as impossible to catch as to neglect. We do not care if they all return to their homes without arms, for European life is too valuable to be wasted in such pursuits. But they must either be destroyed, or so utterly and completely cowed that their reunion even in large gangs shall be impossible. If this can be accomplished by amnesties, let us have amnesties, for the country craves, for peace. But let us not have great armies, let -loose out of Baraitch and Gouda, and then be told that the dispersion of the enemy fulfils all the ends of civilized warfare. It ia only by strong - columns organized with special attention to speed, and entering all quarters at one and the same time, that Oude can be pacified without driving the mob back upon our older Provinces. It is by the Commander-in-Chief's use or neglect of such columns that the public will estimate the chances of the campaign.