WITH THE ANZAC REARGUARD.

Hauraki Plains Gazette, Volume XXXX, Issue 5387, 13 February 1929, Page 1

WITH THE ANZAC REARGUARD.

WITHDRAWAL FROM GALLIPOLI. (By the (ate Lieut.-.CQloncl G E. Andrews, N-Z. Staff Corps). In November, 1915, Fielil-Marsual Lor,d Kitchener visited Gallipoli and inspected the British positions, at Cape Hejll.es, Ari Burpu (Anzac), and Suvla, toy, and it was on that grept soldier’s ajdvice that the British aut/lioritiqs decided/ upon the abandonment of ,the land attack on the Dardanelles and the withdrawal of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Eorce from Gallipoli. Lt was apparent to all on the Peninsula tiiis time that, unless large additional forces could be throwp in, no f urther adivance on a decisive sc,ale could be hoped for. Qn the other‘hand, the position of the landed force witu

reference to the fast approach of winter and iinprovemepits ip the hostile artillery was fast becoming serious. In November, a blizzard had; broken over Gallipoli with great sudi-

denness apd terrific effect. Communication with the ships was, completely cut off for sevejral days, majny small craft and lighters were wrecked, and nearly all the landing Piers smashed to matchwood. The temperature

dropped summer heat to nine

dejgrjeee below freezing; point in a few

hours, and; a heavy snowfall covered

the ground for days. Qasud-lties frpm

sickness were very heajvy, and the

limited hospital accommodation was,

of course, overtaxed, for it was quite impossible to gejt the sick away tothe ships. The Gallipoli winter, we were assured, invariably included a

succession of these blizzards, ap.d the ,water-torn nature of the gullies indicated that these might well be more. Severe than .that already experienced. Further, it was known that the enemy was bringing up heavy modern artillery, which would enablej him tpl attack our beaches, landing places, and the store depoto more effectively than had hitherto been possible. It was, in short, high time to sink senti-: mejnt and be moving if the landed force was not to be; exposed to the risk of utter disaster. It was therefore decided that the Anzac and Suvla positions were to be simultaneously ev®cr uated in the middle of December, and that the force at Helles should be withdrawn later in the sajne month. The dangers of the undertaking were, of course, fully appreciated, and the weather wag anxiously studied. I understand that a heavy casualty list was feared and fully provided, for, but Providence was with us, and) the whole operation was carried out without a ■hitch, and with only sudh minor casualties as would normally have .happened had no such movement been in progress. So unhoped for an immunity was this that first reports were net credited by those who knew thq Peninsula, andi many stories wer,e afterwards in circulation to the effect that the Turks had been bribed tp allow us to depart in peace. The best answer to such absurd rumours will be found in an enemy crjticjsm which 1 have appended to this article. HOW THE LAND WAS HELD. I will epdeavour to narrate what actually hapened at Anzac, In order that the reader may appreciate the position, it is necessary to explain that this sector was held by the Ausr ti’alian and. New Zealand Army Corps, under, the command of General Birdrwood. This corps numbered) 4’5,000, and! the strip of coastrline it held was so narrow that its furthest inland post (the Apex) was only 2000 yards fr.om the sjea. The Turkish trenches were in the ejelsept contact with ours ait many points in the line, and; our position was generally under the direct observation of the enemy, who occupied the higher ground. Communication between thq trenches and the beaches, was practically only by the military tracks formed! in the gullies or “deres,” and embarkation from the beaches was possible only by two narrow piers.

It will thus be seep that an army corps 45,000 strong, cooped up in a narrow' strip of land, with the sea behind! them, and at almost handgrips with an unbeaten foe, waß called upon to disengage secretly, to pass by narrow and devious ways to an open bqach, and 1 there to embark in small vessels by means of piers, which might be swept by fire or wrecked by storms at any moment. A retirement upon a defile is always regarded as one of the most difficult problems of war, and history provides few examples of its successful accomplishment by any considerable body of troops. At Anzac the piers represented a defile of the worst possible character.

In December, 1915, the Australians held l the right of the line right up to and including Walker’s Ttidg.C' The New Zealand Mounted Rifles heji the left in the direction of Hill 60. The New Zealand irifamtry Brigade held an irregular, saliemt betweeri these, the point of which was Apex Post, facing Saro Ba'hr and overlooking the“ Farm.”

(To be' eontinuejii on Friday.)