CAN THE FRENCH INVADE ENGLAND?

Lyttelton Times, Volume X, Issue 600, 4 August 1858, Page 4

CAN THE FRENCH INVADE ENGLAND?

(From the 'Liverpool Journal!') In the debate on the Naval Estimates, on Tuesday night (the 20th April), in the Commons, an impression prevailed that this country'was not exempt from the perils of an invasion; and Mr. Horsman seemed to speak the general sentiment when lie said-.— "He was afraid that the sums voted in past years had not given us an efficient navy. Prom the statement of the late Lord of the Admiralty it would appear that at the present moment England, professing to be the first maritime power, and having the largest commerce to protect, had not the command of the sea. They all wished that the present government of France anight continue long, and that war between this ■country and that government might be impossible. But it was their duty to be secure against accidents and possible contingencies. The pre-sent-French government might not endure for -ever, and they knew that one of the first proposals made to the Republican government by -one of the French generals, was that he miglit hare a force with which he offered to invade England. "Well, a Change of government in France was not, at least, extremely improbable, and in case of change England must be prepared not •only for war, but also against surprise. The. blow might come suddenly, and be levelled against this country unawares. And what was its condition? Reference has been made to the f-enormous works at Cherbourg, and a railway to • Cherbourg would ba opened in July next. Then : the French Government had a magnificent army •=aud a superb navy, to which they could furnish i 100,000 men more easily than this country could furnish 30,000. Their steam transports were each capable of transporting 2000 men at a time, and with'a railway between Cherbourg and Toulon they had the power of manning two .fleets.at a time by conveying the men from one ■port or theother,as most convenient. What is the •position of this country? Even with a fleet numerically equal to that of France, this country wanted "the power to man it. At this' - moment England had lost the command of the Mediterranean, for the French- Government -maintained there double the force of the English. That was not creditable to this country. Supposing war to break out between France and England, France would at the commencement have the advantage, and they all knew that that was of immense importance. Napoleon I. desiredthe command of the Channel for 24 hours, and it must be admitted that if a French army landed on the English shores the position of this •country would be critical." There is great potency in "if." "If the French landed on our shores our position would .be critical." "Would it not be awkward," asked sa noble lord of George Stephenson, when the .Liverpool and Manchester Railway Bill was before a committee in Parliament—" would it not bs awkward if a cow got on the line?" " Very awkward for the co-.v," was the reply. The presence of an invading army would be rather .awkward, but most awkward ultimately, for the .invaders. Tradition is ever at war with facts •and preconceived notions endure despite of palpable refutation, On Mr. Horsman, and on' many others the lessons of the Crimean war are already entirely lost. Mr. Russell's letters to the limes ' are remembered only as brilliant liter*ary affairs, and few recall the months that were exhausted m conveying so.o'OO to Turkey, and the weeks spent in preparing the expedition to.the Crimea. Had not the Russian General bean.the most stupid of men, he would have prevented the landing; but although permitted to land, there was a deficiency of all the material necessary to render the army efficient. Courage obviated all defects, but then in the expedition find all that followed it, the resources both of France and England were taxed. Mere civilian's fancy, that a general wants nothing biit men when lie'invades a country, or iacas at) enemy, and,it wjil surprise most people

