Extracts.

Lyttelton Times, Volume IX, Issue 586, 16 June 1858, Page 3

Extracts.

ALLIANCES

(From the ' Spectator,' March 13.)

Much public discussion at the present moment turns.upon the subject of alliances, and none can exceed it in importance. * A good understanding between the most civilized Countries of the world is more than equivalent to " a stride " in human progress; it multiplies the civilizing resources of each country by the resources of all the rest. What could England have done in literature., art, science, or moral progress, without Italy, Germany, and France: and will either of those countries deny that England has duly repaid the advances made to her? Every form of alliance which draws countries together, which gives the deniEensof one free community access to the others, makes mankind richer, more powerful for good, stronger in the resources of human happiness. But on the other hand, the desire to secure that inestimable union may lead to bpnd compacts, in the shape of "treaties, which are vulgurly regarded as the only " alliances," but which may degenerate into instruments of embarrassment, litigation, and estrangement. In the slang of the day, we may confound these inferior and sometimes questionable compacts with the genuine and higher alliances, and in trying to retain the shadow lose the substance. The discussion now going on gives us a case in point. We have been threatened with the possible loss of the French alliance; and considering how much France and, England owe each other, how much they ought to owe each other in future, the threat excited a just uneasiness. Special circumstances render the firm friendship of the two countries doubly important in our day.

"Of late years," says Mr. Disraeli, "other imperial influences, no longer limited to Europe, have arisen in the world, which render it necessary that, if the preeminet power of Europe is to be maintained, a rivalry between these two chief nations should no longer be encouraged, but that a cordial alliance should be cherished, as the only means hy which the independence and importance of Europe in the scale of the world can be maintained. That is the real reason why both Englishmen and Frenchmen should support the alliance between England and France." .

It is hardly a question now whether we shall lose the French alliance, but rather whether we have not lost it already; and if we have lost it, what shall be done to restore it ? For the purpose of bringing about a reconciliation, Mr. Disraeli launches into a strain of encomium, we might almost say adulation, towards the Emperor of rthe French. Of small value to a country like England can be a combination which is to be kept up by such means. What reliance can we henceforward place upon the friendship of Imperial France ? :Ly what stead has it stood us? Although it is true that Englishmen and Frenchmen have fought side by side —*true that by the aid of France we have effected some objects to which our Government had committed itself— still, a coadjutor, a confederate in one special pursuit, is not necessarily a friend. From friendship, we expect something beyond; we expect that our good faith and conduct shall be trusted even when appearances may change, much more that it shall not be disturbed by accidents over which we have no control. Yet what are the facts immediately before usP Although we have made great sacrifices for France, although we have materially contributed to the success of the French Emperor^ to the prosperity of his schemes and the stability of his throne—his Government is

ready, for the conduct of a few vagrant outlaws, who have had about as much to do with England as they have with Belgium, Italy, or France itself, to accuse us of harbouring his assassins, and even of extending to them the shelter of our laws. The Emperor, as represented by his agents, not only entertains that base suspicion, but in order to correct our conduct, a feeling of malignant animosity is called forth from his army towards this country, and :then that display of feeling is pointed as a threat to compel our obediendfc. This is the " friend," this is the " ally " I Experience, we say, does not justify unhesitating trust in that sort of French allian*.

We, who are threatened with this disruption unless we debase ourselves and assimilate our laws _to the wishes of a French dictator, hay« certainly not exclusively reaped profit from the confederacy. It led us into the Russian war. The beginning of that conflict might be dated at the time when the English Government agreed to stand by the Emperor Napoleon after he had committed himself to the paltry quarrel with Russia about " the holy places." In that little squabble he would have been beaten, if England had not made the relations of Russia to Turkey an European question; and the whole cost of the Crimean war might in one sense be fairly placed at the debit of France. Yet she did not even pay her own share of the bill, but some portion of the expenditure for her. part was actually defrayed by this country. The alliance with France has frustrated our natural relations with other countries. It made us connive at the French occupation at Rome. It thwarted the boasted independence which Lord Palmerston intended to show, or professed to show, in Naples. It made us repay with ingratitude the services of Sardinia in the Crimea; and we carried the ingratitude so far, that we positively dishonored our promissory note when it was presented for payment on maturity at the Paris Conference. Jt made us wink when France bullied our natural ally Belgium. In all cases the French Emperor has gained through the cooperation of England, at the expense of communities with whom the English people sympathize much more than they do with the Bonaparte faction in France. Practical experience, therefore, proves that, in its present form, the French alliance is much more valuable to the reigning Bonaparte than it is to this country.

