BRITAIN’S FIGHTING POWER ON LAND.

Kumara Times, Issue 2666, 7 April 1885, Page 2

BRITAIN’S FIGHTING POWER ON LAND.

[From the Auckland Herald.] An Empire in arms ! Such may be regarded as a befitting description of Britain’s present attitude. By one stroke of the pen the Queen has summoned to military service 156,000 trained men, consisting of the entire Militia force and both classes of the Army Reserve. Among the preparations for emergencies this is undoubtedly the most warlike yet made, as it more than doubles the number of effective soldiers, and wai rants the conclusion that Britain really means to fight. That England can and will beat Russia single-handed, and independent of any allied help which may be available, may be accepted as certain. There still runs in the veins of the British soldiers the same blood which thirty years ago enabled them, under every possible disadvantage, with bold and calm resoluteness, and under every conceivable disadvantage, to confront and overthrow the Czar’s hosts in the Crimea. And not only so, but the appliances by which their courage may lie rendered more effective have been greatly multiplied since then. In the present <vi«is it is important to form an estimate of Britain's fightiug power on laud, and for obvious

reasons it is better in this respect to under-estimate, rather than over-esti-mate, her capacity. At present the number of her trained men under arms may be reckoned at 400,000, exclusive of Volunteers and the Native troops in British pay in India, and, along with her other available forces, may be tabulated thus:— Standing Army ... ... 130,114 Reserves 47,250 Militia 141,982 Yeomanry ... ... ... 14,404 Troops in India 61,591 395,341 Volunteers 249,412 644,753 Native Indian troops in British pay ... ... ... 140,000 To these remain to be added the distinct armies of the native princes, which may safely be relied on in a war with Russia. One native prince has already offered to place the whole of his army, 20,000 strong, at the service of Britain, and the other princes may be confidently expected to follow his example. The contributions from these sources would raise the effective strength of the British army to 1,000,000, and the Afghans, who by this time are aware that their alliance with England is the only guarantee of their independence, would augment this number by 200,000, and more if requisite. Britain would thus be enabled to place in the field a force numerically equal to any which Russia, with the extensive demands made on her vast army for maintenance of her communications, would be able to bring to the front, and with this great advantage to Britain that, while in this conflict she is assailable at only one part of her Empire, Russia is vulnerable in several parts of her wide dominions. There need, therefore, be little doubt of the result even if England were under the necessity of relying on her own resources in her endeavours to arrest the encroachments of Russia.