THE CLOSE OF THE CONFERENCES.

Lyttelton Times, Volume V, Issue 293, 22 August 1855, Page 3

THE CLOSE OF THE CONFERENCES.

(From the Times.) The proceedings of tbe Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers at Vienna have now reached a point which at once removes the uncertainty and destroys the hopes raised at the outset iv the progress of these negociations. We have not, indeed, ourselves at any lime used language in speaking of these transactions which implied the slightest confidence in their successful result; but as long as the negociation itself lasted there was a possibility that the Russian plenipotentiaries might have in reserve some concession to satisfy the just demands of the Allied Powers, or that sortie decisive occurrence at Sebastopol might alter tbe present aspect of affairs. These faint chances of success have both failed. The Conference has now terminated its sittinsfby an adjournment sine die ; the plenipotentiaries have separated with assurances of mutual regret; Lord John Russell and 3VI. Drouyn de Lhuys are already on their way to Loudon and Paris ; and it is probable that a negotiation for peace with Russia will not be resumed until events of a far more decisive character than any which have yet occurred determine tbe issue of tbis great contest. It will, of course, be the duty of Lord John Russell and of theßritish Government to make known to Parliament and to the nation, at the earliest period, the precise nature of tbe terms of peace proposed to the enemy, and the cause of the failure of this negotiation. This course was followed when Lord Malmesbury broke off the negotiation at Lille in 1797; and when Lord Lauderdale relumed from Paris in 1806. Lord Palmerston has, however, already informed the House of Commons that in the final interview of the plenipotentiares on Saturday last Prince Gortscbakoff and M. de Titoff wholly rejected tbe proposal for a limitation of the naval forces of Russia in the Black Sea, and likewise the alternative ofthe neutralization of those waters, nor did they offer any counterproposition to the Conference, although they were expressly invited to do so. This answer brought tbe negotiation to a close. The position of Russia in this negotiation may therefore now be clearly defined. She professed to give her assent to a document based upon th« notes of the Bth of August and the Four Points as the basis of a definitive arrangement, well knowing that the diminution or abatement of her own power in the Black Sea formed an essential part of those terms. The mode in which this abatement of her power in the Black Sea was to be effected depended chiefly on the result of our military and naval operations while the negotiation was going on ; but, as Sebastopol was still untaken, and a part of the Russian fleet undeslioyed, the proposition itself assumed the mildest form ; nothing was said of the destruction of Snbastopol, and the allies professed their willingness to make peace on condition that Russia should no longer maintain in the Black Sea a naval power fatal to the existence of Turkey. Nevertheless, when the Conference arrived at a positive and distinct discussion of this point after a fresh reference to St. Petersburg, the Russian Ministers refused to accept any terms involving either a surrender of territory or a diminution of their own naval power, and they were offered no other expedient for attaining the proposed end, which is to secuie the independence of Turkey These'facts having been stated in Parliament by the first minister of the Crown, the conduct of Russia in the last stage of this negotiation affords us demonstrative evidence Unit she never intended to submit to the diminution of her preponderance in the Black Sea, unless the military events occurring iv the interval should leave her no option ; but as the progress of the siege of Sebastopol has been and still is, undecisive, she would not lend to any arrangement which might give effect to that essential condition. Had the time which lias been spent in these negotiations been employed with vigor by the Allied commanders it is quite possible that the language of the Russian ministers would have undergone a considerable change; but during the inaction ofthe Allied forces in the Crimea the Russians appear to have thought that our demands were not yet justified our success. The effect produced upon the enemy by these discussions is therefore null and void, and we must even doubt whether Russia had acceded with sincerity to any part of. the proposed compromise. It remains for us to consider what will be tbe effect of these conferences aud their termination on

our relations with the other powers of Europe, and especially with Austria. Throughout these discussions at Vjenna, both within and without tbe official Conferences, tbe Austrian Government has not ceased to act in close union, and apparently entire agreement, with the Western powers. The statement that a difference of opinion.arose between these three powers as to the extent of the conditions to be demanded of Russia for tbe limitation of her power in the Black Sea is without foundation, and it is consequently equally incorrect that the Western Powers were called to make, or did make, any further concessions to meet the views of Austria. In fact, the refusal of Russia to treat on this basis was so absolute, that it admitted of no such distinctions of mode or degree. Neither has Austria given the slightest cause for the imputation of entering into a separate arrangement with Russia, from which she is expressly precluded by tbe first article of the treaty ofthe 2nd of December. We shall assume then," until the contrary be proved, that Austria agrees with France and England on the princi pal conditions and securities for the restoration of peace, as she agreed with those powers in the notes of the Bth of August, as she agreed in the treaty of the 2nd of December and the correspondence of that period, and as she agreed in the joint interpretation affixed to those propositions at the outset of these conferences. Indeed, as long as words retain their meaning, there are so many documents in existence recording this assent of Austria in so many forms that there can be no dispute about the matter ; nor has the Cabinet of Vienna shown any disposition, so far as we yet know, to repudiate or recede from these declarations. Indeed, Lord Palmerston expressly stated last night that, the principle laid down by France and England was agreed to by Austria, and unanimously pressed on Russia by the four other powers. If those conditions were essential to the restoration and maintenance of peace eight months ago, they unquestionably are so still, and Austria has not expressed an opinion that peace can safely be obtained on any less broad and solid basis. Thus far, then, and on the ground of policy and principle, Austria has not deviated from the views which have led the Western Powers to take up arms. Is she then prepared, on the failure of these negotiations, to act up to the engagements of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, and peace not being made, to enter at once upon the " effectual means for accomplishing tbe object of that alliance ?" That is the next vital question which can engross tbe attention of Europe, and at the present moment it is by no means decided. As Austria has adhered throughout to the views and proposition of the Western Powers, and as she has already made herself a party to formal treaties with the belligerent States, announcing an irrevocable determination completely to unite her own efforts with theirs, " until their common object is entirely attained" (these are tbe words of tbe treaty with France and England), it is impossible that she should ignore or repudiate these engagements without renouncing her own position in Europe, and acting in direct opposition to a.l the arguments she has herself addressed to Prussia and the other German states To subside into the Prussian system of neutrality, after having followed the opposite line of policy to the very verge of hostilities, would be an act of such supreme inconsistency and absurdity that it must instantly expose the Court of Vienna to all tbe consequences of a moral defeat both in Germany and in Europe. But, on tbe other hand, it is clear that the Ministers of Austria regard with extreme apprehension the dangers and chances of war. They are aware that, they can by no means rely on support from any part of Germany, and that it is not impossible that Prussia should take a selfish advantage of the embarrassments in which Austria might be placed. They cannot hope for the direct military assistance of France or England against Russia, because the whole available force of those States must be directed for the present to the Crimea. Austria has in front of her the four finest corps of the Russian army, amounting, probably, to 250,000 men, operating upon a basis of impregnable fortresses against a frontier which is almost unprotected from Czeruowitz to Olmutz, and unless Austria is supported by her Germanic confederates, whose strategical position completes her own, the result of such a contest might depend on the fate of a battle. These are the considerations which doubtless check the resolution of tbe i Cabinet of Vienna ; and they are materially

aggravated by the want of decisive success on tbe part of tbe Allied armies. But, although the decision of Austria is not yet taken for active war, she must perceive that there is more danger to herself, as well as to Europe, from a protracted war, than from one vigorous and united effort, iv which she would have for her allies tbe most powerful and civilized nations in the world ; and as it is now certain that the Emperor of the French is resolved to proceed to the Crimea for the purpose of giving the full weight of bis authority to the conduct ofthe war, the fame and possibly the existence of her Government is staked on this contest.