SIR CHARLES NAPIER AND "THE TIMES."

Lyttelton Times, Volume V, Issue 300, 15 September 1855, Page 3

SIR CHARLES NAPIER AND "THE TIMES."

Sir Chahxrs Napiek lias published a very telling reply to the strictures of the Government and the press upon his* conduct in the Baltic. We publish the'rcmarks of the "Times," and Sir Charles's reply :— The investigation of the Crimean expedition having been transferred by the House of Commons to a select committee, the discussion of the proceedings of the Baltic fleet offered a ready way of getting over air evening which might otherwise have hung heavy on the hands of a Legislature no longer, as hitherto, bewildered by a multitude of measures, and overwhelmed under the weight of its avocations. Of the exact merits (if the controversy we are not permitted to judge, for the public service does not permit the whole of the facts to be laid before us, but siime things appear to us to be estSW.ished without the least probability of being rendered dubious by any future disclosure, and these we propose to state with as much fairness and as much brevity as we can command. The first, and by far the most important conclusion is, that it would be neither just nor generous in this country to feel or to express dissatisfaction with the performances of the Baltic fleet. Though it has not been thought advisable to bestow on the officers and sailors of this gallant armament the thanks which have been lavished on the Admiral and fleet of the Black Sea, there ate many respects in which its naval campaign may bearcompaiison with that of its more highly-appreciated rival. The officers of the Baltic fleet bad, undoubtedly, to train and discipline the mews of their ships, and have by common consent worked up th;s excellent raw material into most efficient and admirable seamen. They have maintained a strict and complete blockade in conformity with the law of nations, instead of imagining that by stopping-the passage into the Baltic Sea they did all that could be iequired of th»*m. Their campaign is marked by no opisode like the loss of the Tiger, they succeeded in completely demolishing Bomarsund, the projected Sebastopol of the North, they effectually kept the enemy within his ports, and, while the Russian steamers for months passed in and out of Sebastopol at pleasure, Cronstadt and Helsingfors were hermetically sealed. Provided only with large ships, and without the assistance of gunboats and floating batteries, they were unable to approach the shores of that shallow sea and destroy the enemy's towns, but our fleet has preserved to us, to our coasts, and to our trade, all the impunity of peace in the midst of war, and has shown to Europe how little the vaunted naval resources of Russia can avail when the real masters of the ocean enter the lists. Their chief has quarelled with the Admiralty, but we must separate him from those he commands, and only regret that the differences that have arisen should seem for a moment to obscure the services of so many gallant seamen, or have interposed between them and that grateful acknowledgment which they deserve at the hands of their country. As to the case of Sir Charles Napier, it is by no means so easy to express-an opinion, for the 6imple reason that we are not possessed of the data upon which that opinion must be formed. Regarding Sir Charles Napier's services as a whole, and without reference to any correspondence between him and the Admiralty, we have 6aid that we see no reason to be dissatisfied with them ; but the case is by no means so clear when that element is taking into consideration. The Government seem to have been of opinion that after the fall of Bomarsnnd, Sweaborg should have been attacked, and there was not wanting high authorities to support that view. If we the case rightly, Sir C. Napier's objection turned much t more on the lateness of the season and the uncertainty of the weather than on any engineering difficulties. This objection the result does not appear to have fHpported, for the Baltic remained open for three months after the capture of Bomarsund, and the weather, however inclement and disagreeable, was not such as to prevent the prosecution in those waters of ordinary commercial enterprise. It was not by nicely weighing difficulties and forestalling every possible contingency that might occur to baffle and defeat their operations that our great admirals have raised the navy of this country to its present height of excellence and renown. The possibilities they have been in the habit of calculating were those of success, not of failure, and they have striven to make an opportunity rather than sought to

