LORD WOLSELEY ON THE FALL OF KHARTOUM.

Kumara Times, Issue 2726, 17 June 1885, Page 3

LORD WOLSELEY ON THE FALL OF KHARTOUM.

In a despatch to the Marquis of Harrington, dated Korti, February 9, Lord Wolseley says, with regard to the altered situation of affairs :—"I shall not attempt to disguise from your lordship how deeply lhe fall of Khartoum is felt by all ranks in the array under my command. If it be literally true—and it is difficult to disbelieve it—the mission of this force which was the relief of Khartoum, falls to the ground. The strength and composition of this little army was calculated for the relief, not the siege and capture, of Khartoum, the two operations being entirely different in character and magnitude. The former meant one or more engagements in the open with an enemy who, owing to the geographical position of Khartoum, could Dot concentrate bis forces without raising the siege, and who, in order to concentrate, would have had to pass his troops, guns, ammunition, &c, over two unfordable rivers of considerable breadth, in the i face of General Gordon's armed steam- j ers. If he opposed my advance along the right bank of the Nile upon Khartoum, he must have fought in a position where defeat would have been his destruction. I think I may say that, as long as Khartoum hald out, he could not have prevented my entering it, although he might afterwards have awaited my attack in a selected position on the left bank of the White Nile to I lie south or soutb-west of the city. With Khartoum in the enemy's possession, the whole conditions are reversed, and the Mahdi— strengthened by the large number of rifles, guns, ammunition, &c, taken in that place, and by the captured troops, who would certainly fight on his side—conld concentrate an overwhelming force to oppose my advance; and, if defeated, could still fall back upon the city, the siege and capture of which, situated as it is in the fork of two unfordable rivers, would be an impossible operation for this little army under my command, mom especially as it would then be encumbered by a large number of wounded men. As I have already said, the the force under my command was not intended for any operation of that magnitude, nor was such an operation ever contemplated in the instructions I received from her Majesty's Government. Khartoum, in the hands of the enemy, cannot be retaken until the force under my command has been largely augmented in numbers' and in artillery."