THE FAILURE OF THE REDAN.

Lyttelton Times, Volume VI, Issue 367, 10 May 1856, Page 4

THE FAILURE OF THE REDAN.

This epoch in the war, is still occupying the attention of the British public "We copy the following from the Liverpool "Albion," of.Jan. 7,—

A pretentious work appeared yesterday,— a large octavo volume, which was expected to make a noise, and ou^ht to do so, considering the hubbub of the advertisements about it, entitled " Inside Sevastopol." Its chief feature was announced as being a new nnd the only true version of the affair at the ltedan ; and, certainly, as now given by the

author, (name unknown,) who gathered it from various spectators of and participators in the ? transaction, it wears an aspect far more discreditable than had been suspected even after the first accounts, as to the muddling in the trenches, refusal of officers to lead and of men to be led, and all the rest of it. Why these first accounts were subsequently attempted to be explained away has never been understood ; but it would appear that they fell infinitely short of the disgraceful reality, and that the excuses offered only deepen the contempt for the authors of the disaster and those who would extenuate it. The author is rather chary of officers incriminated, and even regiments principally obnoxious to censure he leaves blank; but he is minute and circumstantial enough as to the nature of the deplorable blundering, and as to the exhibition of a peculiar emotion that is happily rarely displayed by British soldiers in face of an enemy. It would seem tl-^.'c there is an entire misconception in tv%« country as to the character of the assault;^ on the Redan. The work was easily enough carried in the first instance, there being exceeding few Russians in it —net above thirty! Their fire was very feeble ; the storming party, consisting of 500 men, ran along the open space easily enough, and with small loss, all the talk about being mowed down wholesale being mere balderdash, as applied to the first part of the operation, though true enough as regarded the fatal finale. Entering the Redan was a facile operation :—That done, two divisions of the supports were marched out of the trenches; there was nothing to oppose them : —except a few dropping shots inside, all was silent as the grave. When, however, they got half-way between the trenches and the Russian work, a panic seemed to seize them. They did not run away, but stood still. " Wfc saw," says one of the authoi-'s military informants, (himself an officer,) describing the occurrence on the spot, " we saw their officers trying to excite them by voice and gesture to advance. Some even took "hold of their coats, and tried to start them, as you would to start a jibbing horse. It was all in vain : — they would not move. The men who were inside called to them to come on, and told them there was no one there ; but it was no use; they stood still. Meanwhile, Wyndham could not get his 500 men to charge; had they done so, the Russians were"in such small force that even with that inconsiderable body of troops, he would have driven them down the hill, and found time ■ to turn the gui.s cityward. As [to spiking the guns, he did not want to do that; he wanted them to defend his position. The moment of victory passed away. The Russians' .supports came up in vast numbers :—instead of finding five thousand Englishmen on the top of the hill, protected by the Russian guns, now turned upon their former owners, the Russians found only the 500 who had first got in, and those engaged in desultory sharpshooting with the scanty gnrrisou which lurked amo % the traverses. The fresh army of enemies did whnt we ought to have done ; they charged with the bayonet, drove the remnant of our 500 towards the parapet and recovered the guns. These wore now ' turned with murderous effect on the poor panic-stricken devils who were standing irresolute between the trenches and the fort. They turned round and ran back into the trenches, already full of the men who were to have supported them. After this the confusion was helpless. Regiments got all mixed together, and no officer could find his men, or men their officer. It was then that Wyndham said ' Send me no more men, unless yon can send an army iorth officered and disciplined.' The few brave

straggling parties that came out were only a useless sacrifice of the good men. Then the shot and shell came over into the crowded trenches ; and the poor innocent babies who didn't know a bayonet from a musket, and were no more fit to act soldiers than parsons, were cut up by balls and splinters, and were got out as quickly as possible." This " real history'of the attack upon the Redan " is not by a'Doctor Devaga or Col. Tal. Schafiiier, or any other philo-Mtiscovic Anglo-Phobist. whether of Cottonopolis or Philadelphia; but by a partisan of the war, very jealous of the military honour of England, extremely sensitive to such criticism, as the writer of the remarkableletter^signed " Viator," in this day's leading journal shows, is becoming most uncomfortably frequent at, the expense of the British Lion on the part of our gallant allies. This volume explains, for the first time, at least to the public ear, why our allies have been so censorious as to the Redan, and why it has required strong official interference from imperial quarters to prevent that censure being a good deal more marked and dangerous than happily it hns yet become. Tender topic this to touch upon, but one remarkably inviting nevertheless^ improper things generally are. Contrary to the impression universally prev?lent here, the attack on the Redan was in no way a feint, except in the bitter pleasantry of the faintheartedness that distinguished it. So far from its being intended for " a diversion of the Russians while the French assailed the Malakhoff, " it was an integral part and parcel of the same operation, and essential to its completion. Because the attack on the Redan failed, and failed so ignominiously, the capture of the Malakhoff led merety to the possession of the " bloodstained ruins " of south Sevastopol, which cannot even be retained because of the dominating fire of the north forts; whereas had the English succeeded, the whole garrison must have laid down their arms or been destroyed : —there was no possibility of escape. This is shown in the volume clearly to be the case ; but it is not so shown by any ex post facto evidence. It appears it was well understood at the time, entered into Pelissier's calculations, and his arrangements were planned iv accordance with the supposition that the Redan would be carried. So entirely was this the case that the Marshal, who, from his position at the Malakhoff, could see our repulse at the Redan, no sooner observed the Russians begin to retreat across the harbour, than he sent word to that effect to Simpson, clearly an invitation, if not a p;oad, to the renewal of the assault. But Simpson was too intent upon his toothache, or lumbago, or tic-douloureux, or chillblains, or chickenpock, or whatever-to-be-coddled complaint was the matter with him ; and remained deaf as a gurnet to the summons. Gortschdtoff got off. and we all know what has come on since. The author assures us that not only is chis the conviction of every British officer competent to form and candid enough to express an opinion, but he adds:—'" I have spoken to at least twenty Frenchman on the same subject. They will subscribe to any theory and join in any compliment to the British arms ; they will even politely deplore the freedom with which or generals are crititiced by our press ; but they are faithful to two impressions ; —first, that there were great faults committed on the Bth of Sept. ; and, secondly, that if the Redan were taken simultaneously with the Malakhoff, the Russian army must have capitulated or been destroyed."