THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL.

Lyttelton Times, Volume V, Issue 312, 27 October 1855, Page 7

THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL.

(From the " Times" Correspondent.) Camp before Sebastopol, June 20. It is but natural that the attack of the allies on the principal points of the Russian defences should now lie scrutinized in all its details, and, as it has failed, that the plan of the attack should be severely criticized and unsparingly censured. It is certainly true that, in some respects, these details were imperfect. As an example of this imperfection, it is stated that the supports were too distant from the attacking parties; that proper care was not taken to prevent the men becoming confused and losing their way in the labyrinth uf works before the Redan ; that no steps were formed above the beam of the parapet so that the men could step over in order; that the attacking parties were too weak, and that the men were crowded into narrow works and trenches which could not afford them cover, and were difficult of access and exit. It is, moreover, affirmed that no proper instructions were given to the artillery for their guidance in the event of success or defeat, and that it was only when the Russians hdd ciowded over their parapets and through their embrasures, and had been shooting down our men for some time on their retreat, that an artillery officer obtained permission from Lord Raglan to open fire upon their lines ; that no directions were addressed even to the ambulance coips with respect to locality or action, and that many minor points of some importance were also neglected ; but the gravest charge of all is that the success of the assault was compromised by the facility with which Lord Raglan yielded to General Pelissier's request, and. late on the evening of the 17lh altered the arrangements for the following morning. As to the propriety of General Pelissier's views in making that rt-quest tbere is scarcely a difference of opinion in this army. If the Russians were indeed about to assault the Matnelon before da^u he would have been prepared for them with overwhelming numbers, could have decimated them as they retreated with his artillery, and could have immediately attacked a position held by a beaten and dispirited enemy. If" they were not prepared to attack the Mamelon, but were prepared to resist us, the original plan of bombarding them for three hours before we attacked could not have failed to drive them from their works under cover, and to slay great numbers of them. That plan was perfectly successful in the attack on the Mamelon, which was easily taken after a fierce cannonade in the open day, which drove the euen.y out of the works. Although we had silenced many guns in the Redan, \>e had not silenced all, nor had we touched die ships' batteries; and Prince Gortsuhakoff tells us daily, ami we find truly, " The damage done to us by day we repair at night." We never searched out the strength of the Redan on that morning, and the Russians might have —for all we knew and know —replaci-d every injured gun, aud have had the battery in as

good order as when we opened fire. We were certain of success. Sir George Brown, inflated by the bloodless conquest of Kertch and Yenikale, directed the operations as if the garrison of Sebastopol were a body of serf militia. A pruate memorandum was sent round the night before the attack to officers commanding regiments, &c., to request them to keep their men in older, and to make them observe silence 'when they {jut inside the Redan till the en^my was entirely subdued.1' It dues not appear why there was no attack on the Russian works on our left. One would certainly have thought that even a feint by the French against the Flagstaff Batteries would have been attended with advantage. However, these are points beyond my province, and I shall stop here, with the assurance that I am expressing the opinions of others, and am not hazarding1 any one statement of my own on a subject of such vast importance. Tt is as impossible to forget that memorable morning as it is hopeless to attempt to describe what occurredIn my former letter (this letter bad not reached the Times office,) written hastily and under the depression of our ill-Siiccess, I could not do more than give a very meagre sketch of what took place, and I am not now able to amend my defects. It will be remembered that the plan of attack originally proposed was that the allies were to open a cannonade for three hours on she Malakuoff and Redan after dawn on the morning of the 3 Bth ; that the Fresch were to assault the Malakboff. and that when they hud taken possession of it we were to attack the Redan. Ar. the latter work is commanded by the former it would not be possible to carry or to hold it till the Malakhoff was taken. The manner of our attack was as follows :—The Senior brigades of the Light Division, Second Division, third Division, and Fourth Division were to furnish each one column of 1,750 men, to whom were joined 60 sailors, and these columns were to be employed against die Rednn and the Cemetery and batteries on our left of the Redan, close to the neck of the Dockyard Creek. The second brigades of these divisions were to be iv reserve, and the Guards' Biigade, and Highland brigade were moved up, an<i kept in reserve also for^any duty that might occur. The attacking party of the Second Division was the only exception to this rule, as it was formed of broken brigades. Sir George Brown had the direction of the assault. The 1,750 men in each instance were formed of 400 men for the assaulting column, a working party of 400 men to cover them in case of a lodgment, and to reverse the work, 800 men as a support, and 100 riflemen or sharpshooters preceding the head of the assaulting column to keep down the fire of the batteries and of the enemy's chasseurs, and fifty men carrying woolpacks to bridge over the ditches. To these were added 60 sailors, bearing scaling ladders. The Light Division column was to attack the right of the Redan at ihe re-entering angle; the Second Division was to attack the apex of the Redan as soon as the Li<rht Division and Fourth Division had carried the works at the flanks; the Third Division was to assault the Cemetery and the Barrack batteries ; and the Fourth Division column w;is to assail the leii flunk of the Redan at the re enteringansrle; The Second Diusion column was to attsickthe apex only after the Lin'ut Division and Fourth Division had gained the flanks, «n>l effected a junction along the base of the works, when they were to prevent the consequences of forcing a strong body of the enemy from the flunks into tbe angle uf the Redan. The attacking column of the Light Division was furnished by the 7th Fusileers, 23rd Welsh, the (Duke of Wellington's) rejrii.-ient, and 34th regiment. The storming party was Jed by Colonel Yea, of the 7lh. The 19:h, 77th, and' 85th re»imenls, or the Second Bridie, were in reserve, under Colonel Shirley. Soon after 12 o'clock they moved down from camp and took ground in the trenches under the direction of Major Halliweil, the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General of the division. The Second Division was on their left, the Fourth Division on the left of the Second Division, and the Third Divi-ion on the extreme left. The movement was simultaneous, and the troops mi.ved off together till they came into the trendies from which they were to issue forth to attack the dark wall of" earth serrated with embrasures before them. These embrasures were only too well filled. The fire which w- opened on Sunday morning preliminary to the assault was marker! with great energy, weight, and destructiveness. In the first relief, the Qtany Battery, commanded l >y Major Sirange, tiitew no ltrss* than 300 8 inch glieils into the Redan, which is only 400 yards

