PLAINS RATE CASE.

Hauraki Plains Gazette, Volume XXXII, Issue 4335, 28 October 1921, Page 3

PLAINS RATE CASE.

COUNCIL V. HEDLEY. JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT. The following is the written judgment in the case, Hauraki Plains County Council v. Joseph William Hedley, of Tahuna, which w,as reserved after being heard at Paeroa.

Mr E. Walton (Ngatea) appeared for the Council, and Mr E. McGregor (Morrinsville) fpr defendant.

"This .action is brought t.p recover the sum of £23 Is 9d from the defendant fpr rates and arrears of rate’ in respect of a number of blocks of land within the jurisdi’/Mi? of the plaintiff county council. “By the Hauraki Plains, Thames, O.hinemurj, and Piako Counties Act, 1919, which came into force on the Ist day of April, 1920, the Hauraki Plains County is constituted a new county, and upon the coming into force of'the said Act a fresh valuation roll was supplied tc the plaintiff County Council by the Valuation partmenlt in terms of sub section d of section 27 of the Valuation of Land Act, 1908. The plaintiff Council advertised its intention to make such rate in June, 1920. The rates were, struck on July 21, 192’). On October 8, 1920, the Collector of Rates, who is also the County Clerk, sent to the defendant a rate demand in respect of these lands, and at the same time wrote a letter .to him with regard to certain alleged arrears of rates. The demand stated (the date when the rates were struck, and that the rates were for the period from April. 1, 1920, to March 31, 1921. Tim demand bore a rubber date stamp ‘Bth October 1920,” and stated that the rates were payable to the collector oft rates, the county clerk, at the County office at Ngatea within fourteen days.. . The date when the rales were due was set out at the top of the printed form as August 2, 1920. The demand sets out, the valuation of each parcel of land, and the amount of the raites. It was admitted by the County Clerk in his evidence- that the printed form of demand contained the words ‘as occupier and or owner,’ and that it Wfis possible that none of these words had been struck out. It was also admitted that at the time the demland was made the name of the defendant did not appear on the raite book as the owner of all these parcels of land. The particulars contained in the notice of demand were copied out Of the r.ate book.

“The defendant’s evidence is as follows: “‘I am not the owner of any of these blocks, nor have I ever owned any of. them. I was the occupier of these blocks in 1916. I had them only for a very short period in 1916. I took a lease from C. Fair, and gave them up in 1916 or early in 1917. I received only one notice —in 1919. I wrote to the Council telling them the position.’ "The defendant’s solicitor gave evidence that some three years before he had acted for both parties in a sale of a number of these blocks from native owners to certain Europeans; that these transfers, being transfers of native land, had to go before the Native Land Board for confirmation, and that in accordance with the practice of the Board, before confirming such transfers it had been necessary for him to obtain from the then local authority a certificate that rates had been paid on the property, and that he did procure such certificate accordingly ; that there lhad been several dealings in several of the blocks in question since 1916, and that notice was sent to the local authority of at least one of such transfers ; that he had on the date of hearing of this case searched the valuation roll and found that the defendant's name appeared as the occupier of only one of - the blocks in question in this case. . “The evidence of the defendant and his solicitor was not disputed, the plaintiff relying upon the conclusiveness of the Valuation Roll: Valuation of Land Act, 1908; 5.26: Rating Act, 1908, 5.30, sub-section 2 and section 54. Counsel for the plaintiff contended tha.t it was purely a question of law whether the valuation roll, and the r;ate book into which the particulars were copied from the Valuation roll, were to stand. He relied upon the sections of the Acts aboveand also upon section 63 of the Rating Act, 1908.

“To consider, first, section 63. i think it is clear that the provision ‘Every owner or occupier of rateable property who sells or otherwise transfers /the same, or any part thereof, shall, within one month after such sale or transfer, give notice in writing thereof' is directory, and not mandatory: this is clear from the words which follow: ‘and until he give’s such notice he shall remain liable for all rates payable in respect of such property.’ The defendant swears that he. .wrote to the County Council in 1919 telling them the position. Under a strict interpretation of the section it is clear, therefore, that if defendant’s notice of 1919 was sufficient (and this was not and could not he contested) he might then be held to be liable only in respect of rates due at the time such notice was given, and section 71 woufld apply. “Sub-section 2 o$ section 30 00 the Rating Act’, 1908, is similar in terms to section 32 of of 1894, and is as follows : “ ‘The valuation list, so signed, shall be conclusive evidence thereof, and that the same has been made in accordance with the provisions of this Act.’ The section was considered by the Court of Appeal in the case of the Mayor etc., of Auckland v. Speight (16 N.ZL.R. 651), and at p. 659 the following passage occurs in the judgment of His Honour Mr Justice Denniston: ‘A person wrongfully on the roll might reasonably prefer to draw the attention of the Assessment Court to the fact instead of relying oh his right to prove it on being sued for the rate.’