We do not speak particularly of France; it is the same all round: it is the principle of diplomatic alliance which has brought us into false relations with all the European Governments : we have meddled only to promote the diplomatic influence, which is nowhere the national influence, least of all in England.

"Let us," says Sir Arthur Hallam Elton, "look abroad, and consider our relations with foreign powers. Have not late events amply demonstrated that the oldfashioned system of diplomacy to which Lord Palmerston was indissolubly wedded is incompatible with the welfare of the British empire? Is it not a simple matter of fact, no longer admitting of dispute, that the less we have to do with the affairs of Europe the better for our national interest and our national honor? I need but name the word ' India' to convince the reader that the policy of England', is to hold civilly aloof from the small controversies of European courts, and, whilst giving none ofFence, avoid too affectionate an intimacy with any one of them in particular. Our interests are too vast, our dominions too ■ extensive and I may add, our responsibilities too onerous, to permit us to waste our energies on the narrow sphere of Continental politics. Lord Palmerston's principle of action since the conclusion of the war has been a species of diplomatic coquetry. He has at one time reclined upon the bosom of France; then coyly taken refuge in the arms of Austria; pouted at Prussia; frowned at Naples; patted Sardinia on the cheek; embraced France once more in an ecstacy of hysterical devotion. And what is the result? We have made many enemies and have scarcely one friend left."

This comes out with great force wherever we find diplomacy tampering with national questions—on the Tiber or the Ilyssus, the Rhine, the Danube, or the Eider.

The very word " alliance" often covers a confusion both of terms and of ideas. We talk of an " alliance between France and England," when we mean an alliance between certain gentlemen officiating in Downing Street and certain gentlemen officiating in Paris. Such cooperation may be the equivalent of an alliance between the countries, but it may not be so, and it may even be an obstacle to the coming together of the two communities. Is not such the case with regard to France at the present moment ? What is " France" ? By what aspect can >we recognize that country, if not in its intellect, its commerce, its representative men, and its society ? But the action of the.. French Government at the present moment positively cuts •us off from communion with these manifestations of France. Where is the intellect of France ? Exiled, suppressed, and silenced. It is not at home*; or we are forbidden to converse with it. Where are the representative men of France? There are none. In their places are men called up to Paris under the compulsion of a chronic coup d'etat. Where is French society ? Even if we can penetrate to it, it is afraid to talk to us ; and the laws of suspicion repression, and exclusion, are positively compelling English people to leave France—dividing us more and more from that country. It is by connivance of the Government that the army has been encouraged to make an Anti-Anglican demonstration; and while complaining, or rather avowing, that the French misconceive our national action and our laws, the Government at Paris is now engaged, daily aud hourly, iv preventing any communication of English proceedings or sentiments from reaching French society

An alliance " between France and England" | would be perfectly natural, from geographical I vicinity, parity of intellectual progress, goeial I affinity, resources for exchange by commerce; it would,, in short, be instigated by every reason, social^ political, and intellectual: but the great barrier to any such complete intercourse between France and Englamd is created at the present moment by the French Government; and the form of " efllianee" which we are now asked to extend has been rapidly becoming nothing more than a conspiracy with that Government against other countries in Europe and other parties in France.

There is alvvays this danger—that mere official alliances will degenerate into official conspiracies. Compacts between two governments are very proper in order to a right understanding for combined action in specific objects; but such alliances naturally die with *:he attainment of the object Or the definitive failure of the enterprise. Continue them, and they become either confederacies between official colleagues irrespectively of national wishes and advantages, or trammels upon the free action of the two countries'.

In the matter of national intercourse as in•'< many other matters, the true principle is, free trade. Allow the utmost freedom of communication between France and England, as between any other two great countries, and the peoples would through the influential persons of their society gradually perceive the reciprocal" advantages of the intercourse, gradually see through the fallacy of national prejudices, rise superior to international differenced; and we should have the best of all guarantees for mutual exertions in the enlargement of a common wealth, with perpetually multiplying guarantees ajEfcinst war. Nations can be friends, but' friendship is not to be maintained by bond; and nations can only be weddgd when they are united under one crown. Even transitory treaties of alliance may become the record and guid»_>r continued cooperation; but moral compacts between two bodies;, whose circumstances are perpetually altering with the progress of mankind, are better preserved when they are kept superior to the letter of statutes —especially when those instruments must be executed by attorneys'that have their own interests to serve at the exppngft of their clients. The first step to restoring the alliance of England and France would be, courteously and gradually, but frankly and firmly to bring political-treaties and alliances to their specific objects, giving pertnanenee only to those which regulate the special arrangem.en_ for'intercourse in particular matters*