avoid one already made for tliem. Had Nelson reasoned thus, where would have been the glories of the Nile or Copenhagen? Had Lord Exinouth reasoned thus, where would have been the csipture of Algiers ? Had Sir Charles Napier reasoned thus at ihe siege of Acre, a most glorious day would have been lost to our annals. We do not presume to prejudge the case, but, as far as we can understand it from the lips of Sir Charles Napier's own advocates, supposing the enterprise to be otherwise feasible, the mere lateness of the senson does not appear a sufficient objection. But, while speaking with diffidence as lo the meritl? of the matter in controverßy, we can feel no 'difficulty 'whatever as to the course Sir C. Napier has taken'swith the view of vindicating hi* character and redressing his real or supposed ill-treatment. Whatever were the differences between the Admiral and the Admiralty, it is clear that he was neither recalled nor dismissed, that no public charge was made against him, nor anything said or done to injure his reputation. His command had expired, and it was not thought proper to renew it. This is a discretion necessarily vested in the Board of Admiralty, and one which Parliament, if it have the public service at heart, will never venture to interfere with. The widest distinction ought to be taken between recalling an officer from a command, or refusing to renew that trust, and preferring charges against him affecting his personal honour or professional reputation. The latter is public property; the former is, and must be, in the discretion of the Executive. In order to form a judgment on the propriety of a recall, Parliament must have access to numerous confidential documents which the necessities ot war withhold from the knowledge of a popular assembly. It must place itself in the position of the Executive, and call for all the information that Executive possessed. The result of such inquiries can only be that officers found incapable will he continued in employment to the detriment of the public service, unless some specific act sufficient to justify their recall in the public eye can be proved aorainst them. The tendency in this direction is already a great deal too strong. The dread of the responsibility of recalling Generals ->nd Admirals is already far too great for the public good, and the House of Commons will act wisely in doing nothing to augment it. We therefore think that Sir Charles Napier had no case to bring before the House of Commons. But, if we disapprove of bringing such questions before the Legislature at all, what shall we say of the manner in which the defpnee or accusation—we know not which to call it—was conducted ? An Admiral, just returned from a service which is to be renewed in two or three months, by the same men, in the same water, against the same enemy, with the same objects as before, does not hesitate, in order t<> revenue himself on a Ministry from which be thinks he has received unhandsome treatment, to throw himself into the arms of the party to which he is politically opposed, and to place at the disposal of the Opposition a confidential correspondence, the possession of which be owes to the favour of those who are now the objects of his attack. But this is merely a party consideration. The documents with which Sir Charles Napier 'furnished Mr. Matins—and printed extracts from which he distributed with his own hand from beneath the Speaker's gallery to members of the House of Commons —were not his own property, were not his to give or withhold, but were the property of the nation. It is not because Sir Charles Napier feels himself aggrieved by the conduct of the Ministry that he. has a right to publish papers of the most secret and confidential nature, which may cost us, for aught we know, thousands of lives and millions of treasure. Mr. Malms said he would seleot his extracts so a? to do as little injury ax passible to the public service, but what right lias lie or his client to do to the public service any injury at all? The quarrel v between the Admiral and the (government; the nation is no party to the dispute- The interests of the naiion must not be compromised for the sake of private or personal considerations. The case has not. been provided for in our statute-book —it has not been foreseen by our legislators. But, had it been so we cannot doubt that, the law would have treated the wilful and advised publishing,by a public servant,of confidential communications received by him in that capacity, without the assent of the Government by which he is employed, as a. ' heavy offence against public morals and the pub- | lie safety.— Times, March 10.