to be told that soldiers, though an essential part, aye only a part of what is required in a campaign or in an invading army. An army must be fed. The Duke of Wellington had no notion of soldiers fighting on an empty stomach. It will not do to depend on foraging and pundcr; a commissariat is absolutely necessary, for, wanting a commissariat, many great, and in other respects conquering, armies have been sacrificed. The subject submits itself to an ordinary understanding; any counting-house clerk can calculate what fifty thousand men would require for the month or any number of months, if you tell him what would be sufficient for the same period for a single man. Writers on the war have made these calculations. " During the Russian war," says Colonel Macdougal, in his " Theory of War," " the rations issued to the troops consisted of H lb- of meat, I lb. bread, besides portions of tea, sugar, rum, and rice, per man daily. A Crimean ox supplies 200 rations at 1$ lb.; a sheep about 30 rations. At this estimate, to feed an army of 30,000 men for one day 150 oxen or 1000 sheep would be required. During the summer of 1855, the English army in the Crimea numbered 30,000 men, and it was supplied with fresh meat four times a week. Thus the weekly supply of animals for the feeding of the army amounted to about 600 oxen or to 4000 sheep. The amount of land transport reqtzired by the commissariat to be constantly employed' in the carringe of provisions and forage for feeding the army, 30,000 strong, when stationary before Ssbastopol, was as follows:— 60 bread wagons of 4 horses each to carry 2000 lt)s.; 178 carts, of 2 horses, 600 lbs.; total vehicles being 238, and 596 horses. Supposing the same army to take the field and make an advance into the interiorof the country,the estimate of land transport required was 60 bread wagons, of 4 horses; 509 carts, of 2 horses; and 9193 pack animals; making a total.of 569 vehicles, and 10,451 horses or mules. When fresh meat is not to be had, salt pork or beef is issued; this would increase the carriage on a march as the fresh meat carries itself, but the pork barrels require transport. Under these circumstances, as a general rule, the troops would have to make it out on bread or biscuit. The operation of forwarding an army includes its ' preservation' as above; and, in addition, everything pertaining to transport, combinations of movement, equipment, &c The supply of the necessary animals, vehicles, and drivers, for an army is in itself a great operation. This service was until lately part of the commissariat —it is now per-, formed by the land transport department, which is presided over by a colonel on the staff, with the title of director-general. The estimated number of animals required to enable our army in the Crimea of 30,000 men to take the field with efficiency was upwards of 20,000, The artillery transport is independent of the land transport corps, except as regards the hospitals and ambulance. Eor the service, of the field artillery in the Crimea, a train was formed at Woolwich for the conveyance of the field artillery and infantry reserve as follows:—For field artillery reserve, 257 horses, 30 wagons; infantry, 475 horses, 72 wagons." This estimate is for 30,000 men only. 30,000 men, if landed, might'take up a position until reinforcements arrive; but, while they are coming, the English forces would be concentrating. A dash might be made by the troops first landed; but how long Trould it take to land? Where would the British war-steamers be? A naval engagement would certainly interfere with the landing of a reliable force.

The facilities of concentrating a French army at Cherbourg are great; but great, too, are the means of observation. The Crimean war demonstrate that the embarkation of 30,000 troops with material, is not to be accomplished in an hour, a week, or a fortnight. The thing is impossible. Could it be done without our knowledge? If known, what would our steam fleet be doing? A review of the difficulties and our strength renders all reference to an invasion of this country simply preposterous and absurd: That is no reason why we should not maintain the superiority of our navy; for while that arm of our strength remains strong, we are virtually masters of the world.

The enumeration of the necessary encumbrances of an army are merely a minimum of what is required, for previous preparations must be made to provide for accidents, deaths, destruction and blunders. In India, the necessary "impediments" are still greater. The special correspondent of the ' Times,' Mr. Russell, describing the march, from Cawnpore, says:—

"In the morning, soon after midnight, commenced a tumult in camp, the like of which I never heard before; first a loud tapping of all the tent pegs, as if an army of gigantic -woodpeckers were attacking us. This was caused by the kellassics, or tent men, loosening the tent pegs,, so that they might be drawn easily from the ground when the word to march was given. Then followed a most hideous grumbling, growling, roaring noise, as if many thousands of aldermen were choking all at once, only that it was kept up for hours; that was caused by the camels objecting to the placement of the smallest articles on their backs,' and continuing their opposition till they stalked off with their loads. Then came tie trumpeting of elephants, the squeaking of bullock cart-wheels, the hum and buz of thousands- of. voices, and at last the first bugle^ call, which announced that the time for turning out had arrived. I have already attempted to give some notion of the magnitude of the various impedimenta, necessary as they are, still they deserve the Csesarean title, of an. Indian army; but I fear that nothing but an actual occular demonstration can give an idea on the subject to anyone who has not seen troops'in; the field on Eastern Warfare. Numbers fail to impress the mind,and the impression produced by a statement to the effect that we have many thousands of elephants, camels, horses, oxen and camp followers, is most vague and unsatisfactory. Who realy can bring before his mind's eye a train of baggage animals 25 miles long, a string of 10,000 camels, a siege train park covering a square of 400 by 400 yards, with 12,000 oxen attached to it, or a following of 60,000 non-combatants? It seems to me even now that no reduction could be made in these several items without impairing the efficiency of the troops, and some doubts I had on the sulijact of dooly, or litter-carriage, have been

dissipated by conversation with officers of experience. "To each company of a regiment there are 10 doolies attached, and to each dooly are attached six coolies, or porters, who receive 8 rupees a month each for their services. You will thus have for each regiment, on an average, 80 doolies and 480 coolies, aud yet you only provide for the carriage of SO wounded men per regiment j but if horse ambulances were introduced matters would not be improved, inasmuch as to each horse ambulance you would have to attach a grass-cutter and the loss of comfort to the wounded would be very great." We may therefore comfort ourselves that an invasion of England or an invasion of India, is now an utter impossibility. Adequate means do not exist either iv France or Russia.