RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

Lyttelton Times, Volume III, Issue 147, 29 October 1853, Page 4

RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

(From the Times.)

Whatever may ensue, the people of this country will require', and they have a right to require, full and honest proof that nothing has been left undone by which war could be avoided ; that the Government sedulously abstained from mixing itself up in questions of foreign interest, such as that of the Holy Places, until the general obligations of Europe and out own interests and engagements were proved to be at stake; that even then our interposition was conciliatory, not menacing ; and that we adhered throughout to the explicit declarations given in her Majesty's name at an early period of these transactions. We still hope that a collision may be avoided long enough at least to afford time for a fresh attempt at negociation. But, should all this fail, should all these delays on the part of Russia turn out to be no more than the disguised preparations of a long-conceived and deliberately-executed plan of aggression on the part of the Emperor Nicholas, then, indeed, we do not think so meanly of our countrymen or of the British Parliament as to think that they will not display the same union and determination which has often borne us through far greater trials.

No doubt it would be easy for the Emperor Nicholas even now to accept the guarantees which the Porte gives to its Christian subjects, and to terminate the dispute, if such were his desire. But it is difficult to pass in review the circumstances of this quarrel without arriving at the conclusion that be who thought fit to begin it, will not think fit to end it here or now. The utter insufficiency of the alleged causes of resentment against Turkey, especially after satisfaction had been obtained on the only tangible grievances complained of, suggests that other and deeper motives must be at work. As long as we had reason to believe that the object of Prince MenschikofFs mission was to settle the dispute about the Holy Places, or even to obtain a fresh declaration of immunities to the Christian Churches, these matters lay within the ordinary compass of diplomacy. But the concentration of armies on the frontier, the review at Odessa, the demeanour of the Envoy, and his reception at Constantinople, awakened other suspicions. He seems to have been sent not so much to obtain a treaty as to pick a quarrel. What he seems most to have wanted was a refusal, and to obtain all he asked would probably have been to fail in his enterprise.

There exists at the court of St. Petersburg, in the Russian empire, two parties, which are broadly distinguished by their respective descent from the German or Baltic provinces of the empire, or from the old Muscovite stock. A large proportion of the statesmen who have done honour to the policy of the empire belong to the former class—among them, Prince Lieven, Count Nesselrode, M. de Benkendorf, M. de Mevendorf, Baron Brunow, Baron Krudener, )i id many others. The reigning house of Rus- / * v;js itself divided by only two generations from f its German origin, and the Emperor Alexander never concealed his predilection for men who strengthened his connection with the manners and ideas of Western Europe. The Emperor Nicholas has pursued an opposite course. His policy has been to identify himself with the passions, the peculiarities, the political aspirations, and the religious fanaticism of the Muscovites, and, far more than his ministers, he has adopted the spirit which he chose to represent. His second and favourite son, the Grand Duke Constantine, has espoused the same great national party, with even greater fanaticism and intensity than the Emperor: and in both of them the cause of the Church and of the Empire, finds a champion, and perhaps an instrument. It is certain that the strong ambition of this party, inflamed by religious enthusiasm and the pride of a dominant race, has for years past been directed to the present year as the fourth centenary of the overthrow of the Greek empire, and

to Constantinople as the prize of war; and, whatever may be the intrinsic worthlessness of such mystical associations and prophecies, it will not be denied that they contribute to the feeling which may lead to their fulfilment. In the impassioned judgment of these men, the circular of Count Nesselrode, which has been condemned in the rest of Europe for its illogical temerity, is denounced as a feeble and unworthy declaration of Russian supremacy. War, in the shape in which it is presented to them, is not an invasion, but a crusade; and the question of the Holy Places, combined with a claim to the protection of the Greek Church, are precisely the subjects most calculated to kindle their ardour. If, in an evil hour for the world and for himself, the Emperor Nicholas has roused this spirit, which it is beyond his power to curb and subdue—if, as we have reason to fear, the advance of the army is accompanied with fresh appeals to the pride and daring of the nation, this calamitous and destructive force may break forth and lead to most deplorable consequences. Such passions are as lawless and hostile to the interests of mankind as those revolutionary commotions to which the Emperor Nicholas conceives his policy to be diametrically opposed ; and it matters but little whether the world is threatened by the intemperate proselytism of the French Convention, or by the po.pulav superstitions and barbarous irruptions of the Muscovite race. The triumph of might over right, and force over law, especially when it is assisted by popular excitement, is the essence of political revolution, and, paradoxical as it sounds, the Emperor Nicholas is rapidly becoming the chief enemy of the established order of things in Europe. That is our chief danger, for the revolution which he represents is armed with enormous military forces and directed by absolute power. But, on the other hand, as its ambition is insatiable, this spirit once let loose must sooner or later come into collision with the constituted rights of other nations, and, if Europe remain united and true to her common interests and duties, she has it now in her power to subscribe to Russia those limitations which that empire seems at present so little disposed to

respect.