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AUSTRIA

(From the Times Correspondent.)

Vienna, Nov. 20. —Your correspondents in the Crimea have given such lucid and detailed accounts of the various movements of the allied troops 'since the fall of Sebastopol, that your readers can hardly have faile-t to form a tolerably correct idea of the actual state of affairs. It is here believed that the allied generals expected, by means of well-combined strategetic movements to force the enemy to evacuate the Crimea, and this opinion also prevails at Russian head-quarters, as you will see by the subjoined article, which is from the pen of M. de Kotzebnc, the Superintendent of Prince Gortsehakoffs military Chancellerie. The document, which was forwarded to the Oeslerreichhche Zeitunq, from Odessa, is long, but it is so full of interest, and in many respects so well agrees with the reports forwarded by your own correspondents, that you will probably be well satisfied to have it in extenso: —

" It is very diilieult satisfactorily to explain to one's s-jlf what have l»eeu the intentions of the allies since our troops have quitted the southern part of Sebastopol. From their operations we must conclude that, calculating on their superior strength, and on the ease with which they e^ucd

transport large bodies of troops to any given ' point of the peninsula, they expected to be able to force our army to evacuate the northern side of Sebastopol, and subsequently the Avhole of the Crimea. The first step taken towards the ; attainment of this object was an attempt to turn : the strong position which we occupy on the Leighls of Mackenzie, between the northern side of Sebastopol and the valley of Baidar. In order to effect his object, the enemy sent ! between 20,000 and 30.000 men into the valley \ of Baidar, and it would have been of no advan- I tage to us had we driven them out of it. The allies fortified the heights which separate the valley in -"question from the position occupied by our troops, and constructed a road along them in the direction of the Upper Belbek. On the'2?ih of September they descended to that river, and took possession of the villages of ' Toth-Sala and Jeiri-Sala. Their object probably ! was to discover whether there was any passage j into the valley of the Katcha or the Alma, j through which they could jreach BatkehifSerai. j They calculated on turning our left flank in this j ■way, and on forcing us to fall back on Simpheropol. ! On the day after his arrival in the valley of Baidar the enemy discovered that, instead of the weak vanguard which he had formerly had before him, an imposing Russian force of infantry and artillery had been concentrated in an almost unassnilabe position at Airgoul, and that strong detachments of cavalry had advanced through the neighbouring valley towards Tatar Oman Kiol ; and on the right flank, from Albata. The ne*-vs of our preparation must havereached the enemy, who probably felt that bis position on the Belbec was in danger, and that it was impossible fur him to advance into the Katcha aud Belbec valleys, and so sur- j round us. i "On the Ist of October, just as our troops were making the above mentioned offensive movements on three sides, the allies retreated in the greatest haste to the rising grounds which leads to the heights that shut in the valley of Baidar. Since that time they have undertaken nothing of importance in that neighbourhood, and confine themselves to unimportant demonstrations along the heights ■which they occupy. '•After he had given up the idea of turning our left flank, the enemy began his operations at Eupatoria. "During the latter half of September and the beginning1 of October, the allies had greatly strengthened the garrison of Eupatoria. On the 14th of September the allies made their first reconnaissance along-the road to Sak and the bridge of Tup-Mamoi. A few days later General d'AllonviSle made a successful" forced reconnaisunce from Karacourt with a large detachment of cavalry. In consequence of the unpardonable negligence of Lieutenant-General Baron Korff, who then commanded the reserve division of Lancers, the French General succeeded in carrying off six light guns belonging to ihs Horse Artillery. 'On the ibth of October the allies advanced with their whole force, which was divided into two columns. The one column uiavcued by die way (if Sak, the other by K;sni2rourt; but seeing on tiie following day that if they continued to advance they would liare to do with a very powerful Russian force, they retreated to Eupaioria daring the night between the 11th and 12th. In fact, our army had received very strong reinforcements in September and at the beginning of October. The reinforcements consist of the Grenadier Corps .•!!!(( of the Militia of the Governments of Ore). Kaiveera, and Tula, s<t that if the enemy should make any serious attempt from Eupatoria, the Russian Coinniiindei-in-Ciiief has the power of opposing to him an enormous force, and that within a wry short lime. This conceiilraiinn of troops will be so managed th-u a sufficient force wili he left on :he* heights A Mackenzie, and in all the other positions, to repel the- attacks of any number of troops. " Ft is extrcnely difficult to guess what the enemy will next undertake, but it is probable that he will still make somo attempts to take our army in fi.isik or rear. For instance, it is very likely that some movements may he made from the tide of Kertch and Yenikale, but it is to be hoped th.it the allies will again Vie baffled, as tiie cuiMUJander-in-chief is in a position to send cousi'ierati!'5: reinforcements to LieuteuautGeoenjtl Baron W'r.nigr-lj who commands the extreme right wing in the peninsula of Kertch. The same may be said of the coast of the "piack Sea, from the mouths of the Danube up