To the Editor of the Times. Sir, —I have no reason to be dissatisfied with your remarks on the services of the Baltic fleet; you have done them justice, aud I am sure officers and men will be pleased. As to myself, you observe," If we understand the case rightly, Sir Charles Napier's objection turned much more on the lateness of the season and the uncertainty of the weather than on any engineering difficulties." As I feel certain you wish to act fairly and justly, I will furnish yi>u with the means of understanding the case rightly. I send you a chart of Sveaborg and Helsingfors, and a plan of their fortifications, showing the adjacent islands and sunken rocks. Show them to any na?al officer, young or old (and you must know many), and ask him if it is possible in winter to place buoys and beacons on those rocks and shoals; to conduct a fleet alongside the batteries of Sveaborg, having neither gunboats nor mortarboats to cover the approach of the vessels and bouts ; to place the buoys on the sunken rocks, all of which are within range of the enemy's batteries. It will require several days for this operation, and they will he under fire night and clay. The Russians themselves could not navigate these seas without beacons, and they are all removed. During the time the process of buoying wai going on, the fleet must lie at anchor amongst the outer rocks. Imagine to yourself, Sir, a south-west gale, coming on (and in the winter without warning), and judge what would become of your fleet and gun and mortarboats. A great number of the former would b ? driven on the rocks, and the latter would either be swamped or obliged to take refuge in the enemy's harbour. You must not compare such an operation to the prosecution of ordinary commercial enterprises. I served with Sir Sydney Smith on his attempt on Boulogne in November, 1805. He did not weigli difficulties and forestall contingencies, and he lost all his boats, and very nearly lost his ships. Nelson had not those difficulties to contend with either at the Niie or Copenhagen. At the former Itis enemj was at anchor in an open roadstead in August. At Copenhagen, in the month of April, he had a safe harbour to lie in to make his arrangements, no gales of wind could affect either his ships and boats, he could choose his day—as the wise men at the Admiralty told toe to do in the month of October— but I will engage not one of them would have found the day had they been in my place. Lord Exmotuh attacked Algiers in the middle I of the summer, there were neither rocks nor shoals I there. He did not capture it, and I doubt | whether he would have tried it again. At Acre ! the weather wastine and no difficulties, and, bad ! the Egyptians held otlt, notwithstanding the ' explosion, its capture was doubtful, and with a j Russian garrison impossible. I Sir .lames Sanmerez, with a very superior | force, was he.it off at Algesiras, and lost a ship ; I ami Admiral Dundns had no reason to he satisfied with his attack on SebiSt"pol. Will you tell nic why Lord Nelson and Lord Colli tig wood did not attack Toulon or Cadiz ? Neither of them was so strong as Sveaborg or Cronstadt. Why did not Lord Hone. Lord B rid port, and Lord St Vincent attack Bresie, i'Orient, Kochefort, &c. ? Because titer knew they would Inn c ecu defeated. Why did the French admiral and myself refuse to attack Sveaborg? Because we had not means, and because the n;:rrow entrance was blocked up. Had it been opened (even without irunhoats) the allied flags would have been living within the inner roads of Sveaborg. \mt s.iv, Sir. " Sun posing the enterprise to be otherwise favourable,-rthe mere lateness of the season does not appear a sufficient objection." A ship attack on a strong fortress is at till times difficult; add to rhat the intricacy of the navigation, and bad weather, and it becomes impossible. You say. Sir, I have'^no case to bring before the House of Commons. Alv complaint was that the Admiralty had perverted, inteiitiouaHy perverted, my reports, and changed their .whole meaning, and used i'auiruage to drive me U> do what was perfectly impossible, persevering in their perversion notwithstanding :»li uiv explanations. These letters 1 "could not produce without