Section 43 of the Rating Act of 1894 is now section 54 of the Rating Act, 1908. and is as follows : ‘The rate book, so signed, with corrections (if any) so initialled, shall be concluevidence in all Courts of the

correctness of the contents thereof without proof of such signatures, and that the same has been duly made.’ “This goes only z to the question of the due observance of .all formalities. As to what is meant by ‘conclusive evidence of its contents’ Milward v. Caffin (2 W..81. 1330) and a long lisc of cases in which it js followed show that very similar words in the English Statute, 43 Eliz. C.2, have been held to conclude the parties only as to such matters as were within the jurisidiction of (the particular Court or body to decide. If, therefore, I am right in the conclusion that, the question of rateabihty of the land; or uf any actual ownership or occupancy are not by the Act referred to the decision of (the Assessment Court, the words of section 43 dp not make the rate book conclusive evidence on either of these points, and they can be raised and determined in the Magistrate’s Court in an action for. rates’ (per Denniston J. in the Mayor, etc., of Auckland v. Speight, 16 N.Z.L.R. 651 at p,- 660). “Although the roll may be conclu"slve evidence of the contents thereof, it cannot be intended that, whilst an owner or occupier is given a right of objecting on the ground of the incorrectness of the rateable value of his property, a man who claims not to be an owner at all is given no opportunity of saying so, though he had received no notice of the rate being made (per Prendergast C. J. in Wairoa County Council v. Bank of New Zealand Estates Co., referred to by Pennefather J. in Mayor, etc., of Auckland v. Speight, supra at p. 667) And in the last mentioned case per Pennefather J. at p. 668 1 : ‘Although an opportunity may be given by the Schedule for a person to object in the Assessment Court on the ground that he is not an occupier, that does not necessarily make it the only place at which such objection may be taken’ ;• (.and later at p. 668) : ‘lf the words of the present Statute positively forbade a reference being in any circumstances made to anything beyond the valuation roll, this Court could only declare that Mr Speight’s name must remain on the list, even though he is rated as manager of a company which does not exist, in respect of unrateable property which he does not occupy.’ “The Walton Park Coal Co. v. Taie'ri County Council (3 N.Z.L.R. 315) is authority for saying that a person may defend on the ground that he is not in occupation. This case was, however, taken under the Act of 1882, and it is instructive to compare the respective sections. Section 21 of the Rating Act, 1882, is as follows: “ ‘The rate book, so signed; with corrections (if any), so initialled, shall, unless the contrary be proved, be evidence in all Courts of the correctness of the contents thereof without proof of such signatures, and that the same has been made according to the provisions of this Act.’ In the Rating Act, 1894, section 43, the words ‘unless the contrary be proved ’ are omitted, and the words ‘shall be conclusive evidence in all Courits of che correctness of the cpnten,*s thereof’ are substituted. Section 54 of the Act of 1908 repeats section 4’3 o r the Act of 1894.

“In Kennedy v. Caversham Road Board (2 N.Z.J.R. N.S. 132) it was skated by His Honour Mr Justice Williams : *1 think the Magistrate w,as wrong in refusing to receive evidence that the appellant was not the owner of t.he property rated. It is (true that, generally, the Magistrate before whom payment of a rate is sought to be enforced, has not jurisdiction to inquire into its validity, 'but must give judgnient/against 'the person rated if only the rate be good on the flace of'it. On this rule, however,, is engrafted the exception that the defendant cap show that he was not the occupier, and that he can do so even though he has appealed against the rate on that ground and his appeal Has been dismissed’ (Milward v.. Gaffin, 2 W. Bi. 1330. It was contended for the defence:

‘‘(1) That t;he rate demand did not comply with section 57 of the Rating Act, 1908 ; that the demand, which was in printed form, contained the words ‘occupier and or owner’’ and that none of these words had been struck out. “(2) That the rate demand did not comply with section 60 of the Act in that it stated that the rate was due on August 2, 1920 ; that it was struck on July 21, 1920, and stated that the rates were for the period from April 1, 1920, to March 31, 1921; that the rate demand bore a date stamp, October 8, 1920, and stated that the rates were payable to .the Collector, tne County Clerk, within fourteen days at the County office at Ngatea. “(3) That the defendant was not the owner or occupier offl these lands or any of them? and had not occupied them for some five or six years, and that there had been several dealings with the lands during that period. The first of these contentions is disposed of by the decision in the case of Anderson v. Mayor, ejtc., of Karon (29 N.Z.L.R. 115), which is directly in poiijt.

As to the second contention, the rate demand meets all the Statutory requirements, and the fact that the rate was stated .therein as due on August 2, 1920, could not mislead defendant. The demand bore the date October 8, 1920, and stated that the rates were payable within fourteen days. In my opinion .the demand is sufficient, and the misdescription is falsa demonstratjo quae non nocct (Anderson v. Mayor, etc., of Karon, Supra). “As regards the third contention, this is established by the evidence called for the defence, whicli was not disputed.

“The grounds upon which the plaintiff principally relied, however, were the conclusiveness of the Valuation Roll and the Rate Book under the sections abovementioned; and the cases of Patangata County Council v. White (31 N.Z.L.R. 999) ; Mayor, etc., of Auckland v. Sneight (supra), and Mayor, etc., of Wanganui v. Stanfor i and Ano'r (6 G.LR. 475) are therefore directly applfic.-ible' and are authorit!es For holding, as I do hold, that the defendant cannot be held liable

for these rates. Judgment for defendant with solicitor’s fee, £2 12s, and witnesses’ expenses, 255.”