THE MACHINE GUN.

King Country Chronicle, Volume VIII, Issue 704, 16 September 1914, Page 6

THE MACHINE GUN.

A MATTER OF TACTICS All accounts from the war appear to agree on one point—the superiority of the German machine guns. Only one of many references need be quoted, that by the Times' correspondent, to the terrible action at Mons: "The German shrapnel was markedly bad, but the machine guns possessed deadly efficacy, and were numerous." It might he supposed from this that the Germans possess a better machine gun, but this is not the fact. The Germans are armed simply with Maxim guna of a rather heavy tpye, but with mechanism the same as that wf our Maxims. The latest pattern of British Maxim .303 weighs 361b, as compared with the 601b of the original pattern. The German Maxim for cavalry detachments weighs 611b, and its carriage 1101b; for infantry detachments, 381b and carriage 751b. The fighting carriage is a sort of sledge provided with four lßgs, for fire in the highest positions. The sledges can be dragged across country or carried by men stretcher fashion, and sometimes several sledges are coupled and drawn by a horse. The British .infantry Maxim of the latest type weighs—total weight of fighting equipment—B4lb only. All the later infantry machine gun equipments are fur pack transport and have no shields. The French use the Puteaux and Hotchkias guns of 501b and 701b weight in use. Both sides carry machina guns on motors, but apparently the Germans have perfected their system more thoroughly. SECTIONS OR SEPARATE UNITS. The essential difference between the Germans and the Allies as to machine guns, lies in the organisation of this formidable weapon of modern waxfare. Opinions in Europe varied a great deal before the war. Some armies ensure co-operation of machine guns by making the machine gun section an integral part of the infantry regimental organisation. Among these are the British and French Armieß. Each cavarly regiment and each infantry battalion has a section of 2 guns under an officer. Other armies ensure co-operation of the machine gun as an army using them absolutely free of infantry control, on batteries. This is-what the Germans do, and this is what seems to constitute their admitted superiority with the machine gun. The German machine gun units are classed as cavalry "detachments" and infantry "companies." The "detachment" consists of 6 guns and 4 waggons, the vehicles being of a light artillery pattern, drawn by four horses. The "companies" have also 6 guns and 4 waggons, but the equipment ib lighter (two-horse), and the guns are carried on sledges, as already described.

MAIM PURPOSE OP MACHINE" GUNS. The comparison of the two ByEtems inevitably brings up the question of the main purpose of machine guns, which are considered equivalent in fire effect of fifty or sixty rifles apiece and take up the apace in the line equal to that occupied by only two men, and prmaeaa by turns the speed of a mounted man and the freedom of movement of an infantryman. The machine gun forms a mobile reserve of fire. Tho greatest difficulty attending the employment of a reserve of any sort ia the selection of the right moment for its intervention in tho struggle and the experience of manoeuvres of all arms in Germany, where "machine gun detachments" began to be formed in 1902, appears to have been that the machine gun always came into action too late. On tho other hand, the? conditions of cavalry versuß cavalry con-bat were more favourable. Here there was every inducement to augment fire-power without dismounting whole regiments for the purpose. Thus, thanks to machine guns, tho external problem of increasing the fire-power of mounted troops is at last partially solved, «iihl the solution has appealed strongly to armies exceptionally Well armed in cavalry, like the German Army. Tho principal difference between the tactics of the stronger and those of tho weaker cavalry in this matter is that it ia generally advantageous for tho former to act by batteries and for the latter to disperse hia machine guns irregularly by pairs. The Germans are admittedly stronger than the Allies in cavalry, and the use of tho maihino gun in batteries ia obviously of great assistance to them. DIVERGENCE OF DOCTRINE.

It is German tactics as a whole that impnse the "battery" method of using machine guns. A German forco in action possesses little depth, that is, reserves, txcept on the lianke, where the enveloping eltack is intended to he made. Consequently a German commander needs a reserve of fire in a mechanical roncontrated form more than a British or a French commander, and, further, as regards the decisive attack on tho flanks, it iB intended not merely to be sudden, but even more to he powerful and overwhelming. These considerations tend to impose bith the massing and the holding in reserve of machine guns. The French and British doctrine is fundamentally different. Here, whether the guns bo massed or not, there ia rarely any question of using the machine guns as a special reserve. In the decisive attack, and especially at tho culmination of the decisive attack, when concealment had ceased, and power is everything, the machine guns can render tho greateßt service when grouped and boldly handled. Above all, they must reach the captured crest in a few minutes, eo, as to cni«ii tho inevitable offensive return of tho enemy's reserves. The decisive attack, moreover, i 3 not a prearranged affair, as in Germany, but the culmination at u Belected point of gradually increasing pressure relentlessly applied to the enemy at all points. Tho holding attack, as this "prefigure" is called, iB not a mere feint. It is launched and developed as a decisive attack, though not completed as such, aa it lacks the necessary reserve strength. Here, then, the machine guns is best employed in enabling relatively small forces to advance—not to assault — without undue loss, that is, in economising rifles along the non-decisive front. It may bo added that all observers agree and combatants also aB to the tremendous mora! effect produced on the combatants by the unmistakable drumming sound of tht) machino gun, an effect comparable even, at certain stages ofUhe light, to the boom of the artillery itslf. SIR lAN HAMILTON'S OPINION. 2 In conclusion, it is an interesting point to note at the present juncture that Gensral Sir lan Hnmi'ton, whom German critics respect highly as a soldier, holds views on iho employment of machine guns different from those generally held in England and already outlined. Sir lan believes in a modification of the German system, and wishes to see machine guns combined into brigades and used independently, instead of being distributed in pairs among the battalions us at present — the English system described previously. He considers that the present system is unfavourable to training in peace time, while in war machine guns will frequently bo Bfc places where they are useless If they were employed in masses they might produce valuable effect. This was tho fruit of Genera] Hamilton's observations in following the Japanese campaigns in Manchuria, and it seems to be borne out again by the present war.