THE ROAD THROUGH THE PUTRID SEA.

Lyttelton Times, Volume V, Issue 283, 18 July 1855, Page 3

THE ROAD THROUGH THE PUTRID SEA.

(From the Times.) We can acquaint our readers this morning with a fact which will create no small astonishment, and which will give the public a new insight into the policy of Russia and the contingencies of the war. The Crimea, at present the scene of hostilities, is a peninsula situated at the extreme south of the Russian empire, and connected, as our maps iuform us, with the continental territory by the Isthmus of Perekop. Across this isthmus, as we have hitherto understood, all Russian troops must be marched to the relief of their comrades before Sebastopol, and great stress has naturally been laid upon the expediency of blockading or occupying this important passage. The isthmus itself is but a narrow strip of land, and is traversed by a wall of masonry from sea to sea. The only access to the peninsular is through au arched gateway in this

wall, and thus, as we are informed by a note in one of the best and most recent maps of the country in question, the possession of this fortified line effectually closes the Crimeafagainst ap enemy. Now, at this moment " the enemy" advancing from the north is no other than Russia herself; and if, therefore, the Isthmus of Perekop could be occupied, the Crimea and its fortresses would be at the mercy of the allies on, the single condition .of dealing satisfactorily with the Russians actually in Sebastopol or the vicinity. No further reinforcements could be brought up. The Crimea would be " invested" far more completely than Sebastopol itself, and the whole peninsula, rather than the principal town, would be in a state of siege. Such has beon hitherto the prevailing belief, and various plans have been accordingly suggested for bringing to pass a result so desirable. Turks were to be landed at Perekop and put in possession of the line ; gunboats were to be stationed along the shore ; and, altogether, it was argued that a pass so easy both to occupy and defend might be made our own with great advan I age to the allied cause. Even if we could not absolutely keep out the Russians, we should, at any rate, be accurately informed of their coming, and could certify the strength of each reinforcement, and the time of its approach, for the beuefit of Lord Raglan's army. Why these schemes were never carried out it is unnecessary at present to inquire. What T?e now wish to tell the public is, that they would, one and all, have been perfectly useless, ior that the Russian Government had some time back constructed across the shallows of the Putrid Sea another great military road to the Crimea, so effectually that it is actually the better road of the two, and so quietly that Western Europe never heard a word about the matter. If the reader will take any ordinary map of the Crimea he will see that to the east of the Isthmus of Perekop there extends a species of narrow inland lake, known as the Putrid Sea, which is separated from the Sea of Azoffby a curious dikelike strip of land, running up from the eastern corner of the Crimea, and almost, but not quite, touching the Russian continent at a point called the Straits of Genitsch. It is possible for troops advancing into the Oriirea from the interior of the empire to leave the Isthmus of Perekop in their rear, to march along the coast of the Putrid Sea, to cross the Straits of Genitsch, and then, by toiling along the whole length of the dikelike strip above-men-tioned, called the Isthmus of Araba, to enter the Crimea a £ew miles north of KaflV. This j route was actually taken by a Russian General I in the last century, and it still forms a commercial road between the eastern parts of the Crimea and the continent. Some nine or ten years ago, however, a road was commenced, upon bridges and viaducts, across the Putrid Sea itself, and was completed, we believe, a considerable time before the outbreak of the present war. At what points the communication between the two shores has been effected we cannot precisely say ; but they approach each other so closely in many places, and the whole sea, besides being narrow, is so full of shoals aud shallows, that many facilities tor the undertaking were no doubt discovered. According to the information we have acquired, foundations were probably laid at favourable points of the shoals, and bridges then carried from one point to another, till the communication was complete. The road itself, now that it is finished, is said to be the best road available for the passage of troops and stores from Russia to the Crimea. For troops moving from Odessa we imagine that the Perekop route would be preferable, but for reinforcements arriving from the south-east of the empire and the country of the Cossacks, the route across the shallows would be more convenient. In this case the distance between Simpheropol aud the interior would be much, shortened, and it is not improbable that both routes may have been recently employed when it was desired to surprise the allies with an overwhelming superiority of force suddenly brought up. Altogether, the fact thus tardily disclosed, in the fifth month of our occupation, bears signal and striking testimony both to the preparations of the Russian Government for the contingency of war in the Crimea, and to the amount of knowledge we may yet have to acquire upon this and similar subjects.