THE THREATENED INVASION OF INDIA.

Kumara Times, Issue 2660, 17 March 1885, Page 2

THE THREATENED INVASION OF INDIA.

Certain articles entitled "Indian Dangers " lately appeared the St. James's Budget, to warn Englishmen of a state of things more threatening than any that disturbed them. The revelation amounted to this: that, in the judgment of the most authoritative and most responsible servants of the Crown in India, Eussia is preparing for a grand advance upon certain objective points, whence an invasion of India could be made with comparative ease, and probably in the midst of a rebellion. Men who only a little while ago would have smiled at the fear of disaffection ate now of opinion that (to use the language as one of the coolest, shrewdest, and most distinguished of Indian officials) " as events march, it seems quite upon the cards that in a year or two we may be in the thick of a storm to which that of 1857 was a joke." A nd why is an outbreak feared ? Because of another and more imminent clanger—a determinate Eussian advance, in great and well-prepared force, upon the frontiers of India. And then we (St. James Budget) showed that while the design is unquestionable, the means exist, and the opportunity has arrived. The means are obvious from the fact that, even supposing Eussia had to watch the German and Austrian frontiers with 900,000 troops of all arms, she could spare as many as 200,000 men for operations in the direction of India. Of that number no small portion already occupy advantageous points of departure; and, according to a detailed estimate made by a most competent military authority, Eussia can iu from 80 to 100 days advance 95,000 regular troops into positions of the utmost importance, from which we could hardly hope to dislodge her. 95,000 regulars, with at least 100,000 more in teserve; and a horde of "native" troops into the bargain ! As for the opportunity, it is to be found in the coincidence of the following circumstances. To the knowledge of the Eussians, of course, the British Government have made no effective preparation of any kind whatever. The Indian army is much below its nominal strength, and cannot be recruited in anything like an adequate way without the adoption of measures from which our Government have already shrunk so long, as a matter of principle, that the possibilities of attack are far ahead of the possibilities of defence. The British Government and its little army are embarrassed by Egypt and the Soudan, Turkey might have been a formidable diversion against the Czar if England's alliance with her had remained unbrokeu; his Majesty is relieved of all anxiety on that score. The Three Emperor alliance is restored, and Englaud is shut out from the friendship her sagacious rulers rejected with insult; therefore bargaining with the other Emperors is possible now to the Eussian Emperor—possible, if not already settled. And that is not all. Afghanistan is iu the hands of a man who was once a pensioner of the Czar, and whom the Czar can the more certainly buy because he might otherwise upset him by favouring his rival. Then there are Britain's difficulties with the native princes of India—difficulties of which <h:) Russian Government kn-iws much more th in the people of England <l\ A-l, '..-t.lv, il„ Me i s the stir of disc.mieiu iu iuuia; the fegliog that we kaow out star ia failing

before that of Russia; and there is the readiness of the tens of thousands of warlike men in India to rise against us, for that share of the plunder which of course will be well promised; in some cases has been. The same writer goes on to obseive : The way in which Sir Peter Lumsden's mission to Afghanistan has been treated is about as significant as anything in its way could possibly be. Sneaked into Afghan as if its business was to sue for peace from a conqueror, this uofortunnte gentleman's mission has been treated with the most open and deliberate discourtesy. He is there upon the fool's errand of agreeing upon a boundary to the Russian advance: an agreement which we all know would not bind the Russian for a day, if it were agreed upon. But Russia chooses to show that she is in no hurry even to gratify the British Government with a paper understanding which both parties are aware would be worthless the week after it was signed. The officer who was to have met our Envoy started for St. Petersburg only to spend a few weeks with his family, while Sir Peter and his escort were kicking their heels in " winter quarters." It is no accidental insult this—it cannot be; and the question that arises from it is whether the Russian Government is not leaving itself at liberty to send Sir Peter home again without his bit of paper even. One thing we know, that he found Russian troops in actual possession of Afghan territory. He found the Czar's outposts far in advance of any boundary that could be defined without admitting them into Afghanistan itself; in positions which yet more clearly indicate the design of dominating the whole country. Soon afterwards the Russian newspapers came out with that audacious letter of General Soboleff's [from which on the sth inst. we made extracts] —which could not have appeared without official consent. In them the invasion of India was discussed at great length as a comparatively easy task now, especially as the people would naturally take occasion to mutiny. Meantime we hear that certain Russian agents are resident at G'abul by the side of the Ameer, who is the Czar's tool and our pensioner. The writer concludes as follows: "Signal given, and in a few weeks 20,000 men would be in possession of Herat; a few weeks more, and 100,000 Russian regulars, with hordes of Turkomans, would be over the Afghan frontier. While as for our provideut rulers, they are aware that they could oppose such an advance with no more than 10,000 Englishmen and 40,000 Sepoys. This is the total; there would be no reserves."