distant, and the place must have been nearly cleared by the incessant storm of iron splinters which flew through if. So near are the works that fragments of our 13 inch shells fly back from the Redan into the Quarry Battery, and on s ime occasions our men have been injured by the splinters of their own shells, which have radiated from the inside of the Russian batteries. Throughout Sunday our artillery fired 12,000 rounds of the heaviest ordnance into the enemy's lines, and on the following day we fired 11,946 rounds of shot and shell. The Russian fire was weak and wild. Although they fired a good deal, they kept irany pieces masked, and one six gun and one .eight gun bi.ttery on the flanks of the Redan were silent, and were left comparatively unnoticed by our artillerymen. The only damage they did by all their fire throughout the whole of Sunday was the demolition of the wheel of a gun carnage. Had the three hours' cannonade and bombardment which Lord Raglan decided on administering to the Russian batteries before we assaulted been delivered to them, it is very probable that we should have found but a small body of troops prepared to receive us at (he parapets; and it must be esteemed a very unfortunate circumstance that his Lordship was induced to abandon bis intention in deference to the wishes of General Pelissier. General Pelissier, in requesting the English General to change the original plan of attack and to forestall the hour which was at first agreed upon, is not stated to have assigned any specific reason for the alteration, but it is reported that he wished to anticipate the enemy, who were about, as he was informed, to make an assault on the Mamelon. He felt, too, that the masses of French whom he had prepared could not be concealed from the Russians for any length of time, and that they would soon be revealed by the noise which always attends t«e movements of large bodies of men. It would, indeed, have been impossible to conceal the fact of the accumulation of so many battalions close to the Malaklioff, and t'teir presence would have been indicated certainly assoon as dawn, and probably earlier. The Russian column which is said to have issued from Malaknff just before our assault, to attack the Mamelon, was certainly so small that it was, according to some, merely intended as a feint to draw out the French and lead them to the assault, for which the enemy were only too well prepared. A deserter who came in yesterday (Tuesday) has declared that the garrison have been expecting an attack ever since the termination of the third bombardment, and that the allies got the Quarries and the lVlamelon, because the bulk of the Russians were concentrated in the Redan and Malakhoff, which they thought we should attack as soon as we had seized these outlying works. Heavy columns of infantry have been marched up every night, according to his statement, to the rear of "the batteries as soon as our fire ceases and are withdrawn soon after daybreak. As the 34th Regiment advanced, the supports, by some means or another, got mixed together with them, and some confusion arose in consequence. On crossing the trench our men, instead of coming upon the open in a firm body, were broken into twos and threes. This arose from the want of a temporary step above the beam, which would have enabled the troops to cross the parapet with regularity; instead of which they had to scramble over it as well as they could ; and, as the top of the trench is of unequal height and form, their line was quite broken. The moment they came out from the trench the c: e:ny began to direct on their whole front a deliberate and well aimed milraille, wbicli increased the want of order and unsteadiness caused by the mode of their advance. Poor Colonel Yea saw the consequences too clearly. Having in vain tried to obviate the evil caused by the broken formation and confusion of his men, who were falling fast around him, he exclaimed, " This will never do ! where's the bugler to call them back ?" But. alas !at that crititical moment no bugler could be found. The gallant old soldier, by voice and gesture, tried to form and compose his men, but the thunder of the enemy's guns close at hand and the gloom of early dawn frustrated his efforts; and as he rushed along the troubled mass of troops which were herding together under the rush of grape, and endeavoured to get them into order for a rush at tiie batteries, which was better than standing still, or retreating in a panic, a charge of the deadly missile passed, and the noble soldier fell dead in advance of his men, struck at once in head and stomach by grape shot. The signal of our assault was to be given by

