THE MILITANT POWER OF CHINA.

Kumara Times, Issue 1146, 1 June 1880, Page 4

THE MILITANT POWER OF CHINA.

The Japan Mail of Jan. 24, in an article on the military power of China, says that an analysis of that power, so far as is possible from sources perhaps not wholly untrustworthy, will show approximately the following result:— The population has been estimated at four hundred millions, but it is doubtful whether, after the rebellions and famines of recent years, it is no more than 320 millions. The number of Chinese troops as given by the native authorities is wholly unreliable. In 1823 it was said to have 1,263,000 men ; but subsequent careful inquiries reduced this to 602,000. Even that is probably too high an estimate for it is notoriously the practice of Chinese officers to reduce their commands during eleven months of the year, drawing at tae same time the full pay, Wd' 'only bringing the force up to the proper, standard when, an inspection is feared. Coolies are then armed, and without drill or discipline are placed in the ranks, to be discharged again when the inspection has been held. This was the course pursued when troops were despatched to Formosa to threaten the Japanese, Many men were inveigled on board the troopships under false pretences, and when they discovered the fraud and the danger which they might have to face, jumped overboard and were drowned in Shanghai river. The habit of deception is too deeply imbedded in the mind of the Chinese officer, and too profitable in tself, to be destroyed by simple regulations. But even admitting the number of men in the army to {be more than hal a million, the most that can be taken into consideration as active troops is less than half that unmber; {lor it must not be for gotten that the army is scattered over an area of ten millions square kilometres, and that China posseses no means of transport for troops. That this must remain the case for many years anyone who knows the strength and depth of Feng shni in the Chinese mind will easily believe. Moreover, the annual inundations, which leave only narrow paths for travelling, would cause almost insurmountable difficulties to a defending as well as to invading forces. The original germ of the Chinese army was formed by the Manchu corps—Pah-ki—which was subdivided into two-wings or divisions, of which the odd members formed the left, the even the right. These corps or banners are distinguished by white, blue, red, and yellow triangular flags. They were established between 1601 and 1604, and then numbered 60,000 men. They conquered tne country for the present dynasty. Subsequent emperors added to these eight Manchu banners, eight Tartar ones, with a strength of about 16,840 men. Later on an army of Chinese was added. These added themselves under the flag of the foreign conqueror, and after the complete subjugation of the empire were made vassals of the Tsing or Manchu dynasty. About the year 1643 eight banners, with a strength of 24,000 men, were established from their ranks : and the 24 banners thus formed which exist at the present day, make up what may be called the first army corps, and, together with the garrison of Pekin, of which more will be said hereafter, compose the chief support of the reigning dynasty. All the officers and men of this army corps are supported in various parts of the land at the expense of the Crown, and form the garrisons of the capitals of the 12 provinces. Their children are bound to enter the ranks, but high civil office is open to them by passing the necessary examination. The personal interests of every bannerman, Manchu Tartar, and Chinese alike, are closely dependent on those of the present line of Emperors. Apart from the ordinary distinctions of rank, there are also differences depending on birth among the bannermen. The aristocracy are the socalled Ukiuns, or direct descendants of the Manchu dynasty, and the Kiolos, or descendants of his brother and uncle. Notwithstanding the strict regulations enacted to keep the bannerman apart from the mass of the surrounding population, yet, in course of time, they have adopted the manners, customs, and modes of life of the conquered, and resemble their warlike forefathers in little. They are but .seldom drilled, and when called, assemble with rusty swords, spears, bows’ and other ancient weapons of the most varied description. Their military pay being small, they are allowed to engage in occupations of all kinds. As soldiers they havs long ceased to be of use ; and until the banner corps undergo a complete and radical reorganisation, they can only be regarded in the light of superfluous pensioners of the Government. There is only uncertain information at present as to their strength. It is believed, however, that they are as numerous now as in 1860, when their corporation was regarded as complete. At that time there were 678 Manchu, 221 Tartar, and 266 Chinese companies—the company being on an average 90 men—thus giving a total of 1165 companies, with about 105,000 men including officers. In and around Peking alone there is said to be 60,000 troops • in the Province of Chihli, in which Peking is situated, 40,000 more, chiefly infantry, quartered in 75 garrisons. But these figures are palpably wrong, because in this case there would hardly be any remaining for the other provinces. From the above description it will be seen that this portion of the Chinese army has but little military value; indeed, the moat that can be said of the banner porps is —Multi non multum.