THE RUSSIANS IN THE CRIMEA.

Lyttelton Times, Volume VI, Issue 332, 5 January 1856, Page 6

THE RUSSIANS IN THE CRIMEA.

(From the Times, September 1!>.)

The latest intelligence of the movemrnts of the Russian forces in the Crimea, which has been forwarded to us by our correspondent, at Vienna, is of the highest importance, and entirely consistent with the opinion we have already expressed of the condition to which the enemy must now he reduced in that Peninsula. It is stated that the Russian forces are known to be retreating from Baksbiserai and Simpheropol to Perekop, and that Prince Gortschakoff. the Russian Minister at Vienna, had received this news with «rt?at emotion. We confess that \re are still inclined to receive with distrust the communications from the Crimea which reach u« through Vienna, for, in spite of all the precaution and discretion manifested by our correspondent in that city, they*have on several occasions proved incorrect, and in one memorable instance a gross fraud was practised upon the public. In this case, however, the fact stated is at least extremely probable, and, as the movement of retreat, must have commenced in the rear of the Russian armies, to which our own Generals in the Crimea have no access, it is by no'mean? impossible that a portion of the Imperial forces uviv have he^uu to evacuate Bakshisefai aud Simpheropol before tins determination became known to the allies in Aunt of the' Russian lines.

We adherent a our opinion that the evacuation of the southern side'of Sebastopol was the commencement of a retrograde movement, destined to withdraw the bulk of the Russian army from

an untenable position in the Crimea ; ami if this view be correct, tlie evacuation of Simuhoropol is precisely the next operation which .was to be uuiicipaied. An atleinpl would probably 'be made to hold the position on the Tchenutya. which is fortified and occupied hv the most efficient part of the Russian army, whiie the rearguard and the ba<j:ia«re, could he withdrawn in comparative safety. Rumours of a combined attack on the position of the allies had been actively circulated before thn decisive events of the Bth and 9th of September, and every spy or deserter who came in irave fresh assurances of the extensive preparations made for this action. The allies were thus kept for several days on the alert and the opportunity w:iS taken to render their own position far more impregnable than it had been on the 16;h of August. No attack, however, was made, and the result seems to prove that in reality these reporls were only a feint to deceive our Generals as to the real intentions of Prince Gortschakoff. His mind was already made up to retrea?, and the fall of the. Mi.iakofT Tower £a»e him a pretext f>r evacuating the town with .some sli.jw »f compulsidu. Should this be the true state of the case, the temporary position he assumed, resting on the northern forts nnd the ridge of lukennm, is entirely explained ; while the forces which were supposed to he impatient for a fresh attack were so well concealed thai not a corps could he seen from our positions, and it seemed to he a matter of some uncertainty whether any considerable body of troops remained about M.tcken/.ie's Farm.

If it be true th:>t suuli a relrogade movement on Perekop has actually commenced, and was known at Vienna, ou the 17th hist, it become; of more interest linn ever In ascertain what dispositions may have been taken by the allied Generals since the decisive advantage of the 9th. That week may decide the fate of the Hussinn army. It lias l)een obrerved that since the despatch announcing M.u>hal Polissicr's entry into the town no further tfle^raphic inleHi«T!iiee has been received, or at least published. °Probably, if the allied Ci en era Is are en»:)^ t ?d in the cindfiei of a (k-iicate and secret o-jecui^n, such as a coiitbiued niuvenient to intercept the Hus■'■iaii armies must be, they would abstain from eoiifidiii^ iheir-Intentions to a line oi telegraphic eoiniiitiuication which passes through the Atistiiaa capital, The silence of the^Generals at

such v crisis in ihe rampaigu is mil u> be take 11 as a proof thai nothing m being done, hturnUic r that nothing can with pmdenee In; communicated ; unit it is consistent with thi* view tint.l we should recmc the lir.sl intelligence of tl ic retre.it from tlie Russian agents id Vienna. The utmost inxieiy will, of course, be felt—. first, to verity this .intelligence, ui»d then tonscerlam whether the retreat of the Russian njiky will be em <>iT; but here our. infunnalion 'si^s for the present, Mud we can only (ail back upon the general considerations we have already presented to o>ir readers. To retreat at all across the steppes which extend »ver tho north of the Crimea, and more-especially tv carry ofT the Mek and wounded of n large army, the baggage, and the ciril government of the country, is ■nn en . lerprise of extraordinary difticulty, and veiy little decision and activity seem to be required on the part of the allies to convert such a re- | treal into a disastrous rout. But be this as it | may, the mere fact that it is understood by the j Russian Minister at Vienna that the Russian I army is endeavouring to evacuate the Crimea I itself jt.st one year afier that peninsula was iuj vaded by the allied armies is the must astonishj inj: indication we have yet had of the magniI tutienfour sucr.es«. Tin; war has compelled I the Emperor of Russia to throw his whole avail- | able force in 10 the Crimea, but exhausted by its own efijris, and deprived of subsistence by the barbarous and unproductive character of its i own territory, this army is compelled to fail j hack upon the steppes, with an iin perfect hope !of making good its dreary and encumbered i march across these wastes.,. In fact, the chief protection of the Russian army is that they are * thrust back upon a country where pursuit isitni possible, beyond the line of the Saigh'uv The e*iieu,tiinn of the Crimea appears to us the inevitable corollary of the fail of Sehastopol ■ and of the measures taken Uy the allied fleets, i as. we expressed it some months ago, " to invest j the whole Peninsula." Yet we are inconceivably j struck by the nvijrnitude «»f such a result. The ; Crimea was the brightest jewel in the Russian. ; crown. Its beautiful southern coast was at j once the resort of opulence at AlottsliMi, the ■ seat of power at Sebastypol, and. the seat t>f I trade at Kertch. It was the Keystone of the j territorial acqui>iiions of Peter and Catherine, j for it defended the whole region from Odessa to j the Sea of Azoff, it .commanded the Circassian j Coast, and ii threatened Constantinople. To j surrender the Crimea in one campaign certainly i proves that Russia is less capable oi maintaining | a defensive war, and is more signally defeated \ than we had yet supposed ; and. if the intellij gence. we have received from Vienna be fully j confirmed the triumph of last w^-ek over the | 'ortressof Seb:ißto;>oi assumes all the proportions I of a great political victory.