the discharge of two service rockets, which were to have been fired when the French got into the Malakhoflf, and the hitter where to have hoisted v flag as a signal of their success. It is cartain that (he French did for ri* short time establish themselves in the Malakhoff, hut they wore soon expelled with loss, and I saw with mine own eyes a large triangular blue and black flag waving from the iMalakhoffall during' the fight. The moment the rockets were fired the 'Light Division rushed out of cover ; in a quarter of an hour tl is infantry Balakluva was over, so far as any chance of success was concerned. The Second Division, seeing that the flank attacks failed, wisely kept under cover, and suffered but a trifling loss. Had they foolishly advanced, we should have to deplore greater and more useless slaughter. The 41st, under Lieutenani Colonel Einan, were to form the assaulting party. Captain Mauleveivr, of the 30ih Regiment, commanded the working party. The 2nd Battalion Royals was to follow the 4lst, and with the 55th was to .form a supporting party, while the 49th and 47th were in reserve, and the 62nd were to furnish men for carrying wool packs and ladders. They were marched off and took ground, guided by Captain Layard, and were formed in the old advanced parallel, next to the Quarry, and remained there till the attack failed. The Fourth Division %vere guided down by their active Quartermaster General, Colonel Wyndliain, and took ground in the trench to the left, but it would seem as if they attacked a little too near the apex of the Redan. Poor Sir John Campbell seems to have displayed a courage amounting to rashness. He sent away Captain Hume and Caplniu Snodgrass, his aide de-camp, just before he rushed out of the trench, as if adverse to bring them into the dangerhe meditated,and fell in the actof cheering on his men. I have in my formeT letter stated the losses of the Fourth Division, and the part they took in the fight, dreadful and useless as it was. The 57th, out of 400 men, had more than a third killed and wounded, and it became evident that the conflict on the left was as hopeless as the right on the right, and in 15 minutes all was ovei. The brigade under Major General Eyre, which was destined to occupy the Cemetery and to carry the Barrack Batteries, consisted of the 9th Regiment, 18th Regiment, 28ih Regiment, 38th Regiment, and 44th Regiment. Four volunteers from each company were selected to form au advanced party, under Major Fielden, of the 44th Regiment, to feel the way and cover the advance. The 18th Royal Irish followed as the storming regiment. The brigade was turned out at 12 o'clock, and proceeded to inarch down the road on the left of the Greenhill battery to the Cemetery, and halted under cover while the necessary dispositions were heiog made for the attack. General Eyre, addressing the 18th, said, " I hope, my men, that this morning you will do something that will make every cabin in Ireland ring again ! " The reply was a loud cheer, which instantly drew upon the men a shower of grape. The skirmishers advanced just as the general attack began, and, with some French on their left, rushed at the Cemetery, which was very feebly defended. They got possession of the place after a slight resistance, wiih small loss, and took some prisoners, but the moment the enemy retreated their bat-, teries opened a heavy fire on the place from the left of the Redan and from the Barrack battery. Four companies of the 18th at once rushed on out of the Cemetry towards the town, and actually succeeded in getting possession of the suburb. Captain Hayman was gallantly leading on his company when he was shot through the knee. Captain Edmoi ds followed, and the men, once established, prepared te defend the houses they occupied. As they drove the Russians out, they were pelted with large stones by the latter on their way up to the battery, which overhangs the suburb. The Russians could not depress their guns sufficiently to five down on our men, but they directed a severe flanking fire on them from an angle of the Redan works. There was nothing for it hut to keep up a vigorous fire from the houses, and to delude the enemy into the belief that the occupiers were more numerous than they were. Meantime the Russians did iheir utmost to blow down the houses with shell and shot, and fired grape incessantly, but the soldiers kept close, though they lost men occasionally, and they were most materially aided by the lire of the regiments in the Cemeiery behind them, which was directed at the Russian embrasures; so that the enemy could not fire down on the houses below. (The conclusion of this Letter will bo given iv our Next.)