PRELIMINARY REPORT ON DEFENCES, NEW SOUTH WALKS.

Inangahua Times, Volume IV, Issue 33, 25 June 1877, Page 2

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON DEFENCES, NEW SOUTH WALKS.

The following extracts are »ade from the letter of Sir William Jervois :— Before discussing what means of defence aro required to enable the Aus« stralian Colonies to resist foreign apgressicj, it is necessary to consider the i nature and degree of attack to which they might be subjected. There is no probability of an expedition , on any [extensive scale being despatched against Australia. Jn the improbable event of Great Britain ceasing to hold the 1 command of the seas, such an expedition might be undertaken with a view of subjugating the Colonies, finally annexing them, and instituting some form of t despotic Government. The very existence of the British Empire, however, depends upon her naval supremacy, and the question must obviously be considered on the ' assumption that that supremacy is, as it undoubtedly will be, maintained. In tbo event of Great Britain being , engaged in hostilities with any great 3 maritime power tie eneny would retain the most powerful portion of his fleet ia European waters, or in the Atlantic, foi * the protection of his country or for operations in the immediate neighborhood > of hostilities. If he sent his fleet, or any considerable portion of it on on expedition against the Australian Colonies, a sufficient portion of our Home fleet would in turn be set free to accept it, aud ow squadrons on the Pacific, en the China, the Aus'raHau, and Indian stations might, if necessary, bo concentrated tc oppose it. But, whilst tbo bulk of the enemy's naval forces would be occupied in tbc , immediate scene of nciion in Europe 01 r Auiorica, 1.0 might do doubt despatch out or more c; U'sors to operate cgainst. out ' maritime commerce, or 111:1 ke a descent f upon any of oar colo-iial possusxion ; and 5 tie Auslrnliim Colon'es, owing to tlieir > wealth and prosperity, would, if undc^ . fen-led st certain points, be tempting objects of attack. ' A sqimdron intended for such an ' operation might consist of s moo three 01 1 fouv vessels, one or two of which would probably lie arniourvd, nncl tuight issue £ from the Uimian ports of Yiildivoslok or Petropaulovski, from tlio French port ol • Saigon, from San Francisco, or from - some other quarter. Eluding our 1 cruisers, and appearing suddenly bofore , Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, or in ' Morton Bay, it might capture the raer--1 cliant vessels lying iv tbe harbors, infer--1 cept nny of the numerous vessels convey. 3 ing vuluable shipments of gold, or under j threat of bombardment, or after actually firing into one of tbe large towns, demand r and obtain taynient of many millions of ? money. t Or this object might possibly bo aU tamed by an enemy landing a small force m the vicinity of one of the places ! named, if the configuration of the country were favorable to such a plan, and if steps were not taken to prevent it. It is obvious that an attack upon New South Wales B ean only be madllat some point along the seaboard which forms the eastern seaboard of the Colony. The seaboard extends for a distance of about j 600 nautical miles, and is opes to the Pacific Ocean. |