NOTES ON THE WAR

Hauraki Plains Gazette, Volume 52, Issue 3275, 14 June 1943, Page 7

NOTES ON THE WAR

ZERO HOUR APPROACHES SITE OF THE FIRST BLOW LAND OFFENSIVE IN EUROPE It is quite possible that the next few days may see the zero hour of the beginning of the Allied land offensive in Europe, the air offensive having prepared the way. It is anybody’s guess where the first blow will 'be struck, and commentators are busy all over the world guessing. The position is summed up in a long message from Rugby. The four possibilities envisaged—ltaly, Greece, France (or the Lowlands), and Norway—have already been discussed from time to time in this column.

If a bridgehead could 'be established, at a reasonable military cost, on the Channel coast of France or in Holland or Belgium, a direct invasion from Britain would involve the least complications in convoys, air cover, supply, and transport, complications unavoidable in the three other plans.

But this part of the coast of the European fortress for the very reason of its convenience to the Allies is by far the most heavily fortified and defended by the Axis. Along this coast there is almost literally a “Western Wall,” the difficulties and dangers of which to the Allies were illustrated in the Dieppe landing nearly a year ago.

Though the rear of these coastal positions, the airfields and the various lines of communication connecting them with Axis main bases, have been pounded and “softened” by Allied, air attacks, ■ almost continuous over* a long period, the coastal fringe of fortifications is probably hard enought still—too hard to risk a direct frontal assault.

It would seem therefore more likely that the first blow will be struck on the softer side of the “FestungEuropa” (European fortress) —the Mediterranean side.

At Italy Itself?

It is generally assumed that Sicily and Sardinia will be the first objectives of the Allies based on North Africa, but there is some reason to hazard a guess that the Allies might strike direct at the Italian mainland' itself—a blow at the heart in Rome or, lower down, in the solar plexus at Naples.’

If the Allies landed in the two islands their armies would be divided and they still might have to fight troublesome campaigns just- when time is most precious. And they would be leaving Italy still to be conquered. Whereas a direct attack on Italy,, by-passing Sicily and Sardinia, would not 'be materially a much more difficult job.

Sicily and Sardinia at present would be useful to the ‘ Axis • mainly as forward air bases, with possibly lairs for submarines. The heavy air offensive of the Allies, mainly directed at the Axis airfields and ports in the islands, must b ythis time have almost neutralised them for effective use by the Axis. Allied shipping can freely use the .Sicilian Channel already. Should Germany elect to meet the Allied challenge in the Italian peninsula, it should suit the Allies, because the German forces would run the risk of being bottled up against the Alps, past which communications lie at each end and over the Brenner Pass, subject to Allied air attack. It is extremely doubtful whether the Axis can dispose of sufficient forces to defend every part of the perimeter of the European fortress, including the long line in Russia. An Axis concentration in Italy therefore would tend to- weaken the fronts elsewhere, and permit the use of the Allied armies based in Britain for a landing in France or the Low Countries, or in the Levant for a landing in the Balkan Peninsula.

But an indispensable preliminary to all offensives is a mastery of the air. The Allies have attained this in the ■Central Mediterranean and are approaching it in Western Europe. The issue is still being fought out in Russia in a terrific air battle which seems to be going in favour of the Russians.

Whatever happens one can be sure that the Allies in their War Council at Washington have studied the" whole situation to the last detail and have made their plans and decisions. The.r success in North Africa gives good hope of like achievements in Europe.