to Perekop. Large bodies of infantry ami cavalry are so posted tliat they can in a very short time be concentrated at any given point, and particularly at Nicholaitff and Perekop. The last-mentioned place is, besides, so surrounded by batteries and other fortifications that it is like an enormous entrenched camp. In addition to the old bridges over the Bug and Dnieper, several new ones have been made, in order to secure a ready communication between the troops which are stationed on each of ihe banks of the river.

" The enemy has done no more at Kinhurn than to repair the works destroyed by his artillery and to arm them. If he intends to undertake any operation from the little fort he will find that he can effect nothing1. Indeed, it is difficult to understand what he intends U> do with Kiuburn, as he has only left a small garrison in it and a few small vessels to protect it. The fort, which is at the very extremity of the Spit, is of no strategic importance, and cannot serve as the basis /or any military operations. It would be extremely difficult for us to retake it, as a few.small ships placed near the coast could easily frustrate all our attacks from the land side, and it would be of no advantage to us."

If the foregoing be read with attention it will become evident that the Eussian Coinmander-in chief will be better able to defend himself if attacked on the Belbeck than if Eu'patoria be made the basis of operations. M. de Kotzebue is far too anxious to impress on the minds of his readers that Prince Gortschakoff can, whenever he please, concentrate an overpowering force in the neighbourhood of Eupatoria. Another circumstance which looks suspicious is that he speaks of the impossibility of retaking the fort at Ivinburn if a few ships are left near it. During the winter the sea is frozen at Odessa nearly as far out as the eye can reach. Iftheliman of the Dniepier and the sea near Kinburn should also be frozen,would " the small garrison" be able to defend the fort against a sudden attack on the part of the Unssians?

November 21. —The new concordat meets with no mercy at the hands of the German journalists, who view it in exactly the same light as it is regarded by at least two-thirds of the population of this empire. The organs of the clerical party iv Germany are at great pains to show ihat. the close union between the Church of Some and the sword of Austria is a deathblow to the machinations of the revolutionary faction in Italy : but lay conservatives predict that sooner or later the concordat will lead to the downfall of the Austrian empire. The effect produced on the people by the convention with Rome is so extremely unfavourable that the heads of the church have directed their subordinates to act with extreme circumspection, and "gradually to accustom their flocks to the new order of thiu<r«."

To all outward appearance, the diplomatic world is .doing little or nothing in the Eastern question, but you may be sure that the preliminary steps towards the realisation of the first and fourth guarantee points are about to be taken. The first point relates to Moldavia, Wallueliia,an<l Serviu ; the second to the future position of the Christian population of Turkey. It is still uncertain when Baron Prokesch will leave Vienna, hut it is well known that as soon ;is he reaches Constantinople, the conferences relative to the reorganisation of Moldavia and Wallanhia will begin. The majority of the Constantinople correspondents write that there are frequent misunderstandings between Lord Pi odd iff^ ami M. de Thouvenel, but reliable information has been given me that such is not the ease.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/LT18560322.2.7

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Lyttelton Times, Volume VI, Issue 35, 22 March 1856, Page 3

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,609

AUSTRIA Lyttelton Times, Volume VI, Issue 35, 22 March 1856, Page 3

AUSTRIA Lyttelton Times, Volume VI, Issue 35, 22 March 1856, Page 3

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