FALL OF KHARTOUM.

Kumara Times, Issue 2756, 22 July 1885, Page 2

FALL OF KHARTOUM.

SIR C. WILSON EXPLAINS THE DELAY. ♦ The following is the statement. It is dated Korti, 23rd March, 1885 : " The steamers from Khartoum reached Gubat on the 21st January, whilst we were engaged with the euemy afc Metemueh, and I received the letters which General Gordon had sent down between three and four p.m. on that day. lat once determined to proceed to Khartoum, but several considerations led me to delay my start. It may, however, be observed that if I had left on the morning of the 22nd, and travelled at the same rate as I did, I should only have reached Khartoum at mid-day on the 26tbj after it had fallen. The considerations which guided me were:— " Ist. The .military position. The force had been much weakened by its heavy losses on the 17tb and 19th j it was to be still further weakened by ths return of the convoy and its escort to Gakdul, and it was hampered by the large number of wounded. Sir H. Stewart had been severely wounded, and Colonel Burnaby, who was to have commanded at Mefcemneh, had been killed; the horses of the 19th Hussars were so ' done up ' they could not reconoitre any distance from the camp, and the camels also required rest and food. On the 18th we heard that reinforcements for .the enemy were advancing from Omdurman and Berber ; on the 19th we fought the reinforcements from Omdurman, and I had every reason to believe that the report of a force advancing from Berber, which came from the same source as the other, was correct. On the 20th I heard that another force under Fekhi Mustafa was advancing from Omdurman, and a repetition of the report about the Berber force. On the 21st Kbasm El Mus Bey told me he had seen Fekhi Mustafa's force on the march, and that it would reach Gubat before sunset or early on the 22nd. My information thus led me to expect an advance of the enemy from the north and south, and I felt that I con'd not leave the small British force in its position on the Nile without first ascertaining whether it was liable to an immediate attack. I therefore went down the river, on the 22nd, as far as Shendy, to see if any force of the enemy were advancing. . " 2nd. General Gordon, in a most characteristic letter, addressed to the Chief of the Staff or to the Officer Commanding the British advanced guard, insisted strongly on our taking actual command of the steamers, and removing from them all pachas, beys, and men of Turk or Egyptian origin. He wrote in strong terms of the uselessness of these men in action, and begged that if the boats were not manned by British sailors they should be sent back to him with none but Soudanese crews and. soldiers. It was originally intended that the steamers should be manned by the Naval Brigade ; but Lord Charles Beresford was in hospital, unable to walk, and all the other officers of the Brigade, and several of the best petty officers and men, had been killed or wounded. It was therefore impossible to carry out the origiual plan, and though Lord Charles Beresford, in the most gallant way, offered to accompany me, I felt that I could not deprive the force of the ouly naval officer with it, especially as the steamers left behind might be called upon at any time to take part in active operations against thu enemy. It was therefore necessary to select Sonilanosfi officer-*, crows, ami soldiers from the four -.ships, and ro transfer them to Hi" two st'-nnV-ns going to Khartoum This was the chief reason for the delay on the 23rd.

"3rd. I knew that Omdormati was in the hands of the Mahdi, and Khasm El Mus told me that the enemy had several guns mounted on the river bank. I expected, therefore, to have to tight my way up the river with Soudanese crews, in steamers like the penny boats on the Thames, which a single, welldirected shell would disable, and to encounter a very heavy fiie from Omdurtnan -when running into Khartoum.. It was consequently necessary to have the engines orer-hnnled, -and, as far as time would allow, to prepare the steamers for the heavy fire they would have to encounter. In all these preparations I received much advice and assistance from Lord Charles Beresford and aid from his artificers. " N.B.—On ascending the river we found that the gun in the battery near Gandattu had been taken to Shendy the previous day, and that the guns at Wad Habeshi had been taken away by Eeki Mustafa, whose force we saw on the left bank, about twelve miles above the camp. " 4th. I was also aware, from General Gordon's letter of 11th November, 1884, and from the letters sent down by the Bordein on the 14th December, that he expected Khartoum to fall about Christmas day. I was also aware, from the information received before leaving Korti, that provisions were very scarce in the city. I knew that Khartoum must be still holding out, and there was nothing to show that the expected crisis which had been delayed so long would occur within the next few days. I rather hoped that the result of the battle of Abn Klea, which was known to Khasm El Mus the same evening, and must have been known in the Mahdi's camp on the 19tb, and possibly in Khartoum the same day, would have delayed the crisis. Unfortunately, ic appears to have had the opposite effect. The only day which might have been saved was the 22nd, as the reconnaisar.ce showed that the force had nothing to fear from the Berber direction; but I think that if I were again placed in similar circumstances I should act in the same way. From the moment the steamers Started on the morning of the 24th no time was lost. No one can regret the untimely death of General Gordon more than I do, or could have been more anxious to relieve him, but I do not think that any action of mine could have saved his life, or averted the fall of Khartoum."