GERMAN CAVALRY.

King Country Chronicle, Volume VIII, Issue 704, 16 September 1914, Page 3

GERMAN CAVALRY.

THEIR FUNCTION IN THE WAR. In view of the important part played by the German cavalry during the fighting in Belgium, it is interesting to read the following extracts from General von Bernhardi's boos on "Gavalry in Future Wars." "Premature advance of the cavalry during mobilisation and concentration can only procure information of little or no importance, for the exist ing railways, the direction of the frontiers, and th 9 peace-time distris bution of the troops reveal all this to the general Btaff beforehand. These, together with the secret service, political conditions obtaining »t the moment, and press intelligence, will enable one to forecast with some degree of precision the general situation. "The decisive purpose only begins when important and possible tasks can be given to the cavalry—i.e., when the main bodies of the enemy become'ready for operations. "Then it becomes our duty to screen not only tb« advance of our own troops and to secure to our infantry the advantages of being able to advance undisturbed, but the climax of all these duites will be reached in the far mora important duty,in the now indispensable task, of securing the widest possible sphere of intelligence. "Whereas, during the period of railway concentration, the front of the enemy was conditioned by the ends of the lines employed in bringing up the troop?, who in turn spread themselves out to utilise the resourcea of the country (hence generally our patrols, if sent out, would come in contact all along the threatened frontipr or the enemy's line of detrainmsnt, with defended villages, etc.), the troops will now be drawn into closer cantonments, or bivouacs, and group ther into clearly-defined masses.

"There will, th«refore, r between separata portions of his army and their lines of advances, spaces unoccupied by troops into which our cavalry can penetrate. The heads and flanks of his columns can now be determined, and the direction in which they are marching, tlus ascertained, becomes of essential importance. "Now is the time when the cavalry must put in its full strength to discover the strength and direction of the enemy's movements, and the fact of this concentration providas the cavalry with the opportunities necessary to solve the problem before it. On the results now obtained, the success of the whole campaign may entirely depend. At this climax secondary consideration must be allowed to distract attention from the principal object. Even fhe desirability of screening the movements of one's o,vn army, in so far aa this duty is not fulfill.d by the reconnaissance itself, must give to the attainment of the principal object in view, which is 'intelligence, not security. "To secure information —i.e., intelconcentration of force. The reconnoitring cavalry must beat their opponents out of the field in order to obtain opportunities for discovering what is going on behind the enemy's protective screen. To accomplish this the cavarly must endeavour to work round the adversary's flanks.and may in consequence have to leave the front of its own army entirely uncovered. "In what concerns the cavalry in the further course of the war, the necessity both of screening and reconnoitring recurs again and again; and in many cases, even after the enemy has been bbaten' r field, these objects will still only be obtained by fighting. Such cases will occur in the duties of screening and security when the enemy still possesses enough offensive power to attempt a reconnaissance with the threat of attack combined, and we ourselves are engaged in a similar manner; also in all such cases in which turning movements entail too much delay or are rendered impossible by the extension of the enemy's front; or, again, whe" the enemy on their part renew offensive operations. "The necessity of breaking through the line of infantry outposts in order to discover the whereabouts of the enemy's principal masses and the direction of their movements will also from time to time arise, and it may become necessary to suppress rapidly the civilian ponulation.

"Further, our cavalry|will b€ called on for attempts against the enemy's communications, the strategical importance of which has been already discussed, and these will be all the more important in cases where the district we are fighting is too poor to supply the enemy's forces, or where operations have assumed a stationary character, as before Fredericksburg, Paris, and Plevna, and it becomes desirble to hinder the use of the railways for the transport of iroops or evacuation of supplies. "Lastly, the cavalry may be called on to occupy wide stretches of country and exploit their resources, to nip in their very inception the formation of fresh bodies of armed defenders, or on the defensive, to secure our own communications or districts against undertakings by flying columns of the enemy. "Such undertakings, particularly when they lead in rear of the enemy's armies, will frequently assume the character of 'raids,' in which the essential purpose is to cover great distances rapidly, often with the sacrifice of forces, to appear suddenly at previously selected positions and atfer completion of one's immediate object to disappear suddenly before the enemy can bring overwhelming numbers against the assailant. "The success of such undertaking will depend, on the one hand, on the rapidity with which the opportunities secured by such surprise are utilised, and, on the other, on the available fighting power, which must suffice to down all oppositon with certainty and speed."