THE PERSIANWAR.

Lyttelton Times, Volume VIII, Issue 499, 15 August 1857, Page 3

THE PERSIANWAR.

(Prom the Times, May 7.)

Our expectation that news might arrive of further hostilities in Persia has not been disappointed. Mohammerali was captured by the British forces on the 26th of March. The loss on our side, as will be seen by the despatch published in our last number, was comparatively trifling. By another message from Sir James Outram we learn that'the flying expedition to Ahwaz, whither the

Persiar. force retreated, had returned to Mohammerah on the 4th of April completely successful. The enemy had retreated towards Dizful, at the base of the mountains, before a small British detachment, a gun was captured, and large military stores •sensed and destroyed. Though, in one -sense, these gallant operations may be said -to be useless, as having taken place after -the Treaty of Peace had been signed in 'Paris, we cannot regard them but as most important and satisfactory. To begin with merely material advantages, there is no doubt that the possession of the plain of the Karoon, between Mohammerah and Shuster, will afford to our army during the ensuing -bummer the means of establishing a healthy -encampment, in a comparatively fertile 'Country, and amid populations which we are fold by Sir James Outram's despatch are •friendly, and are sending in their submission. Whatever may be the temperature during summer of the •'flat countries drained by the ■Tigris, it is generally stated that they offer a favourable contrast to the insupportable heats and malaria which prevail on the shores of the Gulf. As, then, the Persian j territory is to be occupied until after the evacuation of Herat, it is no small matter 'that before the cessation of hostilities We •should have secured possession of a district •where our troops may remain in health and •plenty. Delays may arise from accident or from evasions of the Asiatic Power to which ny« are opposed, and in any case it is as well that, our troops should not be --compelled to pass even one July in Bushire or on the rock of Karrack.

But the moral effects of the victory are •of even greater importance. The Persians 'have not had Frenchmen, and Germans, and Russians among them for so many years ■without learning something of their own -strength and weakness; nor is there any ■reason to believe that the Court of Teheran, •with all its ignorance, has been without a .certain acumen in this affair. The false account of the battle of Khooshab, and the "description of the British return as a retreat, are very well to salve wounded vanity or to animate a discouraged people, but the Shah's advisers, whether native or foreign, know that the real strength of the country lies in its'inaccessibility. In fact, a descent on BusMie might well lose its terrors for a court which had found by experience that the operation hitherto had led to nothing. Persia, certainly, might be unwilling to part with her only port, but still might decide to braveH*fee power of a nation which seemed unable^to do more than occupy a point on her coast. For the third time British troops 'had .appeared in the Persian Gulf with 'hostile dntent, but never before had they in the country far enough to alarm '-even'Shiraz and the cities of the south. ''We cannot wonder, then, that there should whave been plenty of advisers ready to -counsel the masterly policy of passive resistance. Let the English take Karrack -and-Bushire; they cau do nothing else; they only wish to frighten you, and if you are not frightened they will be glad to make peace on any terms, and to get rid of the barren-rock and the decaying town where fever and cholera are hovering over their ■troops." So would say Russia, so would say all the naturalized adventurers, and • native-cunning would feel the force of the argument. * We doubt therefore whether the capture of Bushire alone would have - exercised much influence over the Persian 'Court for the future. We had only done • what we did years ago, and we should retire •as we had retired before. " What can England do ?" would have been the taunt always in the mouths of Teheran politicians. Russia can attack us, conquer provinces, and keep them ,- even Affghaus and.Tartars worry us in the east; but England's only notion •of a campaign is to come to our shores,take a town, and then go back again."

But the capture of Mohammerah is a very different operation. It means, and will be felt to mean, that the British Government is resolved to make its power felt and respected, even by a resort to the last extremities. The ..capture of Bushire might have been called a demonstration,—the capture of Mohammerah was the beginning of a campaign. It teils the Persians that, if forced ■Into conquest, we will conquer. The capture of Mohammerah means the occupation ofKhuststari, of the Valley of Tigris, of the whole Persian Gulf. The Shah is made to feel that the question of peace with England concerns the very existence of his •empire. Thus, not only^the, brilliancy and completeness of the victory itself, but the determined policy of which it has given sign, are calculated ,to have '^their .influence throughout Central Asia. Nor can the secondary advantage of an ascendancy over the Arab tribes be forgotten. Already,w.ehave little doubt, the si f»y of .the fall of Mohammerah has been told all through Arabia, Mesopotamia,.and Kurdistan. The despatch relates that the

Arabs are friendly and submissive ; and there can be little doubt that the influence of the English name over those wild races will be much strengthened by the exploit oi Sir James Outram. The event has taken place at a good time. A principal obstacle to the improvement of those regions has been the independence and uncontrolable spirit of the Arabs. Even now, in any discnsion relating to the development of Asia Minor and the Valley, of the Euphrates, it is generally urged that the wandering tribes are too irreclaimably savage to permit civilization to enter the lands they occupy. Such an event as the capture of Mohammerah and the encampment of a victorious British army among them must do much to establish an influence which future enterprise may turn to good account. For all these reasons, while regretting that our troops should have fought a second battle after the war had been virtually terminated and the news of peace must have been on the very point of reaching them, we cannot but hope for many benefits from their gallant exploit.