injury to the service, but they might 'have been examined by a secret committee, who could have reported whether Sir .James* Graham or Sir Charles Napier told the truth. I'll answer for it, Sir James Graham would not like to have his hands uutied, and I tell him the day will come when they will he untied, and he and his hoard will be covered with confusion. I produced no papers, Sir, nor did Mr. Stfalins utter one word that could injure the public service. The list of vessels going to the Baltic, published the other day, will do more harm than all thai was said in the debate. Sir James Graham stated in the house that when I was called upon to specify the ships that were not in a state of discipline I did not do so. This is a subterfuge. [ wrote the following: answer to the question :— "I heir to observe that when I stated that some of the ships of the line were perfectly unfit to go imo action, I alluded to those which had lately arrived from England and had not fired a shot; and ships in that state I considered, and still consider, are unfit to fight; and I beg to remind their Lordships thatthe fleet was newly manned and had only been two months from England, and though every exertion had been made to render them efficient by the officers in command, two months is not enough to organise a fleet. With regard to the detailed rejmrt of the siate and condition of the ships not ha vine accompanied my letter, I beg to observe that I did not conceive the reports 'of inspection suffi ciently satisfactory to "lay before "their Lordships. I waited till I could send a proper report.'' That requires n? comment. Again, alluding to O^enhnrg be said:— " li>ir Charles had adhered to his assertion made early in May, and repeated in July, that bweaborg was unassailable either by sea or land not one ward of doubt with respect to the prudence exercised by him would have fallen from my lips. Now, Sir, in plain English this is downright deception. a . Upon the 30th of May I had seen Sweaborjr. I sent the Admiralty plans of that fortress who tbe accompanying letter: &'• I beg to send you" for the information of their Lqrdships, the plans of Sweabor- and Helsmgfors which appear tome unavailable by sea or. land. , And on the 20th of J RO e and 18th of July I sent my own report., and Admiial Chads, and ofllpie? U lber r7 Ilttle- froin tbe )eP°«of the 25th How then can Sir James with truth say (hat 1 stated in May, and repeated in July' that Sweaborg was unassailable by sea and 1.-fnd ? In May T }, : ,d not seen it, :iJ .d only sent the pans in June and July i sent him detailed plans of attack, which he apnears to have either to hnve lost or forgone*, and he tries to she! c his neglect under what 1 wrote on the 24tl of July, alluding to the troops coming ,„« as follows:-' An attack on Sweaborg is en ire** out of the Question. The rendezvous mus not be Baro bound, as Bomarsund is the most likely g.ace to be auacked." Had there been 30 000 men , instead of 10,000, we should have gone to s>weai)org. o"»e io Sir James goes on to say: " ft appeared to me and my colleagues even upon &c JhcMr,..* of Sir Charles Napfer, that" was p W b.e ( ,f hi, forces were reunited, o make the attack by aiaval means alone." I never shoiwd anything of the sort What I showed in June and July I showed in September, ..euuer more nor less; and this m-.n who considered himself fit to manage Queen's fleet told .the Hou.se of Co.n.S th« he ami his colleagues Jhought it was possible to attach Sweaborg by naval means alone, when a few ueeks before h« thought it require 200 Kunboau and 50, f1 00 men. He stop , c ] the French squadron and PJumridge's sl.i.fs a t Kiel on the 2nd of October, when he heard of the capture of Sevastopol, and on the 9th of October when he heard it was a miserable deception he oountennandMl the order. Why did he do M He had not received my letter disapprovina of his senseless scl^me. It is true he told me'no to attempt it if it was desperate, but th?, waJTo cove,- himself h, the event! «,f disaster His c.M,,plaint agai, Ist vie i,, that I treated ' nsukuig iue Board at the very time the/were

praising- me. I admit that once, and once only, I did write harshly, bm I apologised to Admiral Berkeley for so doing. After the 4th. of October, when T was insulted, T did write strong-letters, hut they were neither insubordinate or turbulent; they were not a bit stronger than a man of spirit Ought to write when hejeh his honour attacked. As.to keeping my flag up under Sir James Graham, no consideration on earth would have induced me to do it. No officer of honour and character is safe in his hands I leave him now before the public, accused by me of wilfully perverting my letters and goading me to risk Her Majesty's fleet. I have been refused redress by the Admiralty and the Prime Minister, and I must trust to the generosity of the people of England till peace enables me to fully state my case. I remain, Sir, your obedient servant, Ciiakles Napier. 18 Albermarle-street, I lth'March.